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LAND REFORM IN UGANDA: HARMONISING THE LAND 
TENURE SYSTEMS OF UGANDA, 1900 - 2003 
By 
Nasani Batungi 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to suggest a model by which the existing diverse and 
complex land tenure systems of Uganda could be harmonised into a formal land 
tenure structure that is simple, easily managed by the land registry officials, focused 
on the local level and readily understood by the community. Moreover, it would be 
regulated by official property laws. 
The literature review established that there are three options which could be used to 
harmonise customary, informal and statutory tenure systems into a formal tenure 
structure that would generate relevant information for sustainable development. The 
first option advocates both the direct formalisation of customary and informal tenure 
systems and the conversion of any other formal tenure systems into freehold and 
leasehold. The second option encourages legal recognition of informal and customary 
tenure systems such that certificates of occupancy and customary ownership issued to 
landholders have legal power. In other words, state regulated transactions including 
land transfers and mortgages can be carried out using land title certificates issued 
under informal and customary tenure systems. The third option is a compromise 
option where informal and customary tenure systems may be formalised into 
transitional certificates of customary ownership which may later be converted to 
freehold tenure. 
A historical review of Uganda's land administration policies revealed that the colonial 
administration used two approaches to formalise customary tenure: the negotiated 
approach and the legal approach. The negotiated approach was used to formalise 
customary tenure, in the Buganda Kingdom, into a quasi-freehold tenure system, 
which was later called mailo. The quasi-freehold tenure system was called 'mailo' to 
signify the fact that the customary land which was formalised into mailo tenure had 
never been vested in the Crown. However, the customary tenure, which was already 
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vested in the British Crown, was formalised using the legal approach into freehold, 
leasehold, native freehold and adjudicated freehold tenure systems. 
The study established that the theory, which purported that the indigenous people 
were incapable of adapting to Western forms of individual ownership, was a mere 
political statement, intended to reinforce the colonial administration's drive to acquire 
and formalize customary land, previously converted into crown land, into freehold 
titles for non-Africans who were expected to boost Uganda's agricultural economy 
through industrialised farming. 
The study further established that the fear of the Ugandan people to use land titles for 
investment purposes, in other words, to use titles as collateral for obtaining loans or 
mortgages from the bank, primarily reflects their mistrust of the previous 
governments, which made several attempts to take away customary land without the 
people's consent. It would therefore appear that the fear of losing the land titles 
through forfeiture due to non-payment of debts was not a big threat to the customary 
landholders. This was because the capitalist culture never existed in Uganda and the 
introduction of capitalism alongside the formal tenure systems by the colonial 
administration would have been much too late. The study concluded that the people's 
fear to use titles for investment was rooted in two basic factors: the people's 
unfamiliarity with the capitalist system and the mistrust of previous governments who 
grabbed customary land without the people's consent. However, a critical study of the 
land reform of 1995 pointed out that the land reform was intended to restore land to 
the indigenous people and that this explains why all the land was vested in the citizens 
of Uganda in accordance with the land tenure systems provided for in the most recent 
Constitution of 1995 
A statistical approach was used to study the trends and relationships among the five 
formal tenure systems with a view to harmonising them into a simple, formal tenure 
structure, which would be readily understood by the community. The analysis verified 
that freehold, mailo, native freehold, and adjudicated freehold tenure systems 
belonged to the freehold category and that the survey and registration processes were 
significantly the same for all formal tenure systems. All these findings pointed to the 
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fact that the government's decision to adopt freehold as the national formal land 
tenure system is well supported by technical evidence. 
The analysis further suggested that the recommendation of freehold out of the existing 
five formal tenure systems, namely, freehold, mailo, native freehold, adjudicated 
freehold and leasehold and its adoption as the uniform tenure system for Uganda was 
justifiable basing on the probability at 95% confidence level. This position was 
further supported by the findings of a case study of the individualised, informal and 
communal customary tenure systems, which verified that freehold stands a 50-50 
chance of acceptability by most districts of Uganda. The three sample areas for the 
case study were selected in the rural areas of Ntungamo district in the southwest, 
Masaka district in the central and Soroti district in the north of Uganda. 
The study validated the fact that all the land under feudal and non-feudal sedentary 
customary ownership was ready for formalisation since 1900. It was noted, however, 
that some negative tribal sentiments exist and that these are firmly entrenched among 
the communal customary landowners. It was therefore recommended that the 
government should introduce freehold ownership by starting with the individualised 
customary tenure areas where there was no resistance to this move. It was also 
recommended that the government should let the market forces take care of the 
existing informal land tenure relationships on mailo land. 
It was recommended that the government of Uganda should adopt a tenure system 
composed of freehold and leasehold; that it should relocate the ultimate title in the 
state on behalf of the people; and that it should liberalize the doctrine of eminent 
domain. Long-term leases of up to 99 years were recommended because they are 
likely to attract foreign investors into the country. It was further recommended that 
freehold tenure should be implemented through a systematic adjudication and 
demarcation approach. This is because the Uganda government believes that all 
citizens should own their land under freehold tenure. However, in order to implement 
all the above recommendations, the existing statutory tenure laws need to be revised. 
Date: 24 November 2006 
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GLOSSARY 
Adjudication: is the establishment with certainty and finality of what rights 
exist, by whom they are exercised, and to what limitation, if any, they are 
subject. Adjudication does not by itself alter existing rights or create new ones. 
Adjudicated freehold: is the holding, in perpetuity, of registered land carved 
out of the former crown/public land; adjudicated freehold titles exist only in 
the systematic adjudication pilot areas of Ankole, Bugisu and Kigezi. 
Communal customary tenure: is the holding of occupancy rights in a 
specified piece of land, in perpetuity by an individual; both the individual's 
occupancy rights as well as the community obligation to control the allocation 
of land to customary occupiers are recognized. 
Demarcation: means physically marking on the ground the boundaries of the 
parcel to be recorded and surveyed. 
Democratisation: refers to the resolving of the long outstanding issue of de 
facto and de jure tenure rights on registered land. This problem was inherited 
from the colonial administration and it exists on freehold, leasehold, native 
freehold and mailo tenure systems. 
Feudal customary tenure: means the holding of customary land according to 
any of the following tenure systems: clan rights; rights of the King and his 
chiefs; individual hereditary rights; and peasant rights of occupancy. 
Freehold land tenure: means the holding of registered land in perpetuity 
carved out of the former crown/public land. 
Individualised customary tenure: means the holding of a specified piece of 
land in perpetuity where the community recognizes the individual's exclusive 
use rights. 
Informal tenure relationship: means the holding of user rights in a plot of 
land, which belongs to a registered individual or corporate body. 
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Kabaka: is the King of Buganda kingdom. He is also the Chief of the entire 
Clan Heads of the 52 Clans of Buganda kingdom. 
Kibanja: is a parcel of land held under occupancy land rights. It exists on 
formal tenure systems such as mailo, leasehold and freehold or on customary 
land whose ownership is already known. 
Leasehold land tenure: means the holding of registered land for a given 
period from a specified date of commencement, on such terms and conditions 
as may be agreed upon by the lessor and lessee. 
Lukiiko: means the parliament of Buganda kingdom. 
Mailo land tenure: means the holding of registered land in perpetuity carved 
out of customary land that had never been vested in the British Crown. 
Mugaoda: is a citizen and member of one of the 52 clans of Buganda 
kingdom. 
Native freehold tenure: means the holding, in perpetuity, of registered land 
carved out of the former crown/public land; native freehold titles were initially 
allocated to native chiefs of Ankole and Toro districts by the British Crown. 
Ssabataka: is the Chief of all the Clan Heads of the 52 Clans of Buganda 
kingdom. 
Systematic adjudication: is the definition of parcels, the determination of 
rights and interested parties, and their registration; in a methodical manner and 
in orderly sequence, district by district, village by village, bock by block, 
parcel by parcel, throughout the country. 
Territorial customary tenure: means the holding of a territory of land in 
perpetuity, in which access to land resources are governed by a complex 
network of reciprocal bonds within families, lineages and larger social units. 
Under this system the individual and community rights are protected and 
guaranteed as prescribed by custom. As long as those bonds remain, any 
individual or group of individuals can secure access to the resources of the 
community. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
This study focuses on two mam Issues: understanding the four land tenure systems 
recommended under the Uganda Constitution of 1995, namely, mailo, freehold, 
leasehold, and customary; and harmonising, in a participatory approach, all the existing 
land tenure systems into uniform land tenure system, which is simple, easily managed by 
the land registry officials, focused on the local level and readily understood by the 
community. 
Mailo, as defined in section 2 of the Possession of Land Law, 1908, following the 1900 
Uganda Agreement, is the holding of registered land in perpetuity, subject to the 
overriding interests spelt out in article 26 of the 1995 constitution. Mailo land tenure 
permits the separation of ownership of land from the ownership of developments on 
mailo land made by a lawful or bona fide occupant. In other words, the registered 
proprietor of mailo lives with tenants on his land in an informal relationship. Freehold as 
defined in section 3 of the Land Act, 1998 (Cap. 227) is the holding of registered land in 
perpetuity, subject to the overriding interests spelt out in article 26 of the 1995 
Constitution; leasehold tenure is a derivative tenure with fixed duration period and it is 
created either by contract or by operation of law; and customary tenure is a form of 
tenure applying local customary regulation and management to either household or 
communal ownership held in perpetuity. 
The total area of Uganda is approximately 241,138 square kilometres. Freehold, 
leasehold and mailo tenure systems together account for 15%, whereas communal and 
individualised customary tenure systems account for 85% of the total landmass of 
Uganda (Uganda Government 2001: 34). According to Kisamba-Mugerwa (1995: 4), 
individualised customary tenures embrace any situation where the local community 
recognises the individual's exclusive use rights over a specified piece ofland. 
As the Uganda Government continues to mobilize and sensitise its citizens about the 
benefits and the need for an integrated formal land tenure system, the registered mailo 
landowners and communal customary landholders are resisting the introduction of 
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freehold tenure in their respective areas. The registered mailo landowners are not 
convinced that freehold is better than mailo tenure. The communal customary clan 
leaders/elders and elites are opposed to the formalisation of customary land rights 
because they believe that the documentation process will make it easy for foreigners and 
individual members from other tribal communities, which have already attained higher 
levels of economic development to take customary land away from the unsuspecting 
customary landowners who would then become landless (Uganda Government 1992). 
In 1995, the Constituent Assembly resolved that customary tenure be recognized as a 
substantive form of tenure by the government of Uganda and that the customary 
landholders should obtain certificates of ownership to ensure their security of tenure. The 
legal principles which were to ensure security of tenure were captured under article 
237(4)(a) of the 1995 Uganda Constitution, which states, "All Uganda citizens owning 
land under customary tenure may acquire certificates of ownership in a manner 
prescribed by parliament." Because the government land policy requires that customary 
tenure be formalised into freehold, article 237(4)(a) can only provide for a transitional 
tenure system. The Constituent Assembly deliberately accommodated the ownership of 
customary tenure by certificate, by including article 237(4)(b) which states, "Land under 
customary tenure may be converted to freehold land ownership by registration." In this 
way, article 237(4)(b) helped to clarify that a certificate of customary ownership is 
temporary and transitional and that it is inferior to freehold title. 
Citing the lack of qualified cadastral surveyors as one of the main handicaps hindering 
direct formalization of customary tenure into freehold, the parliament resolved that sub-
county Land Committees be set up and charged with the duty of systematically 
adjudicating and demarcating the boundaries of customary plots. Parliament also resolved 
that the boundary corners of the adjudicated and demarcated customary plots should be 
marked with drought-resistant plants. These Land Committees were mandated to prepare 
sketches of customary land parcels, which would then become records against which 
district land boards would issue certificates of customary ownership. 
The parliament further resolved that the sketches should be deposited with the recorders 
at the respective sub-counties. The Land Act, 1998 (Cap. 227) and the corresponding 
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Land Regulations, 2001, are replete with detailed procedures on how the certificates of 
customary ownership should be issued by the district land boards and distributed to 
customary landowners by the recorders. To ensure that the law governing the certificates 
of customary ownership conforms to the Constitution, section 9 of the Land Act, 1998 
(Cap. 227) was enacted to clarify the fact that customary tenure does not change under 
certificate of ownership; customary tenure only changes when it is formalised into 
freehold. 
To date, only limited research has been carried out to inform and guide the harmonisation 
of the existing informal and customary tenure systems into formal ones. According to 
Adoko (1997: 1 ), the recognition of customary tenure under the 1995 Uganda 
Constitution, is not enough; the government has to identify and consider different 
customary land management practices in the country before advocating the introduction 
of the formal land tenure system. For example, in Karamoja, the whole district shares the 
land resource under transhumant pastoralism; in Teso, Acholi and Lango, in contrast, 
customary land is held under a clan system; and in Kigezi, Ankole and Bugisu, customary 
land is held under individual/family ownership. Given such a variety of practices, it is 
clearly necessary to carry out research to identify and quantify all these diverse 
customary tenure practices before taking any steps to formalise them. 
1.1 Background to the study 
Since 1900, a total of four unsuccessful attempts have so far been made to harmonise the 
existing tenure systems into a single formal land tenure system. Sir Harry Johnston made 
the first of these when he concluded a land settlement through negotiations with the 
leadership of the Buganda kingdom in 1900. He integrated clan rights, hereditary rights, 
the rights of the king, his relatives and chiefs, and the peasant rights of occupancy into 
formal land tenure. Johnston had hoped that the formal tenure, which was later called 
'mailo', would be adopted throughout the entire protectorate (West 1964: 8). However, as 
more kingdoms and districts were annexed and added onto the Buganda kingdom, which 
was the nucleus Uganda Protectorate, no attempt was made to extend mailo tenure into 
the new kingdoms and districts; the quest for a single formal land tenure system for the 
entire Uganda protectorate thus remained unresolved. 
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In 1900, the British Empire introduced freehold and leasehold tenure systems in Toro 
kingdom, and later on, to other kingdoms and districts. By a stroke of the pen all 'waste 
and unused' customary lands were converted into crown lands with effect from 1900, and 
the governor, through the land officer, was empowered to alienate the crown lands to 
non-Africans in freehold titles. In 1922, all the fertile customary lands that were occupied 
and cultivated by the local inhabitants were also converted to crown lands and vested in 
the British Crown (Morris and Read 1966: 45). 
The second attempt was launched through the Land Reform Decree, 1975, which 
declared all land to be public land and authorized the Uganda Land Commission to 
administer it in accordance with the Public Lands Act, 1969. The decree abolished mailo 
and freehold tenures and converted them into leases of 99 years for individuals and 199 
years for corporate bodies. The decree sought to address a need, which had been 
recognized in the early 1950's, viz. the need to enact a comprehensive law, which would 
enable and empower the state to enforce good agricultural practices. It also intended to 
resolve the longstanding impasse on mailo land in terms of which the mailo landlord had 
ownership of the land without inducement to invest in it or to improve it, whereas the 
tenant was merely in occupation without the power to develop the land (West 1964: 121-
123). 
Freehold was abolished because the government assumed that it was not suitable for 
Africa. The abolition of freehold moreover enabled the state to hold the reversionary 
interest in the land in trust for the people. However, because the decree was enacted 
without public debate or even prior warning, it failed to achieve its objective. 
Nonetheless, it remained a law in the books until the Land Act, 1998 (Cap. 227) repealed 
it. 
The Agricultural Policy Committee made the third attempt to harmonise the existing 
tenure systems into a single formal land tenure system in 1989. The committee 
commissioned the Makerere Institute of Social Research to carry out studies on land 
tenure and agricultural development in conjunction with the Land Tenure Centre, 
University of Wisconsin. The team carried out studies and field surveys in the districts of 
Luwero, Masaka, Mbale, Mbarara, Bushenyi, Kampala, Tororo, Iganga and Mukono. It 
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prepared a report, which was discussed at several forums before it was submitted to the 
Agricultural Policy Committee in 1989. The report recommended that the Land Reform 
Decree, 1975, be repealed and that a new legislation incorporating freehold tenure 
without any development conditions should be introduced throughout the country 
(Mugambwa 2002(b): 38). 
The fourth attempt was made in 1992 by the Uganda Constitutional Commission, which 
recommended that land, in the long term, should be granted in freehold in rural areas and 
leasehold in urban areas (Uganda Government 1992). The Constituent Assembly, 1995, 
considered the recommendations contained in the Agricultural Policy Committee report, 
1989 together with the Uganda Constitutional Commission report, 1992 (Mugambwa 
2002(b): 42). According to Nsibambi (1996:11), the Constituent Assembly rejected the 
recommendation of the Agricultural Policy Committee on the grounds that it was not 
proper to rely entirely on the legal instrument alone to harmonise the existing tenure 
systems into a formal one. It was, however, appreciated that Uganda must recognize the 
existence of four land tenure systems, namely, customary, freehold, mailo and leasehold. 
The Constituent Assembly further observed that Uganda's differential development could 
not be wiped out overnight. Basing on these observations articles 237(4)(b) and 237(9)(b) 
were enacted in the 1995 Constitution. Article 237(4)(b) recommends that customary 
tenure be converted to freehold by registration, and article 237(9)(b) recommends that 
lawful and bona fide occupants on mailo land should acquire registrable interests. It 
should therefore be noted that, although freehold was not officially declared the single 
formal land tenure for Uganda, it was entrenched in the 1995 Constitution under articles 
237(4)(b) and 237(9)(b). 
According to Nsibambi (1996: 11), who was one of the members of the Constituent 
Assembly, "The Constituent Assembly believed that when the process of capital 
penetration supplemented by greater educational opportunities reaches different comers 
of Uganda, most areas of Uganda are likely to opt for freehold tenure." Despite this noble 
ideal, however, nobody seems to know when and how capital penetration supplemented 
by greater educational opportunities will actually reach these different comers of Uganda. 
Kisamba-Mugerwa (1995: 17) has rightly observed that such "blanket cover policies are 
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often inapplicable. Successful land policies need to be formulated and implemented in a 
more participatory manner." 
It would appear that the Constituent Assembly was persuaded by the fact that freehold is 
a universal formal land tenure system, which is held in perpetuity. Although mailo tenure 
is also a formal type of tenure, which is held in perpetuity and supported by the same 
cadastral and registration systems, it is not completely democratised because it hampers 
agricultural development by permitting the existence of lawful and bona fide occupants 
on mailo land. 
The government of Uganda has made further arrangements to attract territorial (nomadic) 
customary land rights onto the register. In addition to the existing land registration laws, 
which handle individual and corporate land rights, section 15 of the Land Act, 1998 (Cap. 
227) provides for the formation of communal land associations by any group of persons 
for any purpose connected with communal ownership and management of land, whether 
under customary law or otherwise. These associations have to register with the Registrar 
of Titles. According to Nwabueze (1972: 54) such associations are usually not registered 
as a corporate entity in law, but merely "as societies or collection of persons with a 
common interest in land, all of whom are jointly, severally and directly liable for debts 
properly incurred on behalf of the land." Although, as indicated, such associations are 
usually not registered as a corporate entity in law, sections 16-19 of the Land Act, 1998 
(Cap. 227) provide elaborate procedures for conversion of communal associations to 
corporate entities. So far, however, no communal association has either been formed or 
converted into a corporate body. 
As the Agricultural Policy Committee (Uganda Government 1989) observed, 
The most successful land tenure reforms in Africa have been those, which 
recognize how traditional land tenure has evolved over time and attempt to 
guide future evolution by encouraging those changes that are beneficial 
and preventing those changes that would be harmful. 
This study will, while taking into account beneficial land tenure changes, investigate the 
existing informal, formal and customary land tenure systems with a view to harmonising 
them into a single, simplified formal land tenure system. 
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1.2 Research problem 
According to the final results of the 2002 national census of Uganda the population of 
Uganda was 24.4 million; 68% of its citizens relied on small-scale farming; and 88% 
lived in rural settings. The starting point should therefore lie in rationalizing land 
utilization, while also attracting private investment to agro-processing. This is because 
the productivity of land and the social advancement of the people are dependent as much 
upon the evolution of sound systems of land tenure as upon the development of 
agricultural practice (World Bank 2003: 17-22; West 1972: 4). Consequently, there is 
need for a formal land tenure system, which will protect the security of land ownership 
and that of transactions for all those who will be involved in transforming small-scale 
farming into industrialized farming (Fourie 2000(a): 1). This research will therefore, 
propose a solution which will harmonise the problem of diverse and complex land tenure 
systems of Uganda into a freehold and leasehold system. 
According to the Bathurst Declaration (UN-FIG 1999:27) sustainable development needs 
to be underpinned by the relevant information on the relationship between human beings 
and land, including data concerned with customary tenure for indigenous people, 
informal tenure relationships and statutory tenure. Consequently, there are three possible 
options through which customary, informal and statutory tenure systems could generate 
relevant information for sustainable development. The first option requires customary 
and informal tenure systems to be directly formalised into statutory tenure systems such 
as freehold and leasehold. The second option captures the situation where informal and 
customary tenure systems may become legally recognised (World Bank 2003: 4) such 
that certificates of occupancy and customary ownership issued to landholders can be used 
to carry out State regulated transactions such as land transfers and mortgages. The third 
option is a compromise option where informal and customary tenure systems are 
formalised into transitional certificates of customary ownership which may later be 
converted to freehold tenure. 
The Uganda government has been operating the first option where customary tenure is 
directly formalised into freehold and leasehold since 1900. From 1995, the government 
supplemented the first option with the third option where customary tenure is formalised 
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into transitional certificates which may be converted to freehold; and legal procedures 
were enacted in the 1995 Constitution and Land Act, 1998 (Cap 227). It is most likely 
that this third option which, like the first, was designed and introduced abruptly by the 
government without any prior sensitisation and without the participation of customary 
landholders, will meet some resistance from both the public and technical land 
administrators. The study examines both options with a view to harmonising them into a 
legitimate tenure system that can ably support sustainable development in Uganda. 
There are a number of reasons why Uganda needs a harmonised formal tenure system. 
Firstly, four out of the five formal tenure systems (namely mailo, native freehold, 
adjudicated freehold, and freehold) are held in perpetuity. There is no need to operate all 
these formal tenure systems concurrently, when the interest being registered in all of 
these is the same. According to the theory of estates, land tenure systems whose duration 
in time is the same, belong to one category of tenure system (Cheshire and Burn, 2000: 
35). Leasehold, which is the fifth formal tenure system, is a derivative tenure created 
either by contract or by operation of law and therefore it would support any formal tenure 
system that is recommended out of the four tenure system held in perpetuity. Secondly, 
the single formal tenure system is less costly, more efficient and better for the nation than 
the existing anarchical arrangements, which differ from one region to the next. Thirdly, 
different tenure systems were introduced in different localities, and this arrangement has 
helped to entrench negative tribal sentiments, which have proved to be a big hindrance to 
nationalism. As De Soto (2001: 184) has correctly observed, the single formal tenure 
would most likely make the citizens lose their anonymity and become more accountable. 
And this would harmonise the social, cultural and political sentiments among different 
tribes of Uganda towards the national goals which are in favour of democratised private 
landownership and national unity. Fourthly, the formal tenure will be introduced all over 
Uganda through systematic adjudication and demarcation, which is likely to enhance and 
spread the land market throughout the country. Finally, the formal tenure system would 
be quite simple and easy to manage, and it would make land administration and 
development more integrative and universal. 
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1.3 Objectives of the study 
1.3.1 General objectives 
The overall objective of the study is to harmonise, in a participatory manner, the land 
tenure systems of Uganda into a single formal land tenure structure, which is focused on 
the local level and readily understood by the community. 
1.3.2 Specific objectives 
The specific objectives are: 
1) To explore the existing land tenure systems in Uganda. 
2) To integrate the statutory tenure systems into a single formal land tenure system. 
3) To recommend policy interventions that are necessary for the smooth implementation 
of the single formal land tenure structure. 
4) To recommend a suitable approach for implementing formal land tenure. 
1.4 Hypothesis 
The British colonial administration made no effort to administer the national land assets 
as a single unit, and this continued to be so throughout the entire period of its 
administration. As a result, Uganda inherited several formal land tenure systems from the 
British colonial administration. To improve the existing land tenure structure for Uganda 
and to minimize the operational costs, the existing systems need to be harmonised into a 
single formal tenure structure. 
1.5 Research questions 
The study will explore the above hypothesis by means of the following research 
questions: 
1) What are the existing land tenure systems that need to be integrated into a single 
formal tenure system? 
2) What methods can be used to harmonise the existing land tenure systems? 
3) Are the existing informal and customary tenure systems ready to be formalised into 
the formal land tenure system? 
4) Which approach should be used to introduce the formal land tenure system in the 
districts? 
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1.6 Significance of the study 
There are two schools of thought regarding the harmonisation of formal tenure systems. 
One school asserts that Communities or Societies are not always internally coherent or 
consistent in their perceptions, views, values and goals towards their tenure systems and 
land, and in fact are more often divided by factions and contested notions (for various 
reasons, including socio-cultural, economic and political reasons). This school believes 
that it is the inconsistency and incoherency of the communities that complicates the 
search for a harmonized land tenure system; such that the question then becomes whose 
harmony? The other school of thought contends that it is the government's non-
participatory approach that complicates the customary land tenure systems rather than the 
communities or society'S internal incoherency and inconsistency in its perceptions, 
views, values and goals. The study identified the school of thought that applies to the 
Ugandan community. 
According to De Soto (2001: 182), the recommended single formal land tenure system 
should be capable of harmonising all the existing land tenure systems under one formal 
property law, and shifting the legitimacy of all rights of landowners away from the 
politicised context of local communities to the impersonal context of the official law. It 
will also codify all conventions on property, in a participatory manner, into a unified 
property system, under one official law, in order to secure the rights and obligations of 
the people. Because this unified property system will have the consent of the people, the 
land titles that will be issued under the new system, will be legitimate. 
The single formal land tenure system will guarantee ownership by documentary title, 
improve land use by facilitating the movement of land rights among the rural farmers and 
providing a secure basis on which to plan and invest for the future. According to Simpson 
(1976: 8), formal land tenure and the title that expresses it, play an important part in the 
free-enterprise economy. Formal tenure will therefore support and promote the 
management of land resources, including the ownership and management of reserved 
lands, common property resources, individual land use, and planning and development of 
urban areas (Uganda Government 2001: iii). 
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1. 7 Limitations of the study 
Since the hannonised fonnal tenure system is intended to democratise individual private 
ownership, the ideal approach would have been to establish the existing level of 
individualisation in the infonnal and customary tenure systems, district by district, 
throughout the country. Such a project would, however, have been massive and would 
have required financial, technical, manpower and time input beyond the capacity of this 
study. The household baseline survey that was carried out in the initial stages of the 
research was therefore a pilot study to establish whether the objectives of such massive 
project are in fact feasible. The study was therefore limited to three samples taken from 
infonnal relationship areas, individualised customary areas, which embrace any situation 
where the local community recognises the individual's exclusive use rights over a 
specified piece of land, and communal customary areas, which recognize individual 
rights as well as community obligation by virtue of access to such rights. It was not 
necessary to take any sample from the territorial customary tenure areas where access to 
land resources were governed by a complex network of reciprocal bonds within families, 
lineages and larger social units. This was because the data on territorial customary tenure 
was already available and could easily be accessed from an earlier study entitled "The 
impact of individualisation on common grazing land resources in Uganda," which had 
been carried out by Kisamba-Mugerwa in 1995. 
The necessary data for integrating the existing statutory tenure systems into a single 
fonnal system was extracted from the land records files and registers kept in district land 
offices, using a data extraction fonn. The records in the land offices were however found 
to be in disarray (see Figure 4.1). This state of disrepair was attributed to a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the liberation wars of 1979 and 1985 destroyed most of the records in the 
land offices. Secondly, no records clerk has ever attended any upgrading course on 
records handling beyond the induction course that he/she went through immediately after 
recruitment. The records clerks are, at best, messengers employed to carry registry 
documents to the registrars whenever the latter request them, or to store them away after 
the officers no longer require them. The researcher made a concerted effort to sample 
representative records for the purpose of this study. 
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The interview schedule that was used to collect information was only administered to a 
limited number of members of the opposition in parliament, top government land 
administrators and policy makers, and private land developers who had privileged 
information about land tenure systems because of the important positions they hold in 
government and society as a whole. Among them were the Prime Minister and Leader of 
Government Business, members of opposition in Parliament, private land developers, 
Commissioners of Land Registration and of Surveys and Mapping, the Coordinator of the 
on-going Land Tenure Reform Project and a senior principal registrar. The information 
obtained from the leader of government business, members of parliament, private land 
developers and public land administrators helped to verify the information which had 
been obtained by means of the questionnaires and the land records. 
1.8 Organisation of the study 
This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter One introduces the study, stating the 
problem, objectives, hypothesis, research questions, significance, and limitations. Chapter 
Two is the literature review: it discusses the concepts underpinning the formalisation 
process for various customary tenure options; explores the steps that were taken to 
formalize customary tenure systems in the neighbouring East African States of Tanzania 
and Kenya; and articulates the steps taken by the USA to integrate the informal tenure 
into its national formal tenure system. Chapter Three outlines the formalisation of 
customary land tenure in Uganda. Chapter Four discusses the methodology, giving 
comprehensive background information about the areas of study and covering the 
methods of data collection and data analysis. Chapter Five analyses and discusses the 
data acquired through questionnaires, data extraction forms and structured interview 
schedules. Chapter Six summarises the research findings. And lastly, the conclusions and 
recommendations are presented in Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
The literature review is arranged into five sections. Section 2.1 discusses the customary 
tenure formalisation options. Section 2.2 discusses the formalisation of customary tenure 
under the German, British, and independent Tanzania governments. It outlines attempts 
made by the government of Republic of Tanzania to protect customary tenure both from 
the elites in their own country and from foreigners for the benefit of the local population 
of the mainland of Tanzania. Section 2.3 outlines how customary tenure was formalised 
into freehold tenure in Kenya. Section 2.4 outlines how informal tenure was integrated 
into the formal land tenure system of the United States of America. And finally, section 
2.5 outlines the concluding remarks. 
Tanzania and Kenya were selected mainly because, together with Uganda, they form the 
previous territory of British East Africa, whose customary tenure systems were 
formalised using foreign property laws in different ways. The United States of America 
was selected for two reasons: Firstly, it had been under the rule of the British Empire at 
one time, and secondly, it provides a typical example of the integration of informal tenure 
into a formal tenure system. These three countries thus provide instructive lessons in 
terms of how the colonial land policies were interpreted after independence. 
2.1 Customary tenure formalization options 
The Development Economists contend that the defining characteristic of customary 
tenure is that land is owned by the community rather than the individual. That the 
exchanges through sales or rentals are limited to the community and that any permanent 
transfer of land to outsiders formally and definitively ends the customary tenure regime 
(World Bank 2003: 52). Nonetheless, customary systems of land ownership have evolved 
over long periods of time in response to location-specific conditions. This explains why, 
in most African States, the formalization of customary tenure into individualized private 
ownership was not only intended to allow permanent transfer of land to outsiders but also 
to extinguish customary tenure. 
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According to Fitzpatrick (2005: 465), it has been seen that the individualized statutory 
titles in areas subject to customary tenure have generally failed to increase certainty and 
reduce conflict, which are the main targets they were meant to achieve. It would therefore 
appear that while customary tenure arrangements may sometimes be less than ideal in 
social, economic and environmental terms, the fact that they are fundamentally embedded 
in complex social processes means that any attempt to change or replace them may itself 
involve prohibitive costs and risks (Benda-Beckmann, 1995 and Binswanger et aI., 1993 
as quoted by Fitzpatrick, 2005: 453). The issue of prohibitive costs and risks was not 
recognized until late in the 1990s when some African States identified the best practice 
options for the legal recognition of customary tenure. Since then, customary tenure has 
been formalized in its own right as a substantive tenure system. This has led to two 
formalization options: the replacement of customary tenure by freehold tenure and the 
formalization of customary group land rights. 
A third option which is flexible and generally a compromise of the above two options has 
been proposed for Namibia (Gold, 2006). This option tends to recognize that in some 
African countries, the population is divided between the wealthy and the marginalized 
poor. Therefore the flexible option recognizes freehold as the most secure tenure system 
for economic development, and proposes transitional customary starter titles for the 
marginalized poor. The starter titles can be converted into freehold at a later date if the 
owners so wish. The underlying principles that underpin all the three formalization 
options are discussed in the following sections. 
2.1.1 The replacement of customary by freehold tenure option 
According to Henssen (1997: 5), land has three distinct meanings. To a lawyer, it is a 
volume of space from the centre of the earth to the infinite sky (which is referred to as the 
'carrot theory' in legal theory), governed by a variety of rights for determining many 
objectives. To the economist, land is a resource used to achieve economic production and 
development. The World Bank (2003: 22) for instance defined land rights as social 
conventions that regulate the distribution of the benefits that accrue from specific uses of 
a certain piece of land. To other people, who are neither lawyers nor economists, land is 
simply the space for human activity as reflected in the many different forms of land use. 
In 1985, the UN ad hoc group of experts on cadastral surveying and land information 
14 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
T
wn
defined land as an area of the surface of the earth, together with the water, soil, rocks, 
minerals and hydrocarbons beneath or upon it, and the air above it. They also agreed that 
land embraces all things that are related to a fixed area or point on the surface of the 
earth, including the areas covered by water and the sea. 
Simpson (1976: 10) pointed out that dealing in land has been a feature of human society 
for more than 2,500 years. He observed, for example, that it was during the siege of 
Jerusalem in 587 BC that Jeremiah bought his cousin Hanamel's field for seventeen 
shekels of silver. The bible story as recorded in the book of Jeremiah 32: 9-10 reads as 
follows: "I bought the field from Hanamel and weighed out the money to him; the price 
came to seventeen pieces of silver. I signed and sealed the deed, had it witnessed, and 
weighed out the money on scales." This effectively disposes of the idea that land dealing 
is basically a Western concept. 
According to Obol-Ochola (1969: 21-24), customary land tenure refers to traditional 
landholding rights, which are a result of the relationship between indigenous people and 
the land. These land rights are controlled and managed by customary law, which in most 
cases is oral and not written. Therefore, customary tenure is in principle a legal tenure 
system based on customary law. Some communities hold their land under a communal or 
tribal land tenure system where ownership is vested in the ruler either as owner or as 
trustee, while others hold their land under clan land tenure system where the leaders and 
elders are administrators of clan land. The nomadic communities prefer to vest the 
grazing rights in the entire members of the tribe with no specific rights vested in the 
individual. 
Njonjo (2002: 19) observed that the indigenous people consider customary land tenure as 
a medium that defines and binds together social and spiritual relations within and across 
generations. As one Nigerian Chief put it, "land belongs to the vast family of whom 
many are dead, few arc living, and countless members are still unborn" (Lawrence 1966 
as quoted by Njonjo 2002: 19). Njonjo further observed, 
Issues about land ownership and control are as much about the structure of 
social and cultural relations, as they are about access to material 
livelihoods. This is one reason why land tenure in Africa always tends to 
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revolve around the structure and dynamics of lineages and cultural 
communities rather than around strict juridical principles and precepts. 
These strict juridical principles and precepts are mainly associated with the formal tenure 
systems, which were imported wholesale into the colonial territories, whereas the 
structure and dynamics of lineages and cultural communities deals with traditional land 
rights. De Soto (2001: 183) points out that there is a one-way link between the traditional 
land rights and the formal land rights. He gives the example of Eugen Huber, who at the 
tum of the twentieth century successfully adjusted the statutory laws, the customs, rules 
and behaviours throughout the cities, towns and rural areas of Switzerland into one 
codified law. Huber pulled together all the local social contracts in the cities, towns and 
rural areas into one social contract under the codified law, which secured the rights and 
obligations of the people under a formal tenure system. 
Rousseau articulated the concept of social contract as early as 1762, using deductive 
reasoning. The concept of Rousseau's theory of contract, which was published by 
Rousseau (1994: 54-55), was based on the following premises. 
The major premise was: 
Man's strength and freedom are the instruments that preserve him in 
nature. How can he easily commit them to others without harming or 
neglecting himself? 
The minor premise was: 
If man can find an association, which would defend and protect, with the 
whole of its joint strength, the person and the property of each associate, 
and in which each, while uniting himself with all, man may still obey 
himself alone, and remain as free as before. 
And the conclusion was: 
The complete transfer of each associate, with all his rights to the whole 
community would make the union between the associates as perfect as it 
can be and remove the state of nature where each man would have to fend 
for himself. Each man would put his person and all his power in common 
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under the supreme direction of the general will, and all the people as a 
corporate body would receive each member as an indivisible part of the 
whole. The property held under such a social contract would be much 
more secure because it would be legitimised and guaranteed by the public 
authority, which contains an implicit obligation which alone could give 
force to the others, that if anyone refused to obey the general will he 
would be compelled to do so by the community or its representative. 
It would therefore appear that the most significant contribution of the social contract is its 
ability to transform the natural world into a civil society where rights and morals replace 
the instincts in guiding the behaviour of man. For example the rights of the first 
occupancy in respect of a piece of land in the natural world are based on the following 
conditions: Firstly, the land must be uninhabited; secondly, no more must be occupied 
than is needed for subsistence; and thirdly, the possession of the land must be taken by 
work and cultivation, the only mark of ownership that ought, in default of juridical title, 
to be respected by others (Rousseau 1994: 60). The social contract then helps to 
transform each associate with his customary land rights into a civil community controlled 
by moral qualities and justice. And the public authority guarantees the land rights such 
that they become stronger and irrevocable. Justice and moral qualities replace the natural 
instincts of each associate. The physical impulse and appetite are pushed back into 
unconscious mind of man to give room to the sense of duty; and man begins to consult 
his reason before attending to his inclinations. As Rousseau (1994: 59) puts it, "Man's 
faculties become exercised and improved, his ideas amplified, his feelings ennobled and 
his entire soul is raised much higher." 
According to De Soto (2001: 215), occupancy land rights whose natural habitat is the 
physical world, become man's property rights under the formal tenure system whose 
habitat is legal and economic, in the civil society. Therefore the formal land rights, which 
are operated by the state on behalf of the community, are tangible and can be defined by 
lawyers in law statutes. It is the law that detaches and fixes the economic potential of 
assets as a value separate from the material assets themselves. This transformation allows 
human beings to discover and realize the economic potential of their assets. The security 
17 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
C
pe
 To
wn
of ownership, the accountability of owners and the enforceability of transactions must 
ultimately be concretised in procedures and rules drafted by lawyers. 
Under the social contract, the customary trans-generational rights are preserved by the 
laws of succession while land registration laws and cadastre transform customary land 
rights into formal land rights. Therefore, any government eager to create an 
individualised formal tenure system must draw up a careful strategy for dealing with the 
legal profession, because it is the lawyers who will explain to the legal profession in its 
own language, how crucial it is to their own and their nation's future, to integrate all 
property into a unified legal system that is accessible to all the citizens of the country. 
The concepts of land registration and cadastre, and the doctrines of tenure and estate are 
defined in the following sections. 
1) The concept of land registration 
Land registration encompasses specialised branch of laws, which register property rights 
under three land registration systems: private conveyancing, registration of deeds and 
registration of titles. Under private conveyancing, private insurance companies register 
the property rights without recourse to any public records at all; the registration of deeds 
is conducted with the assistance of public record of deeds affecting land; and the 
registration of title registers land or the title itself. The deed, being a document that 
describes an isolated transaction, is registered. In other words, the deed is documentary 
evidence that a particular transaction took place (Henssen 1997: 8). However, the deed is 
not a proof of the legal rights of the involved parties and, consequently, it is not evidence 
of the legality of the transaction (Dale and McLaughlin 1988: 22). Thus, before any 
dealing can be safely effectuated, the ostensible owner must trace his ownership back to 
the good root of title. 
Under the title registration system, however, the legal consequence of the transaction or 
the right itself (the title), which is transferred to a beneficiary, is registered. In essence, 
the right itself together with the names and physical address of the claimant and the 
object of that right with its restrictions and charges are registered. In contrast to the deeds 
system, the title registration system has the positive qualities of speed, simplicity, 
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cheapness in terms of conveyancing, and suitability to the needs of the indigenous 
communities. 
However, any land registration system must satisfy the following four basic legal 
principles (Whalan 1971: 8; Henssen 1997: 7-8): 
1) The booking principle: This means that all transactions must be effected on the 
register. For example a change in real rights on an immovable property, especially by 
means of transfer, is not legally effectuated until the change or the expected right has 
been booked or registered in the land register. 
2) The consent principle: This means that the real entitled person who is booked as 
such in the register is the one to give consent for a change of the inscription in the 
land register. 
3) The principle of pUblicity: This means that the legal registers should be open to 
public inspection. The main advantage of this requirement is that the published facts 
on the register can be upheld by third parties in good faith as being more or less 
correct, so that law can safely protect them. 
4) The principle of specialty: This means that both the registered subject (man) and the 
object (real property) must be unambiguously identified. 
On top of the four legal principles, the title registration system must also satisfy the 
following three additional principles (Whalan 1971: 8; Henssen 1997: 7-8): 
1) The curtain principle: The curtain principle prevents all other persons from selling 
or having any other dealings with the registered land after the date of registration. In 
other words, it is not admissible to look behind the title to investigate previous 
interests, which existed before the land title was made. The only exception to this 
principle is the overriding interests, which are meant to protect public interests. 
2) The guarantee principle: Rightful users and owners are insured against any loss that 
may occur to them through the certificate of title being granted in error or by fraud or 
misrepresentation. Public funds would therefore be drawn upon to make good any 
balance that may not be recovered from the person wrongfully or in error registered 
as owner. Hence, the land title is guaranteed by the state. 
3) The mirror principle: This means that the mapping of the physical asset (land) 
becomes an essential feature of the registration process. In other words, the mapping 
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of the physical size and shape of the parcel of land (subject) into its spatial image 
(object) becomes an essential requirement in the registration process. 
According to Ruoff (1957, quoted by Simpson 1976: 22), the basis of the mirror principle 
is that the register of title is a mirror, which reflects accurately and completely the current 
facts that are material to the title. Apart from overriding interests, the title is free from all 
adverse burdens, rights and qualifications unless they are mentioned in the register. The 
curtain principle makes the register the sole source of infonnation for third parties, so that 
purchasers need not concern themselves with any trusts or equities that do not appear on 
the register. The guarantee or insurance principle referred to above proposes that, in case 
the mirror fails to give an absolute reflection of the title, anyone who thereby suffers a 
loss must be put in the same position, so far as money can do it, as if the reflection were a 
true one. The insurance principle appears to satisfy the expectations of a leasehold 
landowner but fails to satisfY the expectations of a freehold landowner who may prefer 
restitution of title or may not expect to forego ownership without hislher consent. 
2) The concept of cadastre 
One of the objectives of representing the parcel of land in an object fonn is to transfonn 
the physical and immovable parcel of land (asset) into movable property (deed plan), so 
that the registration process can conveniently take place in an office away from the site. 
A map helps to anchor the property aspects of assets in physical reality so as to 
synchronise virtuality and physicality (De Soto 2001). Although the orthogonal 
transfonnation of the shape of the physical parcel of land, through the mapping process, 
onto a cadastral/registry map is detennined to a high level of accuracy under the Torrens 
system, "the boundaries of the surveyed parcel of land are not guaranteed by the state" 
(Simpson, 1976: 137). But the integrity of the fonnalisation system depends on consistent 
application of the highest standards of surveying to ensure that land is indeed reliably 
identified. Surveyors therefore "act on behalf of the client and as an agent of the state to 
ensure the integrity of the land tenure system" (Ristevski and Williamson, 2001). 
The cadastre is a parcel based land infonnation system, usually managed by one or more 
government agencies. A parcel of land is a basic unit with a particular type of land use, or 
an area exclusively controlled by an individual or a group. The flexibility of the 
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definition of a parcel makes it possible to adapt the cadastral system to vanous 
circumstances, for instance to represent the interests of land use in traditional tenure 
systems. Since many different users often need information about land parcels, a cadastre 
also helps to avoid duplication and assists in the efficient exchange of information. Hence 
a cadastre is a public land information system and as such should be managed or 
supervised by government. 
The identification of the person (the subject) and the real property (the object) of land 
registration are determined by the surveyor through a cadastral process. According to 
Henssen (1997: 3), a cadastre is the primary means of providing information about land. 
It provides the names and physical addresses of all those people who have rights in 
parcels of land (Dale 1976: 1), and it gives information about the nature and duration of 
rights, restrictions and responsibilities, which help to define the relationships of human 
beings and land (Kaufmann 1999). Cadastre also provides information about the parcels 
themselves in terms of their location, size, parcel identifiers, improvements, and value. 
The parcel identifier is specifically meant to link the registered property with the 
corresponding mapped parcel of land on the cadastral map. 
Cadastre is basically a system of recording and registering land. It facilitates the 
marketability of land through land transactions, valuation for purposes of taxation, land 
use for purposes of planning, and land ownership by documentary title. According to 
Okec (1970, quoted by Simpson 1976: 111), the government of Uganda was ready to 
introduce proprietary (legal) cadastre in form of well-demarcated and surveyed land units 
throughout the country by the 1970s. 
3) The doctrine of tenure 
In pre-feudal Europe, land was owned absolutely, though subject to custom, by persons 
who were grouped together in village communities (Cheshire and Bum, 2000: 9). The 
feudal era did not only create some chaos and disorganisation but it produced conditions 
in which it was necessary for private persons to procure for themselves a higher degree of 
protection than could be provided by their own unaided efforts. In those days, 
interference with personal freedom or with ownership of property could come from 
several quarters including, revolt of peasants, the arrogance of a powerful neighbour, the 
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extortion of a government, and the hostility of a tribe. The only method of obtaining 
security was mutual support, and so men deliberately subordinated themselves to the 
strong hand of some magnate versed in arts of war, and were compensated for the 
diminution of personal independence and the loss of land ownership by acquiring the 
protection afforded by the forces which the magnate could dispose. Therefore, the 
conversion from individual or communal landownership to tenure system began in the 
lower ranks of society, but quickly spread upwards until it finally embraced the greater 
part of the land of Western Europe. 
Thus the doctrine of tenure encompasses the simple and uniform feudal theory which 
signifies the relation between lord and tenant. In return for the land they occupied, the 
tenants were bound to render services, chiefly of the military nature, to the overlord, 
while the later was bound to protect the tenants. 
Under the English feudalism, every acre of land vested in the Crown (Cheshire and Bum, 
2000: 13). This meant that the landowner, that is, the person who had the right to use and 
abuse the land, to cultivate it or leave it uncultivated, to keep all others off it, held the 
land of the King either directly or indirectly. The indirect ownership was such that tenant 
C held of B who held of A who held of the King. With time the indirect holding of land 
was phased out; such that instead of creating new tenancies, there was the substitution of 
one tenant for another. Since the substitution was extended only to the land held under 
fee simple estate, the largest interest known to the law, the exercise led to the 
disappearance of numerous petty lordships that had arisen between the crown and the 
tenants who were in physical possession of the land. 
4) The doctrine of estate 
The doctrine of tenure as developed in England made it difficult for the tenant or his lord 
to regard themselves as owners of land itself. For example, no tenant could own the land 
because it could be recovered by the lord if the tenurial services were not faithfully 
performed. Similarly, the land could not be owned by the lord, since he would never have 
any claim to it as long as the tenant fulfilled his duties. The English law, in analysing the 
relation of tenant to land, directed its attention not to ownership but to possession, or, as 
it is called in the case of land, seisin. Seisin is the root of title, and it may be said, so far 
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as land is concerned, that there is no law of ownership in England, but only the law of 
possession. Seisin is therefore, an enjoyment of property based upon title, and is not 
essentially distinguishable from land rights. 
The doctrine of estate represents the extent of the right to seisin. Estates vary in size 
according to the time for which they are to endure; and they are classified either as estates 
of freehold or as estates less than freehold. And several different persons may 
simultaneously own distinct and separate estates in the same piece of land. 
The time for which freehold estate owners were entitled to hold the land was not fixed or 
certain. They invariably held the land either for life or for some other space of time 
dependent upon an event that might not happen within the life time. Estates of freehold 
represent real property law in the strict sense of the term, and as such are subject to all the 
consequences of feudal tenure. 
Under the English law, property estates were divided into the following categories: 
• Fee Simple: This is the largest estate in point of duration, for; it is the one granted to 
a man and his heirs. It lasts as long as the person entitled to it for the time being dies 
living an heir, and therefore it may last for ever in the sense that it may never pass to 
the State as longer as there is an heir. The word fee denotes its inheritability and the 
word simple indicates that it is inheritable by general heirs of the owner for the time 
being whether they be ascendants, descendants or collateral. 
• Fee Tail: This is inherited only by specified dependants of the original grantee and 
never to his ascendants or collateral relatives; and it has no perpetual existence. The 
fee tail is granted to A and an heir of his body and therefore, it is less in quantum than 
the fee simple. 
• The Life Estate: This includes an estate which A holds for his own life and also one 
that he holds during the lifetime of B, his second species, being called an estate pur 
autre vie. 
• Leasehold: This is the smallest proprietary interest recognised by the English law. 
Leasehold is not a freehold estate because its duration is certain. It is not considered 
to be real property either. This is because real actions lay for restitution of some 
object and personal actions for the recovery of damages (Cheshire and Bum, 2000: 
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35). Therefore a tenant for years is possessed, not seised, and if dispossessed he could 
originally bring only a personal action for the recovery of damages against the grantor 
of his term. Consequently, leaseholds are personal property which are neither affected 
by the incidents of feudalism nor governed by the same legal rules as freeholds. 
The fee simple which entitles a tenant to use the land for an infinite time is an aggregate 
out of which any number of smaller and simultaneous estates may be carved. The entire 
ownership resides in the person holding the fee simple since he and his successors are 
entitled to use the land for ever. The fee simple can therefore be apportioned among a 
number of persons, each of whom is the present owner of his individual portion. 
Where the concept of ownership is allowed to prevail, the power to create successive 
interests stretching into the future tends to be restricted. But once it is admitted that what 
is owned is an imaginary thing called estate, it immediately becomes possible to frame 
elaborate and subtle schemes for the passing of the beneficial enjoyment of the land to 
one person after another in certain prescribed eventualities (Cheshire and Bum, 2000: 
34). In other words, the concept of estate creates room to deal with ownership in a more 
fanciful way than if it were attached to the soil. And by the virtue of the powers of 
disposition, the fee simple owner may exchange his property for money. 
The land tenure which was introduced in most African Countries was akin to fee simple 
estate and the real property law that came with it falls into the following three divisions 
(Cheshire and Bum, 2000:8): 
• Purely common law system, which was designed to meet the needs of a feudal 
society; 
• An equitable system, which was gradually evolved in certain directions with a view to 
adopting the common law rules to a society moved by different ideals and possessing 
a more commercial outlook on life; and 
• Various legislative enactments by which the judge-made law of the land was rendered 
more adequate to the needs of society. 
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2.1.2 The legal recognition of customary group land rights option 
According to the recent World Bank Policy Review Report (2003: 53) on land policy, 
"customary systems of land tenure have evolved over long periods of time in response to 
location-specific conditions. In many cases they constitute a way of managing land 
relations that is more flexible and more adopted to location-specific conditions than 
would be possible under a more centralised approach." In other words, both the 
customary tenure systems and the centralised statutory tenure systems are poised to play 
complementary roles in sustainable development. The solution seems to lay in 
formalising customary tenure in such a way that it continues to manage location-specific 
land relations. 
Fitzpatrick (2005: 449-450) has established that in the countries where customary tenure 
was formalised in such a way that the internal social processes of the customary groups 
were maintained as much as possible, the State had to identify the nature and causes of 
customary tenure insecurity, before determining the nature and degree of State legal 
intervention. Bearing in mind that the defining characteristic of customary tenure systems 
cherishes traditional property rights or customary group land rights, the State legal 
intervention would then be required to provide: 
• An appropriate process by which the rights of group members can be adjusted to 
changed circumstances; 
• A legal mechanism to regulate dealings or conflicts between outsiders and customary 
groups; and 
• A legal mechanism to regulate matters internal to the group, particularly in relation to 
conflict resolution and the prevention of discrimination. 
The current models of customary tenure argue that, in certain circumstances, communal 
forms of customary tenure are optimal arrangements because they provide tenure security 
to groups at a relatively low cost (World Bank 2003: 53). This assertion is based on the 
conception that traditional property rights are institutions which evolve in response to 
social and economic circumstances (see also World Bank 2003: 9-10). 
Because most customary tenure systems "allow individuals to obtain heritable long-term 
rights through the input of time and effort, and because dealings in land with outsiders 
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tend to develop as the resource value of land increases, no necessary disincentive to 
investment is created by the overarching collective nature of customary tenure" (Platteau 
2000:58). Just as long-term leases can generate substantial investment in western 
economies, so too can traditional usufructuary rights encourage investments that are 
appropriate and available in the circumstances (World Bank 2003: 29, 53). 
According to Fitzpatrick (2005: 450), customary tenure needs to be recognised before it 
is formalised. Some jurisdictions that recognised and formalised customary tenure 
adopted a minimalist approach, in which customary groups were recognised without a 
great deal of intervention in their internal or external affairs. Other systems sought to 
transform the institutions that recognise and manage customary land relations, either by 
empowering traditional leaders or establishing decentralised land boards and/or elected 
village councils. Others again allowed customary groups to incorporate and establish a 
written constitution for the governance of their affairs. These formal customary tenure 
models are discussed below. 
1) Minimalist approach towards the formalisation of customary tenure 
After legal recognition of customary tenure, certain areas are described in registry maps 
as customary land without defining which groups hold what land, and all internal and 
external issues of the customary groups are determined by customary authorities utilising 
customary processes (Fitzpatrick, 2005: 457-8). The State only gets involved in 
establishing and enforcing the external boundaries of customary land. 
This approach supports those customary systems which retained strong internal 
structures. It also allows customary rights to evolve over time in response to population 
changes and economic needs, without undue restriction or imposition by a formal legal 
regime (Fitzpatrick, 2005: 458-9). It would for example, not be appropriate where tenure 
insecurity arises from internal matters of the group, as in cases, where conflicts are 
caused by discriminatory processes or individual dealings with outsiders. However, it is 
most appropriate in relation to indigenous or traditional forest user groups, where the 
issues are not intra-community conflicts or the emergence of a market in land but rather 
cultural survival, resource degradation and encroachment by outsiders including the State 
itself. Examples of this formal customary tenure are found in Ecuador, Columbia, 
Panama and Mozambique. 
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2) The Agency approach towards the formalisation of customary tenure 
Here the State intervention takes the fonn of identifying agents to represent their 
customary groups. This approach was common in a number of British colonies in Africa. 
For example, the Registered Land Act, 1965 for the Federal Territory of Lagos provided 
for family representatives to be appointed in order to enable registration of family land 
(Fitzpatrick, 2005: 459). Bona fide purchasers would deal with family representatives as 
though they were the owners of the land. And any dispute within the family as to the 
dealing would not affect the validity of the dealing itself. The only fonnal obligation 
imposed on the representative was that he or she would sign a statutory declaration 
stating that the family had been consulted and that a majority of its members supported 
the deal. 
In the Solomon Islands, South Pacific, up to five named trustees hold legal title to land on 
behalf of their customary group. These trustees have power to deal in that land subject to 
their signing of statutory declaration that those entitled to a major portion of the 
beneficial interest in the land consented to the deal in question (Lannour, 1986: 11-16). 
The main disadvantage of the agency approach arises from the fact that representatives 
may not always be trusted to act in the interests of their group. This tends to be the case 
particularly when group leaders who are familiar with traditional obligations, based on 
ties of kinship and ritual, are suddenly introduced to external elements such as money or 
fonnal legal authority. In order to minimise these circumstances, tried and tested external 
models for reducing agency risk such as democratic elections or corporate fonn may 
prove to be necessary elements of any legal recognition of customary tenure (Fitzpatrick, 
2005: 460). Because of this agency cost, most sub-Saharan African countries have 
abandoned the agency approach. 
3) The group incorporation approach towards the formalisation of customary 
tenure 
This is the best-known institutional method for reducing agency risks; it allows the 
principals and agents to combine in an incorporated legal entity which may, for example, 
enter into legally secure transactions with outside investors. In Papua New Guinea, the 
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Land Group Incorporation Act, 1974 allows a customary group to incorporate as a formal 
legal entity with the capacity to hold, manage, and deal with land in its own right 
(Fitzpatrick, 2005: 460). 
A similar scheme is found in South Africa where the Communal Property Associations 
Act, 1996 allows traditional land holding groups to incorporate with a view to acquiring, 
holding and managing property in accordance with an agreed written constitution. As 
Fitzpatrick (2005: 461) has rightly observed, any effort to impose different rules and 
processes on customary groups inevitably runs up against a social-legal problem namely, 
the limits of formal law as an instrument of formal policy. To overcome this problem, the 
State usually makes sure that the process of incorporating customary groups introduces as 
little change as possible to the internal processes of the group. 
4) The Land Boards approach towards the formalisation of customary tenure 
The best-known example is Botswana, where authority over traditional land was 
transferred from tribunal chiefs to district and sub-district Land Boards by the Tribunal 
Land Act, 1968 (Fitzpatrick, 2005: 463). Land Boards hold the right and title of the chiefs 
and tribes on trust for the benefit and advantage of the tribesmen of that area and for the 
purpose of promoting economic and social development of all the peoples of Botswana. 
The primary duties of each Land Board are to allocate land within its jurisdiction, 
implement policies for land use and planning, and collect household rents. 
Land Boards in Botswana allocate land for residential, agricultural, grazing, industrial 
and commercial use. Some allocations may be made on application to a local land 
occupier; and the site is demarcated either for the issue of a certificate of customary land 
grant or the grant of a statutory lease (Quan, 2000: 199). Other allocations may also be 
made to outsiders and, where the allocation has a commercial purpose, it will take the 
form of a statutory lease and its holder must pay rent. 
A similar approach is found in Lesotho, where under the Land Act, 1979 non-urban land 
is administered by a large number of decentralised committees (Adams et aI., 2000: 146-
147). The powers of each land committee include land allocations and implementations 
of government land use policies. Thus, a local land occupier can apply for a formal 
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leasehold title which may range in term from thirty to ninety years depending on the type 
of use (Fitzpatrick, 2005: 463). The lease may be transferred, sub-leased and 
encumbered. Even outsiders are also entitled to receive direct grants of leasehold rights 
from the local land committee. 
Similar to the Land Board system, but constituted at Village rather than district and sub-
district levels, are the village land councils of Tanzania. Approximately 11,000 village 
councils have been established under the Village Land Act, 1999 (Fitzpatrick, 2005: 
465). All the council members are elected by village members over eighteen years of age; 
and at least a quarter must be women. Village councils may also grant individualised 
rights of customary occupation that may be bought and sold in certain circumstances. 
2.1.3 The flexible land tenure option 
The flexible land tenure system was designed after a pilot study of four informal 
settlements in Oshakati town, the fourth biggest urban centre situated in the far north of 
Namibia (Gold, 2006). The study which spread over four years (1992-1996) revealed that 
the poor perceive the concept of freehold title as highly desirable. The security of tenure 
and opportunity for collateral which freehold tenure offers were found to be very 
important although they cannot be sustained by the informal settlers and rural poor. This 
is because the poor families with freehold titles would seldom qualify for a bank loan due 
to lack of creditworthiness, no formal employment, and no record of repayments. It was 
therefore realised that the poor do not need freehold titles; they only need security of 
tenure. The pilot study concluded that the suitable land tenure for Namibia must offer 
different levels of tenure at different costs, with the ability to move from one level to the 
other (Christensen, 1997: 74). This arrangement would enable the most marginalized 
sectors of the population acquire access to secure and affordable land rights. 
A range of options for secure land rights were considered by the government of Namibia. 
These included secure land titles for groups as well as individuals and special titles for 
lower income groups which would be upgraded. It was agreed that the upgradeability 
should occur incrementally to the eventual stage of freehold title. For example, a 'starter' 
title, upgradeable to 'landhold' title and finally to freehold title or directly to freehold title 
was recommended for persons living in informal settlements. Similarly, a customary 
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landholder would directly acquire freehold title or a landhold title, which is convertible to 
freehold title. These proposals were turned into the Flexible Land Tenure Bill which is 
scheduled to appear before Parliament in April 2006. 
2.2 Formalisation of customary tenure in Tanzania 
2.2.1 German rule in East Africa 
The first land tenure reform in Tanganyika (Tanzania mainland) occurred during German 
rule, which lasted from 1885 to 1914. The German influence in East Africa began in 
1884 when several local chiefs granted large tracts of land to the German adventurer, Dr. 
Karl Peters, in exchange for a few trinkets in form of glass beads, which they had 
received from him (James 1971: 13). Peters subsequently formed the German East 
African Company and transferred to it all the rights in the lands alienated to him under 
the 1884 grants. Dr. Karl Peters and members of the Society of German Colonization put 
pressure on the German empire until a charter was issued in 1885, which provided for the 
extension of the German protection to all the territory acquired under the agreements. 
According to Malcolm (1953: 110), when the German government assumed sovereignty 
in Tanganyika, "it recognized all existing rights in land, individual as well as tribal, but 
converted all the land to which there was no land title into crown land." James (1971: 14) 
reported that the Imperial Ordinance of 1895 facilitated this land alienation and declared 
all land, except the land already in private ownership or possessed by chiefs or 
indigenous communities, to be un-owned crown land and vested it in the German Empire. 
And that a subsequent Imperial Decree stated the manner of proof of title to land to be by 
producing authenticated documents. In terms of this decree, then, only settlers who 
possessed grants of land from the German administration, or those who had documentary 
evidence of grants from the local chiefs or a public authority had security of title. 
Land alienation therefore occurred in accordance with German law, which applied as a 
general law governing land tenure in the foreign enclave. For example, a common right in 
the grant of agricultural lands was for the lessee to be entitled to buy in freehold, one-half 
of the land for each one-quarter he cultivated; when half of the land was cultivated, he 
was given an absolute right to buy the whole area. This procedure reflected a desire to 
prevent speculation and served to entrench the principle of land utilization. Land, that had 
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systematically proved to be occupied by indigenous residents, was also recognized as 
freehold by the German administration. By the end of the German administration in 
Tanganyika, about 1,300,000 acres of land (about 0.5% of total landmass), on the coast 
and in the northern highlands, were in the hands of settlers (James 1971: 15). This 
alienated land now consists of the most highly developed business, residential and 
commercial properties, and plantation estates, and forms the most valuable land in the 
country. 
2.2.2 British rule in Tanganyika Territory 
Immediately after receiving the mandate from the League of Nations, the British 
administration enacted the Tanganyika Order in Council, 1920, under the Foreign 
Jurisdictions Act, 1890, to provide for the reception of English law. The Order in Council 
vested all rights in or in relation to any public land in Her Majesty. The land rights 
became exercisable by the Governor in trust for Her Majesty in the form of grants or 
leases of public lands. The British administration recognized all existing German land 
titles and made a small number of freehold grants. These grants were intended to give 
effect to contracts or undertakings made by the former German administration or the 
British administration (James 1971: 17). Such grants were either in exchange for a 
German freehold title surrendered to the British administration, or gave effect to certain 
international agreements. For example, the Land Registration Ordinance (Cap. 334) 
provided that any land previously held in absolute ownership, which had been validly 
endowed or dedicated as Wakf under Muslim law, was deemed to be freehold on 
registration. 
In an effort to fulfil its obligation of dealing with the Trust Territories, the British 
administration introduced the Land Tenure Ordinance, 1923, which was based on the 
Native Rights Ordinance of Northern Nigeria. The Ordinance declared all lands, not 
previously acquired by title, whether occupied or unoccupied, to be public lands. Public 
lands and all rights over the same were placed under the control of the Governor of the 
Territory, to be held, used or disposed of on rights of occupancy not exceeding 99 years 
for the benefit of the indigenous people of the Tanzania mainland. 
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In 1928, a right of occupancy was redefined to include the title held by an indigenous 
person or by a native community, lawfully using or occupying land in accordance with 
the customary law (Silayo 1997: 2). Since then, customary land rights have come to be 
called "deemed rights of occupancy" without any term limits. No survey was required to 
map the boundaries of the land parcels held under deemed rights of occupancy. The 
object of this redefinition was to safeguard the title of the indigenous people of Tanzania 
mainland to their lands. Apart from the right of occupancy system, government also 
enacted legislation to control the transfer of property from an indigenous person to a non-
African. Such provisions were intended to prevent voluntary transfers of land by 
indigenous people to the more prosperous immigrants; however, they would not prevent 
the compulsory acquisition of customary land by the government for the benefit of 
immigrants (James 1971: 19). 
While the mandate imposed an obligation on the administering power to safeguard the 
interests and laws of a Trust Territory, the declaration by the British administration of the 
entire Tanzania mainland territory as public lands, with the exception of lands owned by 
settlers, was inconsistent with protecting native laws, custom and local interests. In fact, 
its aim was to protect the land rights of settlers, and to facilitate grants to them. The 
traditional laws were only safeguarded through the implementation of the colonial 
indirect rule policy in local administration. It should be noted that this policy hindered the 
development of a nation state and an integrated modem society, and that it entrenched 
tribal parochialism with a basic dependence on traditional loyalty. Similarly, the effect of 
indirect rule on the land tenure structure was to prevent changes taking place uniformly in 
traditional land tenure and land use. By the end of the British administration in 1961, 
alienated lands in freehold comprised just less than one percent of the total land area. The 
agricultural and pastoral lands alienated on long-term rights of occupancy, in comparison, 
covered about 2,500,000 acres, being one percent of the total landmass (James 1971: 18). 
All lands occupied by the urban centres, whether granted on rights of occupancy or not, 
were deemed alienated lands and were considered by the government to be outside the 
domain of customary law. 
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2.2.3 Post-colonial period on the Tanzania Mainland 
Immediately after Tanganyika's independence in 1961, one of the first priorities of the 
new government was to put in place a land tenure structure. In this attempt the 
government was assisted by the report on the economic development of Tanganyika 
submitted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1961 (James 
1971: 21). The report identified two approaches for organising the people for agricultural 
development: the improvement approach and the transformation approach. 
The primary aim of the improvement approach was the progressive improvement in the 
methods of crop and animal husbandry by encouraging the peasant farmer on both the 
psychological and technical planes to increase his productivity without, however, making 
any radical changes in traditional, social and legal systems. The emphasis was thus on 
increasing production on the small-scale peasant farms through extension work, 
education, credit and subsidization by the government. After considering the report, the 
government concluded that this development approach could not work because much 
time would be spent by extension workers on travelling from one homestead to another; 
individual peasant farmers might be unwilling to adopt new farming techniques; and the 
increased production would create a class of wealthy farmers who would become 
employers of hired labour, a standpoint, which would be inconsistent with the African 
Socialist ideology. 
In contrast, the transformation approach involved transforming traditional agriculture, 
land use and land tenure in order to organise the peasants in governmentally supervised 
settlement schemes. The government favoured this approach because it would introduce 
cost-reducing factors of production, which would increase the attractiveness of investing 
in agriculture. It would also lead to the incorporation of scattered rural hamlets into 
compact villages, overcome the conservative force of tradition by liberating farmers from 
traditional controls and concentrate capital investment and technical manpower on groups 
of farmers living together rather than scattered over large areas of the territory. Lastly, it 
would enable the government to supply social services, such as schools, dispensaries and 
water, to communities of farmers at minimum cost. 
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The initial land tenure problem confronted by the government was either to improve the 
freehold system or to discourage it by substituting a completely different form of land 
tenure. If the improvement approach had been adopted, the government would have 
developed a freehold system out of customary tenure, thereby adopting the British form 
of land tenure, which had been previously denied to them (James 1971: 21). By 
approving the transformation approach, the government discouraged freehold tendencies; 
thereby putting to an end whatever freehold existed, and instead identified the 
sovereignty of the state and property, which translated into nationalizing the land. This 
option was preferred because it facilitated the creation of a nation state and an integrated 
modem socialist community out of the more than 120 independent tribal communities 
that had evolved under the colonial indirect rule policy. 
This marked the beginning of an era during which the land came under the control of the 
government of Tanzania mainland and absolute individual land ownership was 
discouraged. Consequently, the role of trustee or caretaker passed to the government, and 
an individual's right to land depended on how he or she made use of it. It was believed, at 
the time, that this approach would encourage good land husbandry practices and serve as 
a substitute for the 'use and abuse' right inherent in the freehold tenure system (James, 
1971). Under the transformation approach, land ceased to be a commercial commodity 
and the former concept of price for the land was reduced to a mere obligation to 
reimburse the old landholder for inexhaustible improvements existing on the surrendered 
land. Thus, the conversion in 1963 by the Freehold Titles (Conversion and Government 
Leases) Act of all freehold lands into government leaseholds was an important step in the 
implementation of the government's land policy. It moreover brought into the public land 
sector big chunks of land (approximately one percent of the total landmass), which had 
previously been alienated under freehold tenure. 
The public land ownership structure was adopted by the government of Tanzania and 
defined under the first Five Year Plan (1964-1969). The creation of co-operative farming 
villages in which the members would work together based on human equality was the 
first and essential step towards the development of rural Socialism. Legislation was 
introduced in 1965 to regulate the land tenure system of the new village settlements, and 
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it defined the derivative rights of the members of the land settlement scheme as being the 
rights of users (James, 1971) 
The first Five Year Plan envisaged the establishment of over 60 highly productive village 
settlements. Each settlement would comprise about 250 comprehensively planned and 
economically profitable individual farms. The initial capital cost was estimated to be 
£ 150,000 per village plus an additional £50,000 per village earmarked for the training of 
supervisory personnel (James 1971: 24). In the great majority of the settlement schemes, 
homestead plots were allocated to individual farmers, although a few implemented the 
block farming technique. For example, on one scheme in Upper Kitete, in Arusha, wheat 
was grown on a communal basis in blocks, but each family had in addition a three-acre 
homestead plot for their private use. 
In 1967, the government laid down practical guidelines for the implementation of African 
Socialism. It defined Socialism as composed of three important principles, namely 
equality, self-reliance and ujamaa. The first of these, the principle of equality spelt out 
that an individual should not exploit other individual; it was concretised by legislation, 
which strengthened the machinery enabling government to give land to the tiller. Other 
legislations were enacted to arrest the growth of landlord/tenant classes in the country 
and to disqualify some categories of leaders from retaining their positions of leadership if 
they became property owners or employers of labour. 
In the same year, President Nyerere of Tanzania made the following statement in defence 
of the government's commitment to protect the land for the benefit of indigenous people 
under government-run collectives (Nyerere 1967: 55-56): 
In a country such as ours, where generally speaking the Africans are poor 
and foreigners are rich, it is quite possible that within eighty or a hundred 
years, if poor Africans were allowed to sell their land, all the land in 
Tanganyika would belong to wealthy immigrants, and the local people 
would be tenants. Even if there were no rich foreigners in this country, 
there would emerge rich and clever Tanganyikans. If we allow land to be 
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sold like a robe, within a short period, there would only be a few Africans 
possessing land in Tanganyika when all others would be tenants. 
What President Nyerere did not realise at the time, however, was that by protecting the 
Tanganyikans from scheming and land-grabbing foreigners and African elites, he 
deprived them of an opportunity to generate capital using land as collateral. 
The second principle of African Socialism, viz. self-reliance, in one sense meant that 
farmers in existing settlement schemes or schemes still to be formed would no longer be 
spoon-fed by the government or be made privileged members of the farming community. 
Instead, they would have to rely on themselves and on each other as a team. In another 
sense, it eliminated Africans' reliance on sources (whether individuals or companies) 
external to Tanzania, in developing the country's economy. Rather, economic 
development was to be based on the people's own efforts, and injection of capital was no 
substitute for hard work (James, 1971). 
The third principle of African Socialism, viz. ujamaa signified living together on land 
owned in common, working together for the good of all and practicing co-operation in its 
widest sense (James 1971: 28). Not only were purchases and marketing to be done co-
operatively, as in the old village settlements, but production too was to be collectivized. 
In terms of land tenure considerations, ujamaa was to transform the traditional sector of 
land tenure into a collective sector. However, despite these ideals, the concept of ujamaa 
villages posed problems of property rights and of feasibility in developed areas such as 
Kilimanjaro, Bukoba and Ngara, where established farms were in fact individually owned 
and cultivated with coffee trees and other permanent crops. 
By 1968, many ujamaa villages were either abandoned or closed down due to their 
failure to retain the farmers and/or to run economically. According to James (1971: 25), 
the following reasons for the failure of the pilot settlement schemes have been widely 
documented by researchers: 
• There had been unnecessarily heavy capital investment, intended to guarantee the 
success of the scheme. This, together with the supervisory role played by the 
government led to economically unviable scheme and poor response on the part of the 
farmers. 
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• Officials other than the people themselves initially managed the settlement schemes. 
Although the farmers were expected to form themselves into co-operatives to take 
over the management, progress in that direction had in fact been very slow. It would 
appear the officials were reluctant to allow their jobs to be taken over. 
• As a result of the special treatment that the farmers received from government, 
farmers regarded themselves as a privileged class. This meant that there was a real 
danger that the government was creating a middle class of farmers in the settlements, 
which would not have been in line with the ideology of African Socialism. 
• The scheme's impact on the total development picture was too slight. In terms ofland 
tenure structure, the impact of the village settlements was negligible. This was mainly 
because all the schemes that were started were on virgin soil or land purchased by 
government from settlers. 
• The traditional sector of the land tenure structure continued as it was evolving, 
becoming more and more estranged from the tenets of African Socialism. 
In 1969, the government carried out the fourth and last land tenure reform, in terms of 
which all government leases were converted into Rights of Occupancy by grant under the 
Government Leaseholds (Conversion) to Rights of Occupancy Act, 1969. Since 1969, the 
Tanzania mainland has operated a dual system of land tenure, namely rights of occupancy 
by grant and deemed rights of occupancy. The rights of occupancy by grant are 
leaseholds of 99 years while deemed rights of occupancy have no term limits. 
James (1971: 30) analysed the land tenure structure in Tanzania as follows: 
Despite the concerted effort made by the government to consolidate the 
dual system of land tenure on the Tanzania mainland, the existing land 
tenure structure continued to evolve into the following four sectors: 
traditional, public, private and collective. The traditional landholdings, 
which had appeared communal and monolithic during the colonial 
administration, lost this characteristic. Geographical, historical and 
population factors contributed to the entrenchment of a private traditional 
system, which defined the rights of groups or individuals in terms of 
ownership and provided a framework for buying, leasing and pledging 
lands. The public sector set out the rules and principles governing 
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relationships between the state and its subjects, including companies and 
parastatal bodies, which hold land directly from the state as either 
government leases or rights-holders. The private sector controlled the 
transactions of the subjects on land held for a right of occupancy or 
government lease. The rules of this sector were mainly rules inherited 
from the colonial administrations and, while severely restricted, this sector 
remained the last vestige of the colonial legacy. Important areas of this 
sector included the basic law of leases and related institutions, and the law 
of mortgages and settlements. By the 1970s, the private sector was 
progressively disappearing, although it was still one of the major sources 
of income of private lawyers. The collective sector was potentially the 
most significant, although the modem collectivisation of agriculture was 
relatively recent and no clear pattern of landholding system had evolved 
by that time. 
In 1995, the government consolidated all the existing legislations on land into a national 
land policy, which defined the following fundamental tenets underlying the national land 
tenure structure: 
• Land is publicly owned and vested in the president as a trustee on behalf of the 
country's citizens; 
• Land speculation must be controlled; 
• Rights of occupancy, whether statutory or customary, will continue to be the only 
recognised types of land tenure; 
• Land rights and title to land under any consolidated or new land law will continue to 
be based mainly on use and occupation. 
Much as the new land policy recognised that land has value, the government still 
maintains a highly socialist ideological position on land. However, it would appear that 
public pressure in favour of the individualisation of land can no longer be ignored by 
government bureaucrats, all the more so if investors, both local and foreign, are to be 
encouraged to increase their commitment in the country's economy. 
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2.3 Formalisation of customary tenure in Kenya 
By the time the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) set foot on the Kenyan 
coast in 1888, the coastal strip, measuring 10 nautical miles inland from the high water 
mark, which extended along the entire length of the coasts of German East Africa and 
Kenya, and which was recognized by the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886, was under 
the control of the Sultanate of Zanzibar. The western boundary of the coastal strip 
continued to mark the administrative limit between the Kenya Protectorate ( coastal strip) 
and the Kenya colony. All rights to land in the Sultan's territory, except private lands, 
which were under certificates of ownership issued by the Sultanate, were ceded to the 
IBEAC in 1888 (Sorrensen 1968) and ultimately to the British colonial administration in 
1895, after the IBEAC entered into an administrative agreement with the British 
authorities. Thereafter, all the land occupied by indigenous people was declared crown 
land and was henceforth governed under the Crown Lands Ordinance, 1902. 
The rest of Kenya was declared crown land with effect from 1899. The conversion of 
customary lands to crown lands was based on the provisions of the Foreign Jurisdictions 
Act, 1890. This English law was received through the first local land legislation, the East 
African (Lands) Order in Council, 1901. The legislation extinguished the rights of 
indigenous inhabitants, turning them into mere tenants at the will of the Crown. The 
Commissioner was empowered to dispose of all crown lands on such terms and 
conditions as he might think fit, subject only to any directions, which the Colonial 
Secretary of State might give (Njonjo 2002: 23). 
Right from the start, the British colonial administration made no effort to administer the 
national land assets as a single unit, and this continued to be so throughout the entire 
period of its administration. It encouraged land divisions, some of which were given 
preferential treatment, whereas others were permitted to remain in a state of relative 
stagnation under customary methods of land use and purely traditional approaches to land 
ownership. The areas that had been treated preferentially were located in the so-called 
'white highlands' and were managed under English property laws. The other areas 
became Native Reserves, and the government regarded them as the property of Kenya's 
indigenous inhabitants. These divisions were later entrenched in the Kenya (Native 
Areas) Order in Council, 1939, and in the Kenya (Highlands) Order in Council, 1939, and 
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by a section in the Native Lands Trust Ordinance, which stated that all native claims to 
crown lands were extinguished (Magala and Magugu 1969: 234). 
The Native Reserves stagnated until 1954 when Mr R J M Swynnerton introduced the 
Plan for Intensification of African Agricultural Development (PIAAD). The government 
accepted the Plan, and later drew up a policy to guide the issuance of individual titles to 
African farmers. The overall objective of the government policy was to intensify the 
development of African agriculture in Kenya. The Swynnerton Plan highlighted the fact 
that time was ripe for government to furnish each African farmer with an indefeasible 
title to his land. It made it clear that such an indefeasible title would provide security of 
tenure to the African farmer on two counts: Firstly, it would encourage him to invest his 
labour and profit into the development of his farm, and secondly, he would be able to 
offer the title as security against such financial credits as he might wish to secure from 
any sources open to him. 
When the East African Royal Commission report on the individualisation of customary 
landholdings was published in 1955, and introduced to the communities in the Central 
Province of Kenya they readily accepted it. This was because the Swynnerton Plan, 
which had already introduced the concept of systematic adjudication and consolidation in 
the Native Reserves, preceded the report. It should therefore be noted that these processes 
of land consolidation and registration, which were concurrently introduced in Uganda and 
Kenya, were a product of the Swynnerton Plan and the East African Royal Commission 
report respectively. These land consolidation and registration schemes were initially 
designed for Kenya as part of an overall plan to intensify agricultural development within 
the Native Reserves. 
The overall objective of the land policies was to ascertain what land each person was 
entitled to, and thereafter, with a view to improving agriculture by eliminating scattered 
fragments of land of uneconomic size, to allocate to him, in a planned layout, a single 
plot of land equivalent to the aggregate of the plots to which he had been found to be 
entitled (Larson 1991: 49). Local land committees assisted by various government 
officers, including measurers, recorders, demarcation officers, surveyors and field 
supervisors, would carry all this out. The committee system was firmly rooted in 
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customary law, as the committee members were, in most cases, the elders traditionally 
empowered to allocate land within the clan areas. However, this is about as far as the 
customary powers could go, because any subsequent land disputes would be decided 
upon by the Courts of Law based on statute law relating to registered title to land. 
The first legislation, which was enacted to put the recommendations of the East African 
Royal Commission report into effect, consisted of the Native Land Tenure Rules, 1956, 
published in October 1956, and the African Courts (Suspension of Land Suits) 
Ordinance, 1956, published in January 1957 (Magala and Magugu 1969: 241). This latter 
Ordinance was needed to prevent the work of the Land Adjudication Committees from 
being dislodged by proceedings pending in or subsequently commended in African 
Courts, which by themselves could not possibly cope with the task of adjudicating upon 
all land rights. 
The Native Land Registration Ordinance, 1959, was enacted to replace the Native Land 
Tenure Rules, 1956. One of the outstanding provisions in the Ordinance was the 
provision for the Land Committees to specify rights in land, which may be converted into 
ownership, and for the recording of rights enjoyed by tenants under the customary law, 
and for other rights and interests existing at the time of adjudication. The Native Land 
Registration Ordinance, 1959, was renamed the Land Registration (Special Areas) Act, 
1960, and later became the Land Adjudication Act, 1963. 
In 1960, a constitutional conference held in London recommended that Kenya should 
rapidly move towards independence. In the same year, an order-in-council terminated the 
preservation of the exclusively white-owned highlands for the whites' exclusive use and 
ownership. This opened the way for land transfer to Africans at an accelerated rate. The 
Kenya government negotiated with the British government, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the Commonwealth Development Corporation, and the 
Federal Republic of Germany for funds to buyout the European settlers. These 
negotiations were successful, and funds were made available accordingly. 
In 1961, a committee of three members was co-opted to draft a Bill whose mam 
objectives were to ensure security and proof of title in connection with the transfer of 
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land and to entrench the Torrens system of registration oftitles (Simpson 1976: 447). The 
1961 Bill became law under the Registered Land Act, 1963, and it was enacted during the 
six months of self-government before Kenya became an independent state in December 
1963. The effect of registration of title was to secure an absolute and indefeasible title to 
land, subject only to the leases and other encumbrances shown in the register and to 
overriding interests. The register moreover had to be maintained and constantly updated 
to ensure that it shows the current conditions at all times, and failure to register an 
interest would render it ineffective. 
The Lawrence Mission of 1965-66 visited all land registries throughout Kenya with a 
view to ascertaining how the Registered Land Act, 1963, was working in practice; it 
reported that the general impression was very favourable (Simpson 1976: 453). The 
report found that there were 275,000 titles on the register in the former customary areas. 
This evaluation was made after systematic adjudication had been in operation for ten 
years. By 1973, the number of titles on the register had increased to 630,000 in twenty-
two land registry offices. 
In 1999, the President of the Republic of Kenya appointed a commission of inquiry to 
review the land law system of Kenya with a view to determining the principles of the 
existing national land policy framework, the constitutional position on land and the 
institutional framework for land administration (Njonjo 2002: vii). It is most likely that 
after a national debate of the commission of inquiry report, the government will reach a 
consensus in favour of the continuation of the private ownership tenure system composed 
of freehold and leasehold and with the ultimate title vested in the state (Njonjo 2002: 40). 
2.4 Formalisation of informal tenure in the United States of America 
When the European settlers arrived on the eastern coast of North American continent at 
the end of the fifteenth century, they encountered diverse Native American tribes. These 
Native Americans, whose ancestors are believed to have crossed the Bering land bridge 
from Asia to North America, in what may be considered to be the first immigration, were 
almost exterminated by the subsequent European immigrants that inhabited and created 
the United States of America. 
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In 1786, The United States established its first Native American reservation and 
approached each Indian tribe as an independent nation. Commenting on the reservations, 
President James Monroe admitted that some parcels of land belonging to the original 
Native Americans were taken over by European settlers supported by the federal 
government of the United States. Monroe (1821: 9), in his second inaugural address, 
observed: 
We have treated the Native American tribes as independent nations, 
without their having any substantial pretensions to that rank. This 
distinction has flattered their pride, retarded their improvement, and in 
many instances paved the way to their destruction. The progress of our 
settlements westward, supported as they are by a dense population, has 
constantly driven them back, with almost the total sacrifice of the lands 
which they have been compelled to abandon. 
By 1890, Americans had migrated all the way to the Pacific Ocean. Before that date, 
however, it had become clear to many that a new policy had to be adopted toward Native 
American tribes, whose dwindling numbers seemed to threaten extinction. Congress 
began moving in this direction in 1871, when it unilaterally decided to abandon the treaty 
process and legislate on the behalf of Native Americans. 
The change from the treaty process to legislation was initiated by President Ulysses S. 
Grant who resolved to expose the Native Americans to education and civilization. Grant 
(1873: 3), in his second inaugural address, stated: 
My efforts in the future will be directed to the restoration of good feeling 
between the different sections of our common country; ...... ; and, by a 
humane course, to bring the aborigines of the country under the benign 
influences of education and civilization. It is either this or war of 
extermination: Wars of extermination, engaged in by people pursuing 
commerce and all industrial pursuits, are expensive even against the 
weakest people, and are demoralizing and wicked. Our superiority of 
strength and advantages of civilization should make us lenient toward the 
Indian. The wrong inflicted upon him should be taken into account and the 
balance placed to his credit. The moral view of the question should be 
considered and the question asked, "Can not the Indian be made a useful 
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and productive member of society by proper teaching and treatment?" If 
the effort is made in good faith, we will stand better before the civilized 
nations of the earth and in our own consciences for having made it. 
The new plan to rescue Native Americans from extinction called for an aggressive assault 
on tribalism by parceling out communally owned reservation land on a severalty 
(individual) basis. The plan, called the Dawes Act (or General Allotment Act), went into 
effect in 1887. One might question whether it is acceptable to make national decisions 
without involving in the decision making process, those who will be most drastically 
affected. This appears to be the main reason why the allotment, which was designed to 
absorb the Native Americans into the society of the United States, turned out to be a 
monumental disaster. Hundreds of thousands of acres remaining after the individual 160-
acre allotments had been made were then sold at bargain prices to land-hungry or land-
speculating whites. In addition to losing their 'surplus' tribal land, many Native 
Americans families also lost their allotted land through sales to local Anglo-American 
bankers, businessmen, farmers and stockbrokers. Many of the Native Americans became 
landless and the majority still resisting assimilation reached their lowest population 
numbers shortly after the tum of the 20th century. The trend was slightly reversed when 
the U.S. Congress granted United States citizenship to the original Native Americans in 
June 1924. 
The integration of customary and informal tenure systems into the national formal land 
tenure system had to overcome the problems of squatters on government land, settlers on 
privately owned land or Native American lands, miners in the various mining districts, 
and the formal laws that were based on the English common law doctrine. The 
immigrants who flocked to the United States in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
occupied vast expanses of land, which were either owned by Native Americans, the state 
or private individuals. Even the British immigrants, who already knew that, under the 
English law, if someone mistakenly and/or intentionally squatted on another person's 
land and made improvements, he could never recover the value of the developments he 
had made on the land, went ahead and developed their newly acquired parcels of land. 
With time, the squatters developed customs that were later identified as land rights. For 
example, the squatters in Virginia developed com rights: staking out land by raising a 
crop of com; those in Kentucky developed cabin rights: staking out land by building a log 
cabin: and those in Massachusetts developed tomahawk rights: staking out land by 
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marking trees on the land they wanted. They also deVeloped social contracts, which the 
Claim Associations used to manage land rights outside the formal property system. 
The colony of Virginia was the first to legally recognise squatter rights in 1642, when it 
allowed a wrongful possessor to recover the value of any improvements from the true 
owner. These squatter rights were entrenched in the Virginia Act, 1642 (Cap. 33), which 
stated: 
If any person or persons whatsoever have sett downe upon any plantation 
or ground, which did not properly, belong to any other man [a] valuable 
consideration [is to] be allowed by the judgment of 12 men (Henning 
1823: 134, as quoted by De Soto 2001: 124). 
Thus, if the rightful owner was unwilling to reimburse the squatter for these 
improvements, the squatter could purchase the land at the price set by a local jury. This 
legal innovation, which allowed a settler to buy the land he had improved, before it was 
offered for public sale was called pre-emption. Other American States also adopted the 
pre-emption doctrine, although the US Congress adamantly opposed it. Between 1797 
and 1820, American politicians passed laws that catered for extralegal constituencies. 
These statutory laws captured two principles of equity: the right of occupancy due to 
improvements, and the right of settlers on privately owned land, unchallenged for 7 years 
and paying taxes thereon (De Soto 2001: 136). 
It was also discovered that the US Congress property laws, which were based on rules of 
property established under the precedents of the English common law, were in direct 
conflict with the American States laws of occupancy, which had carefully fused the 
English law with the home grown American traditions. This conflict came to the fore in 
1821, when the Supreme Court declared Kentucky'S occupancy laws as unconstitutional. 
The judgment was made in a case involving the heirs of John Green, a landowner who 
owned large tracts ofland, and Richard Biddle, a squatter who had settled upon Green's 
land illegally. The politicians who had been cultivating the support of their extralegal 
constituents (squatters or illegal settlers) lambasted Biddle as being "most ruinous and 
causing great alarm for Kentuckians" (De Soto 2001: 138). Nonetheless, the Governor 
and the Kentucky legislature voiced their opposition to the Supreme Court's decision. In 
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1830, a coalition of western and southern congressmen passed a general Pre-emption Act 
that applied to every settler or occupant of public lands who was now in possession of 
and cultivated any part thereof during 1829. A squatter could claim up to 160 acres of 
public land, including land he had improved, at a rate of $ 1.25 per acre. Payment of the 
total amount was required before the land was set for public auction, and transfers or 
sales of pre-emptive rights were strictly forbidden. The estates were to be held in what 
was then called 'fee simple ownership,' that is, in perpetuity with unlimited power to sell 
or give them away. Between 1834 and 1856, Missouri, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Alabama, 
Arkansas, Michigan, Iowa, Mississippi, Oregon, Kansas and California all adopted 
occupancy laws similar to the Kentucky law, which had been rejected by the Supreme 
Court in Green v. Biddle. 
In 1866, Congress for the first time declared the nation's mineral lands officially open for 
exploration by US citizens, eighteen years after thousands of miners had first begun to 
prospect for gold in federal lands in California. The 1866 statute explicitly noted that all 
exploration for minerals would be subject to those "local customs or rules of miners in 
the several mining districts" that were not in conflict with the laws of the United States 
(De Soto 2001: 154). The 1866 legislation did not only acknowledge the legitimacy of 
social contracts outside the official law, but also incorporated principles and rights that 
had been won by settlers in pre-emption and settlement claims. 
The American legal system gained legitimacy because it built on the experience of grass 
roots settlers and the extralegal arrangements they created, while rejecting those English 
common law doctrines that had little relevance to problems unique to the United States. 
The integration of extralegal property rights constituted a revolution borne out of the 
normative expectations of ordinary people, which the government developed into a 
systematised and professional formal structure. A similar informal tenure situation exists 
in Uganda. Since informal land tenure relationships and the local social contracts have 
never been formalised into the formal tenure system of Uganda, this study will be 
informed by the American experience and will prepare a proposal for the integration of 
the informal tenure relationships into the national formal land tenure structure. 
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2.5 Concluding remarks 
There are basically two approaches for formalisation of customary tenure: the customary 
tenure replacement options leading to individual private land rights in form of freehold or 
leasehold and the formalisation of legally recognized customary tenure which seeks to 
maintain group land rights intact as much as possible. The legally recognized customary 
tenure has adopted a number of legal approaches for formalizing group land rights. These 
include the minimalist approach, the agency method, the group incorporation and the 
district land boards approach. The third formalisation option, the flexible tenure option, 
which is currently in bill form, is expected to become law in Namibia this year. 
The customary tenure replacement option is universal in the sense that it ought to be 
accepted nationwide by all ethnic groups in any given country. It is largely based on the 
concept of social contract between the people as tenants and the State as the lord. The 
formalization of customary group rights is intended to serve the interests of tribal groups; 
and each country is likely to end up with as many formal customary tenure systems as 
there are tribal ethnic groups. The flexible tenure system recognizes the fact that some 
countries have both the wealthy and the marginalized poor. It further recognizes that the 
customary tenure replacement option is most appropriate for the wealthy people and that 
although the poor people need freehold, they do not immediately qualify for it. This is 
why flexible tenure systems in form of 'starter and landhold' tenure systems, which are 
convertible to freehold, were specially designed for the marginalized poor. To understand 
how each of the three formalisation approaches were implemented in various countries, 
case studies of Tanzania, Kenya and the United States of America, were carried out. 
For example, private land ownership was introduced in Tanzania by the German 
administration in the nineteenth century. The Germans formalised customary tenure into 
freehold and leasehold titles, which were issued to foreign investors. By the time the 
British took over from the Germans in 1919, only 0.5% of the total landmass was under 
freehold and leasehold. The British administration recognized all existing German land 
titles and made a small number of freehold grants as well. These grants were intended to 
give effect to contracts or undertakings made by the former German administration or the 
British administration. 
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In 1923, the British administration converted all the unalienated land into public land and 
introduced 99-year grants by occupancy. In 1928, deemed rights of occupancy with no 
term limits were also introduced. At the time of independence in 1961, only 1 % of the 
total landmass was under grants of occupancy. Immediately after independence, the 
government abolished freehold and leasehold tenure systems and moved away from 
private to public land ownership. The government vested public land in the President as 
trustee and retained grants by occupancy and deemed rights of occupancy, which had 
been introduced by the British administration. 
In Kenya, the British administration introduced private land ownership under freehold 
and leasehold in the reserve areas. These tenure systems were implemented under 
systematic adjudication and consolidation under the English system of general 
boundaries. The Torrens system of land registration was introduced by the colonial 
government at independence in 1963. The government of the Republic of Kenya retained 
the dual system and it is currently reviewing the land law system with a view to 
determining the principles of the existing national land policy framework, the 
constitutional position on land and the institutional framework for land administration. 
In the United States of America, the integration of informal tenure into the formal land 
tenure system had to overcome the problems of squatters on government land, settlers on 
privately owned land, miners in the various mining districts, and the formal laws that 
were based on the English common law doctrine. This necessitated the introduction ofthe 
principle of pre-emption to incorporate the squatters, settlers, and miners into the national 
formal system. However, the lands of Native Americans were not integrated into the 
national formal tenure system. The basic distinction that sets Native Americans apart 
from other groups of people in the United States is their historic existence as self-
governing peoples, whose nationhood preceded that of the United States. As nations, the 
Native American tribes signed treaties with colonial authorities and later with the United 
States government, and today, on what remains of their former lands. Native Americans 
are still functioning as separate governments within the United States federal framework 
up to today. The next Chapter will, while taking into account the lessons learnt from the 
experiences of Tanzania, Kenya and the United States of America, review the 
formalisation of customary tenure in Uganda. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE FORMALISATION OF CUSTOMARY 
TENURE IN UGANDA 
3.0 Introduction 
The origin of the present Uganda territory dates back to 1890, when Britain and Germany 
signed a treaty, which firmly set out and defined each power's sphere of influence and 
adjusted the boundaries of their East African possessions. Under the treaty, Germany was 
granted an area comprising Tanganyika, Rwanda and Burundi, which were declared a 
German Protectorate in 1891 (James 1971: 11), while Britain made Uganda a protectorate 
in 1894 and Kenya a colony in 1895. Germany later renounced all rights over her colonial 
possessions in favour of the League of Nations (later the United Nations Organization) 
under the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919. The League of Nations mandated Britain in 
1922 to administer Tanganyika, while Rwanda and Burundi came under Belgian control. 
In 1897, Kabaka Muwanga of the Buganda kingdom gave Colonel Sir Henry Colvile, the 
Commissioner of the Queen in Buganda at that time, a piece of land at Port Alice on the 
shore of Lake Victoria in Entebbe. In addition to being a place of residence for Col 
Col vile, the land was also to be used for building houses for official work and for any 
other purpose the Protectorate government may desire. The piece of land was demarcated 
with markstones and surveyed; and the title deed was signed by Kabaka Muwanga and 
witnessed by his principal chiefs. The land was given to Col Colvile and his successors in 
office; neither he nor those residing on the land were to pay any tribute or dues forever. 
This site became the headquarters of the Protectorate government (West 1971: 9). 
According to Thompson (2003: 41), Britain's interest in Uganda was "not settlement but 
control over the headwaters of the Nile - the lifeblood of Egypt." Its purpose was 
possession, rather than economic exploitation, and thus the official British presence in 
Uganda was to be minimal, sufficient to maintain control and sustain order. As soon as 
law and order had been established, cotton was introduced to peasant farmers as a 
commercial cash crop. Ultimately, it was the peasant as consumer and not the British 
official as the representative of the British Empire, on whose interests the colonial 
economy rested. Most Africans had enough land on which to produce their own food, as 
well as to satisfy their tax obligations and consumer wants by growing cash crops. Sales 
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of cotton enabled the peasants who produced it to pay a poll tax; and their consumption 
of goods, on the proceeds of sale, yielded customs and excise duties. By 1915, cotton 
represented 70% of the total value of Uganda's exports; it was largely the proceeds from 
cotton sales, which freed the Uganda Protectorate from financial dependence on imperial 
grants-in-aid after that year (Thompson 2003: 42). 
In 1911, the colonial state instituted the Sir Morris Carter Commission to consider the 
appropriate land policy in Ankole, Bunyoro, Busoga, and Toro kingdoms of Uganda 
(Bazaara 1994: 29). Between 1911 and 1921, the Commission produced four reports 
calling for plantation agriculture to be instituted, but the idea was never fully embraced 
and was later dropped entirely. 
By 1938, the European population in Uganda comprised slightly more than 2,000, with 
77 being employed in the civil establishment and 53 in police (Thompson 2003: 52). In 
addition, there were 17,000 Asians, and approximately four million Africans. Rural life 
seemed to be undisturbed by the pressures of British colonial rule. The Asians dominated 
trade and cotton processing; and the Africans bought imported goods from Asian stores. 
Industrialization consisted mainly of cotton ginning and local mining in western Uganda. 
Apart from two large sugar estates and a handful of tea, coffee and tobacco plantations, 
productive activity in Uganda has remained African, individual and small-scale 
(Thompson 2003: 58). 
The relationship between human beings and land in the tribal communities of Uganda 
manifested itself in three distinct categories (Uganda Government 2004: 4). The first 
category was based on feudalism. An essential feature of this system was that access to 
land was controlled by an oligarchy in which political power was exclusively vested. 
Security of tenure for land users was, therefore, based on continuous loyalty to that 
oligarchy. The payment of tribute in the form of produce and services was normal and, 
indeed, a requirement as evidence of that loyalty. The second category was based on 
territorial control in which access to land resources were governed by a complex network 
of reciprocal bonds within families, lineages and larger social units. The primary function 
of those entities was to protect and guarantee individual and community rights as 
prescribed by custom. As long as those bonds remained, any individual or group of 
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individuals could secure access to the resources of the community. This system of land 
relations was mainly predominant in many of the arid and semi-arid regions of Africa. 
The third category was based on access to the land through a network of social relations 
and on the specific uses to which parcels of land were put. This type of land relations 
recognized individual rights as well as community obligation by virtue of access to such 
rights, and it was prevalent in the non-feudal sedentary communities. Common to all 
three systems of land relations was the fact that radical title to land was always vested in 
the community as a corporate entity (James 1971: 62), rather than in the political organs 
through which control of the territory or the resources of the land was exercised. 
3.1 Formalisation of customary tenure under British rule 
The British colonial administration had to first secure the Uganda territory and then 
incorporate it into the world economy, promote production and consumption to ensure 
that the Uganda Protectorate was financially viable. It was believed, at the time, that 
industrialised farming was better than small-scale farming, and that large-scale farming 
was the only way through which the Uganda Protectorate could achieve economic 
viability and self-sustainability. Since the establishment of such large-scale agricultural 
farms necessitated land ownership by authenticated document, however, the colonial 
administration had to introduce the concept of land ownership by registered title in the 
protectorate. 
The first attempt to formalise customary land was thus through negotiations with the 
leadership of the Buganda kingdom in 1900. The second and third land tenure reforms 
were carried out by the colonial administration in the other parts outside the Buganda 
kingdom, through the legal approach. The fourth and fifth land reforms were also carried 
out through the legal approach by the independent governments. It was only the sixth and 
most recent land reform that hesitated to rely entirely on the force of law to formalise 
customary tenure. 
According to West (1972: 6), Sir Harry Johnston decided to negotiate with the chiefs and 
regents of the Buganda kingdom because the kingdom had attained a semi-feudal system 
with a well-established form of government. At that time, the customary land tenure in 
the Buganda kingdom had evolved into: 
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• Obutaka (clan rights); 
• Obutongole (rights of Kabaka [King] and his chiefs); 
• Obwesengeze (individual hereditary rights); and 
• Kibanja (peasant rights of occupancy). 
According to Mukwaya (1953: 7), the first category, Obutaka, referred to fertile 
agricultural estates, where the clan ancestors had settled. The clan ancestors' claim to 
Obutaka estates is rooted either in the original grants by the kings or in uninterrupted or 
unchallenged occupation for more than one generation. Only in a few of the Obutaka 
estates were the clansmen in the majority, though, because the original clan estates could 
not support all the descendants of the clan founders. Clansmen were therefore free to 
move to any contiguous territory within the same political or cultural boundaries. The 
Obutaka were inheritable but inalienable, implying that land itself did not have value; it 
was the productive effort of the land occupiers, which gave value to the land (James 
1971: 62). The Obutaka served as residential home, burial ground for the clan members, 
and as an agricultural area. 
Obutongole, comprised community estates attached to political offices. They were 
granted as remuneration to the chiefs for political services in the form of labour, tribute of 
beer, and food crops contributed by the peasants living on the estates. These estates were 
not inheritable and not subject to tax or tribute to the Kabaka. The chiefs as landlords 
'owned' the people who lived on Obutongole estates and not the land itself (West 
1964: 4). 
Obwesengeze, the third category, were grants in the form of a single landholding or a 
small estate granted to an individual chief or peasant by the Kabaka himself. These were 
private permanent rights and could be inherited. However, they represented an 
insignificant fraction of land in the Buganda kingdom. The Obwesengeze estates also 
served as Obutaka in the sense that they operated as residential homes and burial grounds 
for specific families and lineages. 
Kibanja, the fourth category, were small landholdings occupied by peasants, and were 
located on Obutaka, Obutongole and Obwesengeze estates. Kibanja were ancestral 
52 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
customary rights, which depended on correct social and political behaviour as demanded 
by the semi-feudal system of governance. Every peasant had a right to occupy and use the 
land he occupied, and therefore he did not have to live in constant fear of eviction. If, for 
some reason, a chief or clan leader wanted the peasant to move from his Kibanja, the 
peasant would be promptly offered another suitable Kibanja. The peasants were obliged 
to give free labour, tributes of beer, and food crops to their chiefs and/or clan heads, as 
well as military service; and this explains why the peasants would remain in possession 
of Kibanja holdings on succession. In Buganda, customary land was vested in the 
community (James 1971: 62), but it was ultimately subject to disposition by the Kabaka 
in his capacity as Ssabataka (chief of clan leaders). Although the Baganda had such a 
strong tribal identity that nobody could question the Kabaka, land belonged to the 
community and not to the Kabaka. 
When Sir Harry Johnston came to Uganda in July 1899, he had special instructions to 
grant freehold estates to the Kabaka, regents and principal chiefs; to confirm the Crown's 
land rights over unused and unoccupied lands; and to establish Boards of Trustees, which 
would administer and protect peasants in rent-free rights to the land they occupied (West 
1964: 2). Johnston wanted to gain control of the unoccupied land in the belief that the 
economic future of Buganda lay in plantation farming by Europeans. He started his duty, 
in 1900, by addressing the land settlement question and chose to negotiate with the 
regents and principal chiefs of the Buganda kingdom. 
At the end of the negotiations, Obutongole were transformed into official estates, while 
Obwesengeze were transformed into private estates, both of which were to be held by the 
beneficiaries in absolute ownership. As it was the chiefs who had negotiated the 
settlement, it is not surprising that the rights of Obwesengeze and Obutongole were 
preserved, although in a slightly altered form. The regents and principal chiefs were 
satisfied with the new land distribution because they were sure that the new estates would 
be used as Obutaka estates for the attached families or lineages, and this has in fact 
turned out to be the established practice (Mukwaya 1953: 10). The land reform also 
transformed the peasant rights of occupancy such that the peasants were now expected to 
be loyal to both the landlords and the Lukiiko (Buganda parliament), which was to act as 
the trustee for the people of Buganda. The outcome of this land reform was that the 
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radical title to land, which originally vested in the community as a corporate entity, 
switched over to the governor (now Uganda government) and the Lukiiko as trustees for 
the people of Buganda. 
The land settlement negotiations were based on the size rather than the value of land. The 
total landmass, estimated at 19,600 square miles (approximately 20% of the total area of 
Uganda), which was to be distributed, included the land of the Buganda kingdom and the 
counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi, which had previously formed part of the Bunyoro 
kingdom. The land distribution formula, which was finally agreed upon between Sir 
Harry Johnston, the Commissioner of the Queen in Uganda, and the regents and principal 
chiefs of the Buganda kingdom is presented below: 
• The Kabaka, members of the royal family, regents, county chiefs and other leaders 
were to receive private or both private and official estates 958 sq.mls 
• 1000 chiefs and private landowners were to receive estates, the majority of which 
were already in their possession 8,000 sq.mls 
• Land set aside for existing government stations 50 sq.mls 
• Three missionaries were granted land 92 sq.mls 
• Land set aside for forest reserves 1,500 sq.mls 
• Waste and uncultivated land to be vested in the Queen as crown land 9,000 sq.mls 
Total area: 19,600 sq.mls 
The two parties to the land settlement signed the Uganda Agreement on 10 March 1900. 
According to section 17 of the Agreement, any minerals found on private estates would 
belong to the owners of the estates, "subject to a 10 per centum ad valorem duty, which 
the owner would pay to the Uganda administration when the minerals are worked." Sir 
Harry Johnston sent a copy of the signed agreement to the Foreign Office, where it was 
realized that parcelling out the land would necessitate an elaborate cadastral survey. 
According to West (1964: 10), the Foreign Office grudgingly accepted the implications 
of the Agreement and committed the Buganda kingdom to a cadastral survey that had not 
been offered anywhere else in the African dependencies at the time. 
The allocation of 8,000 square miles to 1,000 private landowners was left to the decision 
of the Lukiiko with an option of appeal being granted to the Kabaka. The total number of 
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original allottees, which included existing claims of chiefs and notables, eventually came 
to 4,138 (West 1964: 11). Among the beneficiaries were clan leaders, the majority of who 
doubled as chiefs. The distribution of land followed the order of dignity, the greater 
chiefs first satisfying their claims and then the lesser chiefs choosing their estates from 
what was left. In this way, many of the old clan estates came into the possession of 
claimants belonging to other clans, thereby paving the way for the old system of 
customary landholding to change permanently into a new formal customary tenure. 
The survey of the customary land started in Ssingo County in 1904 and ended on the 
Buvuma Islands in 1936 (West 1964:12). The total surveyed area, excluding the open 
waters of Buganda was, at the completion of the survey, placed at 17,310 square miles; 
crown land was estimated to comprise 8,307 square miles, whereas the customary land of 
the Buganda kingdom, which was distributed among the Kabaka, chiefs, notables, and the 
Buganda government stations, was estimated at 9,003 square miles (Thomas and Scott 
1935:63). 
As already pointed out above, the territory, which comprised the 19,600 square miles, 
included the Buyaga and Bugangaizi counties of the neighbouring Bunyoro Kingdom. 
The total landmass of the Buganda kingdom excluding the counties of Buyaga and 
Bugangaizi was estimated at 14,506 square miles (West 1972: 2). This meant that the 
counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi together occupied approximately 2,804 square miles. 
Out of 341 initial mailo allottees claiming land in these two counties, only 12 were 
Banyoro. The result was that, whereas the Banyoro cultivators remained in occupation, 
the mailo ownership of the better land passed mostly to influential but generally absentee 
Baganda landlords. The relationship between mailo owners and cultivators was marred 
from the outset, ranging from indifference and inefficiency to outright hostility. 
The annexation of the Bunyoro counties of Buyaga and Bugangaizi during the colonial 
administration and making them part of the Buganda kingdom was meant to be a 
punishment on the Bunyoro kingdom which had resisted the protection of the British 
Empire. Although Bunyoro kingdom was eventually subdued and it became part of the 
Uganda protectorate, the two counties were never handed back to Bunyoro by the 
colonial administration. These counties were, however, returned to Bunyoro on 1 January 
55 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
1965, following a referendum, which had been held in 1964, but the mailo land titles 
remained in the hands of the absentee Baganda landlords. Buyaga and Bugangaizi 
counties were later converted into the district of Kibaale. 
The Johnston settlement abandoned the basic principle of natural justice, which requires 
that full rights of land ownership should belong to the actual cultivators, who are the first 
occupiers of the land. Even the Buganda negotiating team did not realise that the land 
reform had changed the peasant rights of occupancy in such a dramatic way that they 
were now similar to those of "serfs and villeins of the medieval manorial system," (West 
1964: 10). According to West (1964: 9), the regents and principal chiefs had also been 
unaware that the land reform had replaced the Kiganda concept of landlordism, in terms 
of which the chiefs 'owned' the people living on their estates, with the English concept of 
landlordism, in terms of which landlords owned the land itself. The resultant formal 
customary tenure ended up as a Western form of the landlord/tenant system, which meant 
that the land was held in absolute individual ownership. And the relationship between the 
Baganda landlords and tenants changed drastically such that the tenants could no longer 
move freely to wherever they wanted to stay; the tenants had to settle down and live in an 
informal tenure relationship. 
As the formal customary tenure became operational, it inflicted grave injustice upon the 
vast majority of peasant occupiers (West 1964: 58). The peasants found themselves 
caught in a precarious situation, because they could not question what their Kabaka had 
already consented to. There was literally nobody they could turn to for help, because, 
even the members of the Lukiiko, the regents and the principal chiefs, who had concluded 
the 1900 Uganda Agreement, had not been directly elected by the people and, therefore, 
were not politically accountable to the people of Buganda. The advantage of the formal 
system was only realised later when each peasant who had enough money could become 
a landowner by purchasing his Kibanja from the landlord at open market value. The 
landlord would then process the formal land title for the peasant. Therefore, it is quite 
logical to say that in the Buganda kingdom, land acquired economic value with effect 
from 1900, when the Uganda Agreement was signed. 
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A committee made up of two protectorate judges, the crown advocate, and the land 
officer was set up in 1906 to evaluate the performance of land reform in the Buganda 
kingdom. According to West (1964: 13), the committee was satisfied that the 'natives' 
regarded the 1900 Uganda Agreement as having introduced a new order of things in 
which were merged any differences between the Obutaka and Obutongole holdings. The 
committee saw no need to study the impact of the new concept of an absolute individual 
ownership; they suggested that the conditions of this new form of ownership, for which 
the new name 'mailo' was proposed and accepted, should be defined in Buganda native 
law, thus showing an appreciation of the fact that customary land, which was formalised 
into mailo, had never been vested in the Crown. The term 'mailo' is a Luganda language 
corruption of the English word 'mile' derived from the fact that, in the new system, the 
land allocations were expressed in multiples or fractions of square miles. 
The conditions under which the formal tenure was to operate were later defined in the 
Buganda Native Land Law of 1908 (West 1964: 10). The most significant conditions 
were that the formal tenure would be freely transferable and disposable by will or 
customary succession to Africans of Uganda and not transferable, neither in perpetuity 
nor by lease, to non-Africans. The total allowable area held by an individual was limited, 
in general, to thirty square miles. Any formal land, which lapsed upon death of intestate 
owners without heirs, was to be dealt with by the governor (now Uganda government) 
and the Lukiiko as trustee for the people of Buganda. The English law of easements was 
to be applicable to formal land and provision was made for the resumption of land for 
public purposes. Land titles were to be registered under the Registration of Land Titles 
Ordinance, 1908, and had a guarantee of indefeasibility. The owner of the formal land 
was not compelled to give to a chief any portion of the produce of his land, either in kind 
or in cash. This ordinance established an important principle, whereby all land, upon 
registration, had to be identifiable by a satisfactory deed plan as stipulated by the Torrens 
system. All the transactions concerning the formal land tenure were to be recorded in 
duplicate, the primary title to be retained by the governor (now Uganda government) and 
the duplicate title issued to the registered owner. 
Although the native land law prohibited the transfer of mailo by will or succession, it was 
silent on the sale or lease of such land to non-Africans. This made it possible for the non-
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Africans to use the Land Transfer Ordinance, 1906 and the Regulations published in 1912 
to purchase mailo land. In the early years, it was policy within the protectorate to 
encourage the transfer of mailo land to non-Africans because it was believed that the 
mailo-owner, through selling part of his mailo land, would raise the necessary capital to 
clear and develop the rest of his land (West 1964: 17). It was also believed that the 
development of a few former mailo estates by incoming Europeans or Asians would help 
to inculcate fresh ideas and farming techniques amongst the neighbouring African 
landowners. By the time the Secretary of State administratively prohibited mailo land 
sales to non-Africans in 1916, about 324 square miles of mailo had been converted into 
freehold because non-Africans were not entitled to mailo land (West 1964: 55). 
Much as the Baganda landlords applauded Sir Harry Johnston's land settlement, the 
colonial administration felt that the settlement did not achieve its objectives. This was 
because the land that could have been reserved for the European plantation farmers was 
all taken up by the chiefs, leaving behind the land, which was rocky and unsuitable for 
agricultural farms. Judging from the behaviour of the Baganda chiefs, it was clear that the 
negotiations approach was not going to succeed in reserving any arable land for the 
plantation farmers in the other parts outside Buganda. Because the colonial 
administration believed, at the time, that the economy of the protectorate needed to be 
based on large-scale farming, they decided to acquire land by force of law. However, 
even after discovering that the economy had to be based on small-scale farming, the 
colonial administration continued to use the force of law in the subsequent land tenure 
reforms. The following part of the discussion gives the background to the facts, which 
appear to have motivated both the colonial and the subsequent governments after 
independence, to continue using and relying on the force of law in the formalisation of 
customary tenure. 
The second land tenure reform was carried out by the colonial administration in the other 
parts of Uganda, outside the Buganda kingdom, through the legal approach. The 
kingdoms and districts outside Buganda had strong family/clan identity, which was in 
sharp contrast with the tribal identity of the Buganda kingdom. The colonial 
administration somehow assumed that the traditional land rights in these kingdoms and 
districts were not serious ownership land rights. The customary land in these kingdoms 
58 
Un
i e
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
and districts was first converted into crov"" lands and then fonnaliscd into Ireeh()ld knure 
without consulting the indigen()us leadership or community. In ~upporl of thl~ 
assumption. a theory wus quickly advanced purporting that the indigenrnls pt'ople in the 
African dcpcndencie~ were n()t capallie of adapting to We~lern f()nm ()f indjvidLL.'l1 land 
ownership. It was ~gajnst this hackdrop th~t lhe foreign property laws wne imporled and 
used with impunity to ali<-llute the crown l:md~ in freebold land titles to non-Africans in 
Uganda. Kenya and the Tanzania !Tl1linl:md in the lir~t half of the 20m century. 
The lemtorial hound~tie~ of Uganda Prolectorale. which were handed over ~t 
inckpcndenec in 1962, datcs back to I K94 with the Buganda kingdom as the nuc1ellS and 
expanded until the la~t di~tricl, Karan1()j~ di~ricl in north-eastern Uganda. was 
incorporated in 1926. Tilt- annexations of other kingdom~ and districts wen: excruk-d 
with the hdp of the Haganda working as military am! admini~tmtive ~gents (Thomp~ 
2003: 44). At the cnd of this extension schcme, the UganUa f>TotcClorate had livc 
kingdoms und t~-n districts sbown in the map of Uganda (~ Figure 3. t). These di~tricts 
und kingdoms were fomled lICCording to tribal cthnic diver~ily, and the religious tivalrie~, 
which existed long before the protectorate earnc into exi~tence. h~ve conlinued t() hold 
back any semhlance of national cohesion. Only the Buganda region operatL'"d as a 
kingdom. while all thl.'" other kingdoms were trcmed as districts in the westL'"m and eaSIL'"rn 
regions. The <-1l1iR' area of Uganda ha.s heen divided further into 69 districts, but the 
sllh-clivi~i()ns wen: based on the si~c of land and administratiw convcnience ratbt--r than 
on thL'" dominlillt tribal c"mmunilies (~e Figure 3.2). 
First in the line of annexations 
were the kingdoms of Tol"O and 
Ankole under the 1900 Toro 
AgrccmL1lt and the 1901 Ankole 
AgrL'"cment. The"" lWo <Ib'fet'ments 
contained provlslOn~ on land 
senlement. which oonvcrtc.tl all 
custnmary land into Crown land. 
'llIc British CWWll, al its pleasure, 
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Figure 3.2: MAP OF UGANDA SHOWING DISTRICTS 
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••• ~==:Wl'U Kilorr~te" 
granted the Omukama ofToro and his chiefs 255 square miles of private estates and 122 
sqllarc miles of official estates. Similarly, the Omugal">c or Ankole and his chiefs ,,~re 
granted 26 square miles of official estates and 50 square miles of private estates 
(Mug<Ul1bwa 2002(h): 6). These estates are referred to !IS native freehold estates. to 
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convey the fact that they were specifically granted to native chiefs. The customary land 
that was granted in native freeholds had customary occupiers. This in itself was an 
anomaly because the land did not belong to the chiefs; land belonged to the community 
and it was individually held by the members of the community. Therefore, the 
formalisation of customary tenure into native freehold in Toro and Ankole kingdoms did 
not respect the customary regulations that governed land transactions in the respective 
areas. As a result, the majority of the native freehold landholders did not receive any 
ground rent and tribute from the customary occupiers of their land. Nevertheless, 
informal tenure relationships were created alongside the native freehold. 
The conversion of customary land into crown land was facilitated under the Uganda 
Order in Council, 1902, which was enacted according to the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 
1890 in order to incorporate the English property laws into the protectorate. The Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act gave controlling powers to the imperial government, which meant that 
the British Empire could freely dispose of the 'waste and unoccupied' land in the 
protectorates where there were no forms of government and where land had not been 
appropriated to the local sovereign or to individuals (Njonjo 2002: 23). The governor was 
henceforth empowered to issue freehold titles to non-Africans and corporate bodies. 
In 1915, a committee made up of the chief justice, a resident magistrate, the Attorney-
General and a land officer, recommended the extension of the official and private estates, 
on the Buganda model, to the kingdoms of Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro and Busoga (West 
1964: 58). These recommendations were however, tersely rejected by the Secretary of 
State, as he felt that they were not in the interests of the peasants. It would appear that the 
Secretary of State had recognised a serious weakness in the native freehold settlement, in 
that it had inflicted a grave injustice upon the vast majority of peasant occupiers. 
All the fertile agricultural customary land outside the Buganda kingdom was finally 
converted into crown lands when the Crown Lands (Declaration) Ordinance of 1922 
came into force. Under the Ordinance, proof of title to land was by authenticated 
document (Morris and Read 1966: 44-45). Persons with any claims of land rights against 
the Crown were given a year in which to lodge claims, but no claims were lodged 
because nobody understood the difference between crown and customary land. 
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Thereafter, until the tennination of the protectorate, the legal position was that, outside 
the Buganda kingdom, all land that was not held under title was deemed crown lands 
theoretically and at the disposal of the governor, but in practice held by him in trust for 
the customary landholders who were regarded as occupiers of crown land. The land 
occupied under customary tenure was therefore regarded as unalienated crown land. As 
such, the customary landholders were merely tenants at the mercy of the government, 
with no legal protection against eviction (Mwebaza 1999: 3). 
In July 1950, a fonnal policy statement issued by the Governor of Uganda reiterated that 
rural lands were to be held in trust for the use and benefit of the African population (Low 
1961: 3). The announcement committed the Colonial State to consult the African local 
governments before appropriating land for public purposes or alienating it to non-
Africans. It further required district councils to draw up by-laws, which would be used to 
administer customary land in accordance with the tribal custom, subject to the approval 
of the Governor. Despite this, no district council by-laws governing land tenure in 
accordance with tribal custom ever reached the statute book. The reactions of district 
councils were intended to show the Colonial State that the people did not approve the 
colonial land policy. 
The third land tenure refonn was also introduced by the colonial administration in 
accordance to the recommendations of the East African Royal Commission report of 
1955 (Okec 1969:255-256). The major recommendations of the report included the 
following: 
• The policy concerning the tenure and disposition of land should seek to individualise 
customary land ownership and the mobility of land transfers to enable access to land 
for economic use; 
• Government should carry out systematic adjudication and registration of individual 
customary holdings in selected areas; 
• Land tenure law should not be left to evolve under the impact of modem influences; a 
lead must be given by the government to meet the requirements of the progressive 
elements of society by applying a more satisfactory land tenure law. 
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The government accepted these recommendations, and in December 1955 it drew up 
proposals and passed them on to the district councils for consideration. These proposals 
were rejected in many areas of Uganda; in Teso, Lango and Bukedi, where customary 
land is held under communal (clan) ownership, there were even riots (Bazaara 1994: 17). 
However, in Ankole, Kigezi and Bugisu, where customary land was under individualised 
(family) ownership, the proposals were accepted and were later enacted into the Crown 
Lands (Adjudication) Rules, 1958. 
Since this was the time of the African nationalist movement for independence, the 
colonial state became cautious about the program of individualisation of tenure; and 
decided to test the waters through systematic adjudication pilot schemes in Ankole, 
Kigezi and Bugisu. Even the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
which prepared a blueprint for Uganda's economic development, was very cautious as 
can be discerned from the following recommendation, which the bank passed on to the 
government: "In the short run, changes in the system of land tenure should be modest and 
largely based on modifying rather than altering the fundamental structure of the land 
system" (quoted in Obol-Ocholla 1971: 135). 
In 1958, the Minister of Land Tenure held discussions with the district councils of 
Kigezi, Ankole and Bugisu to work out the modalities for setting up pilot schemes. These 
pilot schemes were later commissioned in Rujumbura County in Kigezi, Igara and Shema 
Counties in Ankole, and Bubilabi village in Bugisu districts. As soon as the pilot schemes 
were underway, the Ankole district council, which had adopted the Crown Lands 
(Adjudication) Rules, 1958, by a substantial majority of 57 in favour and 2 against, 
suffered humiliation from an application to the Uganda High Court filed by Mr Daudi 
Ndibarema (a former chief and a signatory to the Ankole Agreement, 1901), 
Mr C.C. Kafureka (a former chief and witness of the Ankole Agreement, 1901), 
Mr B.K. Mubangizi and Mr N. Katarishwerwa (both elected members of the Ankole 
district council) (Low 1961: 4). The application sought to nullify the minutes, resolutions 
and/or proceedings of the district council of Ankole held on 8th August 1958 on the 
grounds that they were invalid because the requisite quorum of sixty members was not 
present. It also sought an injunction to stop the Enganzi (Prime Minister) of Ankole 
and/or the district commissioner of Ankole from acting on the aforesaid invalid 
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resolutions, and to stop the Minister of Natural Resources and/or the Uganda government 
from introducing the Crown Lands (Adjudication) Rules, 1958, in the Ankole kingdom. 
The High Court granted the application, and Her Majesty's Court of Appeal for East 
Africa dismissed the subsequent appeal by the colonial administration and affirmed the 
decision of the Uganda High Court made at Kampala on May 28, 1959. However, the 
Uganda High Court had established (Low 1961: 5) that no consultation with the district 
councils was legally necessary before the Crown Lands (Adjudication) Rules, 1958, were 
formulated and implemented. The net outcome of this judgment was the suspension of 
systematic adjudication together with the Crown Lands (Adjudication) Rules, 1958, until 
1967 when systematic adjudication was resumed under the Public Lands (Adjudication) 
Rules, 1967, to complete the work that had been started in the three pilot districts of 
Kigezi, Ankole, and Bugisu. Adjudicated freehold like mailo and native freehold was 
thus never allowed to spread to any new areas outside the counties that had been 
earmarked for the systematic adjudication pilot projects. 
According to Okec (1969: 262), by the time the pilot project in Ankole came to a 
standstill, 1,600 applications had been adjudicated and 1,560 plots surveyed, out of which 
370 titles were issued. The systematic adjudication and survey of Rujumbura pilot 
scheme in Kigezi were completed in March 1962 with 6,600 plots adjudicated and 6,400 
plots demarcated and surveyed. More than 95% of the applicants had been awarded land 
by the committees. About 3% of the applicants appealed to the Magistrate's Court and 
the number of appeals upheld and rejected was almost equal. By 1968, only 1,800 land 
titles had been issued to the respective landowners in Rujumbura County. In Bugisu, 120 
plots were adjudicated and surveyed without prior payment of fees, and 34 titles were 
issued. These land titles are referred to as adjudicated freehold titles just to convey the 
fact that they were issued to indigenous customary landholders through the systematic 
adjudication process. 
The purpose of the pilot schemes was to secure absolute and indefeasible titles for 
customary landholders, subject only to the leases and other encumbrances shown in the 
register and to overriding interests. The register had to be maintained to ensure that it 
showed current conditions at all times, and failure to register an interest would render it 
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ineffective. Because the formalisation was done for the benefit of customary landholders, 
who physically held and cultivated the land, no informal tenure relationships were 
created in the formal adjudicated freehold areas. 
The cost of adjudication, demarcation and field survey of customary land parcels was 
between Uganda shillings 25-35 per acre inclusive of aerial photography, plotting and 
provision of survey control. Given that the market value ofland was estimated at Uganda 
shillings 200 per acre in 1960 (Okec 1969: 261), it follows that the pilot schemes were 
heavily subsidised by government. Moreover, one would have expected the customary 
landholders to accept their titles almost immediately. However, their apparent 
indifference in collecting the land titles can be attributed to a number of reasons. Firstly, 
they did not know about the advantages of a freehold land title. After the boundaries had 
been adjudicated and surveyed, litigations were reduced and the landowners felt 
adequately secure. Secondly, the titles were issued at the district land offices, which were 
too far away for many owners to travel. Thirdly, the cost of title was still high for people 
living at a comparatively low standard of subsistence agriculture. Fourthly, the majority 
of the uncollected land titles pertained to small plots or belonged to poor people, who, if 
they had had to pay fees in advance, would never have applied for titles in the first place. 
However, the indigenous people believed that they held customary land in perpetuity. 
Because the colonial administration did not interfere with customary landholding in the 
rural areas and because freehold was introduced without prior sensitisation, the 
indigenous people had no reason to believe that freehold would offer better security of 
tenure; they thus decided to ignore it. This explains why valid freehold titles are still 
lying in land registry offices to the present day, awaiting collection by their owners in 
exchange for a nominal payment. 
3.2 Formalisation of customary tenure after independence 
The colonial administration left behind an agricultural sector, which was vulnerable to 
world crop price fluctuations, as well as an agro-industrial sector that could not absorb 
Uganda's growing population (Thompson 2003: 340). The economy did not have any 
capitalist characteristics either. This was because no attempt had been made by the 
colonial administration to introduce capitalism throughout its tenure of office. The 
65 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
productive activity remained African, individual and small-scale. Throughout the 
country, there was an increased emphasis on tobacco, a shift towards coffee as the main 
cash crop and the spread of maize cultivation. The terms of trade also turned sharply in 
favour of many Ugandans, and the export prices for cotton and especially for coffee far 
outstripped the increased prices of the imported goods. 
Although the government retained the mailo and freehold tenure systems, their scope of 
operation was already limited. Mailo tenure was already limited to 9,000 square miles of 
the Buganda kingdom, and adjudicated freehold had been suspended following the High 
court case of 1959, which the colonial administration finally lost in Her Majesty's Court 
of Appeal for East Africa. The subsequent governments implemented the colonial 
administration's land policy, which was recommended under the Public Lands Act of 
1962. This Act provided for the conversion of crown lands into public lands and the 
implementation of leasehold tenure throughout the country. It established the Uganda 
Land Commission and districtlkingdom land boards to allocate land to individuals and 
corporate bodies. One of the main drawbacks of the 1962 Public Lands Act was that it 
did not put a ceiling on the amount of land that could be allocated to an individual. By 
1968, the Land Committees in some districts were granting as much as ten thousand acres 
of land to senior members of government including members of Parliament. And in some 
of these districts, local residents were enclosed and turned into squatters on their own 
land (Uganda Parliamentary Debates: 26 February 1969) 
The question of land tenure reform continued to be highly controversial and divisive. The 
first attempt to formalise customary land was thus through negotiations with the 
leadership of the Buganda kingdom in 1900. The second land tenure reform was carried 
out in the other parts of Uganda, outside the Buganda kingdom, through the legal 
approach. The third land tenure reform was introduced according to the recommendations 
of the East African Royal Commission report of 1955. The fourth land tenure reform 
came under the Republican Constitution of 1967, which put an end to the special federal 
relationship previously enjoyed by Buganda. Every estate held by a corporation by virtue 
of the National Official Estates Ordinance of 1919 was vested in the Uganda Land 
Commission, a statutory body, which was established and empowered to allocate all the 
unalienated land on behalf of the central government. The official mailo, which was 
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operated under the Buganda Land Board, and the Kabakaship mailo were both 
eliminated. The ownership of public land and the powers of control over it were likewise 
centralized and vested in the Uganda Land Commission. All mineral rights in mailo land 
were vested in the government of Uganda, thus removing one of the differences between 
privately held mailo and freehold interests in land. The districtlkingdom land boards were 
abolished and replaced by the Uganda Land Commission (Bazaara 1994: 17) and the 
maximum amount of land that could be allocated to an individual was set down at 500 
acres. 
In 1975, the government initiated the fifth land reform through the Land Reform Decree 
of 1975. Under this decree, all land in Uganda including land previously held by title was 
declared public land and vested in the State. The land reform decree abolished all 
freehold interests in land, except where these were already vested in the State, in which 
case these were already transferred to the Uganda Land Commission. It also abolished 
mailo land tenure and converted both mailo and freehold into leaseholds of 199 years for 
public bodies and 99 years for individuals. Effectively, then, all land was now held in 
trust by the government on behalf of the people of Uganda and was administered by the 
Uganda Land Commission. Because there was no parliament at the time, the ultimate title 
vested in the head of state. The main objectives of the decree were twofold: to enact a 
comprehensive law, which would enable and empower the state to enforce good 
agricultural practices; and to resolve the longstanding landlord/tenant impasse on mailo 
land in terms of which the mailo landlord had ownership of the land without inducement 
to invest in its improvement, and the tenant occupied the land without having the power 
to develop it. 
The sixth and last land refonn took place twenty years later in 1995. The Land Refonn Decree of 
1975, which had been enacted without public debate or even prior warning, was abolished by the 
1995 Constitution and repealed under the Land Act, 1998 (Cap. 227). The Constitution restored 
mailo and freehold tenure systems. It went even further, and made new and radical changes in the 
relationships between the state and the land in Uganda by declaring that all land in Uganda would 
henceforth belong to the citizens of Uganda and vest in them in accordance with mailo, leasehold, 
freehold and customary land tenure systems; that the government or local government may 
acquire land in the public interest and also hold in trust for the people and protect, natural lakes, 
rivers, wetlands, forest reserves, game reserves, national parks and any land to be reserved for 
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ecological and tourist purposes for the common good of all citizens; and that non-citizens may 
acquire leases in land not exceeding 99 years. By the end of 2000, approximately 5% of the total 
landmass of Uganda was under freehold and leasehold, 10% was under mailo tenure, and 85% 
was under customary tenure. 
During the discussion of a paper entitled, "Access to land and other natural resources: Research 
and other policy development projects (Uganda)" which was presented by Marquardt (1996) at 
the Sahara and Sahel Observatory Workshop held at the headquarters of the Economic 
Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa, it was observed that it was necessary for the government 
of Uganda to assess further the effort by the 1995 Uganda Constitution on the location of radical 
title to land, the exact quantum of rights conferred by each tenure category set out in the 
Constitution, and any policy the government may wish to undertake 
Table 3.2: The history of formalisation of customary tenure in Uganda, 1890 - 2003 
PERIOD FORMALISATION OF CUSTOMARY TENURE IN UGANDA 
Existing tenure Eligible tenure Tenure systems in New formal tenures 
systems systems transition 
1890 - - Feudal (tribal) - Feudal - Communal - IOO-year leases 
1900 - Communal (clan) - Individualised - Territorial - Absolute ownership 
- Territorial 
(nomadic) 
- Individualised 
(family) 
1900- - Feudal - Feudal -Communal - Mailo 
1962 -Communal - Individualised -Territorial - Freehold 
- Individualised - Native freehold 
- Territorial - Leasehold for 99 
- Leasehold years 
- Absolute 
ownership 
1962- -Communal -Communal -Territorial - Adjudicated freehold; 
1975 - Individualised - Individualised - Leaseholds for 49 and 
- Territorial -Informal 199 years. 
- Leasehold 
- Mailo 
- Freehold 
- Native freehold 
1975 - -Communal -Communal -Territorial - Leaseholds for 49,99, 
1995 - Individualised - Individualised and 199 years 
- Territorial - Informal 
- Leasehold 
1995 - - Communal -Communal -Territorial - Mailo 
2003 - Territorial - Individualised - Freehold 
- Individualised -Informal 
- Native freehold 
- Mailo 
- Customary tenure 
- Freehold 
- Adjudicated freehold 
- Leasehold 
- Leasehold for 99 
- Native freehold years 
- Adjudicated 
freehold 
68 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Table 3.2 presents the history of the formalisation of customary tenure in Uganda for the 
period 1890-2003 (West 1971: 10-13; Uganda Government 2004: 4; Cohen 1959: 67-70; 
Mugambwa 2002(a): 2-4; Kisamba-Mugerwa 1995: xiii). 
According to West (1971: 10-13), the formalisation of land in the Uganda Protectorate 
had already begun before Sir Harry Johnston arrived in the country in 1899 to resolve the 
land question. Between 1890 and 1900, Her Majesty's Commissioner issued four 100-
year leases, two 5-year leases, and one 21-year lease to English as well as German 
companies. He issued an absolute ownership title to Katikiro Mugwanya of the Buganda 
kingdom and also, together with both the King and the chiefs of Buganda or Toro 
kingdoms, issued title deeds in absolute ownership to religious missionary societies. 
3.3 Discussion of land Tenure issues in Uganda 
The British Empire took over the Buganda kingdom, which became the nucleus of the 
Uganda Protectorate, in 1894. The other districts and kingdoms of the present Uganda 
were annexed to the Buganda kingdom one by one with the help of the Baganda working 
as administrative and military agents; and the exercise went on until 1926 when Rudolf 
province, which shares its borders with the Karamoja district, was transferred to the 
colony of Kenya. The annexation process was relatively smooth in the kingdom areas, 
except in Bunyoro where Omukama Kabalega put up some stiff resistance, which was 
later subdued by the colonial administration in collaboration with the Buganda kingdom. 
It was, however, not so smooth in the northern region and some battles had to be fought 
in Teso, Lango and Bukedi districts leading to a number of deaths (Thompson 2002: 43). 
The Uganda Protectorate was created by the British Empire through a struggle. The areas 
under feudal customary tenure were taken over first, followed by the non-feudal 
sedentary and territorial customary areas in that order. Because the colonial 
administration wanted to incorporate Uganda into the world economy and promote 
production and consumption to ensure that the Uganda Protectorate was financially 
viable, the land question became one of the main items on the agenda. The colonial 
administration insisted on formalizing customary tenure into freehold to support large-
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scale farming, which was believed to be the most important factor that would help to 
incorporate Uganda into the world economy. 
Despite the aggressIve approach, the British Empire made a number of significant 
positive contributions to the development of Uganda. It created the borders of present day 
Uganda; although inside these borders were a number of tribes with different objectives. 
As Thompson (2003: 339) observed, "Even in the 1890s, the Baganda themselves were 
already divided; and the protectorate came to contain a great variety of peoples, whose 
previous relations had tended to be neither close nor cordial." The British Empire did not 
make any attempt to unite these tribes into a nation state. This was because the purpose of 
the British Empire was to possess, rather than to settle. Thompson (2003: 339) further 
observed, "The districts that were formed under British rule expected the state to act as an 
agency for satisfying the local/tribal expectations rather than for promoting territory-wide 
benefit." These district-tribal sentiments were later passed on to the subsequent 
governments after independence. It would appear that tribalism is an issue, which the 
independent Uganda government must resolve in order to create national unity. 
The introduction of uniform land tenure in all the districts throughout the country is one 
of the avenues through which national unity could be achieved. Formal land tenure is 
likely to set a firm foundation for land market forces, which may also help to minimize 
these tribal sentiments, which are now entrenched in mailo and customary tenure systems 
and are being perpetuated by the elites and by representatives of the districts. As Fred 
Burke (1964: 229, quoted by Thompson, 2003: 324) observed, "not a few representatives 
to Uganda's National Assembly are inclined to regard themselves (and, just as important, 
are regarded by their fellow tribesmen) as district-tribal ambassadors." 
The British Empire succeeded in incorporating Uganda into the world economy by 
identifying small-scale farming and encouraging it to continue. Many attempts have been 
made by the subsequent governments to modernise Uganda's economic culture of 
production and consumption, which is a legacy of the colonial administration, albeit 
without much success. However, the partial integration of the local Ugandans into the 
capitalist system was aptly summarised by Brett (1973: 307, quoted by Nsibambi 
1996: 5) in the following words, "the creation of the relations of service dependency does 
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not constitute the evolution of the capitalist system proper, but only a bastardised version 
of it." These service dependent relations are to some extent responsible for having created 
an ideological stalemate under which the competing socialist and capitalist elitist groups 
used to engage each other in oral and documentary academic discussions and criticisms 
most of the time (Nsibambi 1996: 14). The full benefits ofa formal land tenure system, in 
the capitalist sense, have never been realised up to today. This problem was further 
aggravated by the fact that the British Empire introduced five formal land tenure systems 
in different districts of Uganda without any prior sensitisation of the local population. 
This made the indigenous people very suspicious of formal tenure, as they thought that it 
was intended to take away customary land. Any attempt to transform small-scale farming 
into industrialised farming through the formal tenure approach will require considerable 
further sensitisation in order to reverse the people's attitude towards formal land tenure. 
The first land tenure reform took place in 1900. At the time, the customary tenure in 
Uganda had already evolved into four categories of tenure systems, namely, feudal, 
family, clan and territorial (nomadic) customary tenures. The local population in the 
Buganda kingdom had strong tribal identity, which was reflected in their feudal system of 
government. Most of the other areas outside the Buganda kingdom had family and clan 
customary tenure systems, with the exception of Karamoja district, which had territorial 
(nomadic) customary tenure and a strong communal identity. The customary land under 
family and clan tenure systems recognised the individual's exclusive use rights over a 
specified piece of land 
The formalisation of customary land into mailo in the Buganda kingdom was achieved 
through negotiations between Sir Harry Johnston, the Commissioner of the Queen in 
Uganda, and the chiefs of the Buganda kingdom. The chiefs, notables and the royal 
family of the Kabaka maximized the opportunity given to them, and literally took all the 
good land for themselves, so that very little arable land was left. There was also no more 
arable land, which the protectorate government could allocate to non-Africans who were 
expected to introduce plantation farming. 
Because the colonial administration was determined to acquire arable land for large-scale 
farming, it changed its strategy so that there were no more negotiations with the local 
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chiefs. As a result, the subsequent land reforms in the other parts of Uganda were 
executed by using the force of law rather than through negotiations. The colonial 
administration converted all the customary land, by the stroke of the pen, to Crown lands, 
and the Governor, through the land officer, was authorised to issue freehold titles to non-
Africans. Issuing freehold titles to non-Africans occurred mainly because Africans were 
assumed to be incapable of adapting to Western forms of individual land ownership. It 
would appear that in making this assumption the colonial administration was sure that the 
way in which they had abruptly introduced freehold without any prior sensitisation 
whatsoever, would make it practically impossible for the indigenous people to adapt to 
freehold. The colonial administration was not even sure that mailo tenure, a quasi-
freehold form, which had been abruptly introduced in the Buganda kingdom, would 
work; nor did it make any attempt to establish whether individualized ownership existed 
in most of the other kingdoms and districts of Uganda. Because individualised ownership 
already existed in most of the other kingdoms and districts of Uganda, the theory 
purporting that Africans were incapable of adapting to Western forms of individual land 
ownership did not hold any water. It must have been a mere political statement, which 
supported the plan to use force to acquire large chunks of arable land for industrialised 
farming from the local population without their consent. 
The plan to acqUIre customary land by force became an uphill task because all the 
sedentary customary land was already individualised and was effectively under 
occupation of the local population. Even the territorial (nomadic) customary land, which 
was held communally, was under effective occupation. It turned out, much later, that 
most of the land that the European plantation farmers acquired and used for large-scale 
farming was instead bought from the mailo landlords and converted to freehold before 
the Secretary of State prohibited the sale of mailo land to non-Africans in 1916 (West 
1971: 6). The fact that the colonial Secretary of State had to intervene and 
administratively prohibit the sale of mailo land to non-Africans suggests that the colonial 
administration would probably have achieved better results if it had negotiated with the 
local chiefs in the other parts of Uganda. An exception, perhaps, is Karamoja district, 
which had a strong communal identity; more research is still required to establish how 
formal ownership of land within communal (nomadic) societies can be achieved. This 
documentary review has revealed that the negotiations approach is a much better method 
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than the enforced legal approach. The legal approach is particularly unacceptable because 
it negates the consent principle, which is one of the four cardinal principles of any land 
registration system. As land is the main source of livelihood for the majority of the local 
Ugandan population, nobody should expect to succeed in taking it away without seeking 
the consent of the indigenous people. According to the World Bank Report (2003: 17), 
land in not only a key determinant in household welfare but it constitutes 60% of the 
households' asset portfolio in Uganda. 
The colonial administration introduced foreign property laws, and changed the ultimate 
land ownership from the community to the State. And the post-colonial governments 
retained the property statutory laws, based on English common law. In 1995, the 
government vested the land in the citizens of Uganda in accordance with mailo, 
customary, freehold and leasehold tenure systems; and attempts are currently being made 
to democratise private ownership and to adopt freehold as the formal tenure to underpin 
the market economy. 
In summary, the discussion of the existing land tenure in Uganda has established the 
following pertinent issues: 
• The negotiations approach is better than the enforced legal approach, and the 
government should democratise private ownership through sensitisation and 
negotiations; 
• Individualised customary land ownership underpins the introduction of formal land 
tenure; 
• More research needs to be done on territorial customary tenure before any attempts 
can be made to bring it onto the register; 
• The theory purporting that Africans were incapable of adapting to Western forms of 
private ownership, was a mere political statement intended to support the plan to 
acquire arable customary land for large-scale farming without first seeking the 
consent of the customary landholders. 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
Despite all the changes that have been made to the colonial land policy to the present day, 
the characteristics of the land question in Uganda are not significantly different from 
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what they were during the colonial period. Firstly, the feudal system of land tenure 
remained a feature of land relations on the 9,000 square miles of mailo land in the 
Buganda region. The 8,000 square miles, which became crown land, lost their feudal 
relations because the Kabaka, his chiefs and the Lukiiko focused all their attention on the 
management of mailo land. The crown land thus became non-feudal sedentary customary 
land like all the customary land in the other regions outside the Buganda kingdom. 
Secondly, customary land tenure systems, which account for 85% of the total landmass of 
Uganda, are unregulated and completely outside the statutory framework of the country. 
Thirdly, land administration had not yet been integrated into a comprehensive land policy 
framework of the country. 
The 1995 Uganda Constitution and the Land Act, 1998 (Cap. 227) did not deal 
conclusively with the fundamental issues underlying the characteristics of the customary, 
informal relationships and the formal land tenure systems respectively. This was because 
no clear policy principles existed to inform legislators in the enactment of those laws. 
Although policies do indeed exist on various aspects of the land sector such as forestry, 
agriculture, environment and urbanisation, these are eclectic, sectoral and inconclusive in 
many respects. There is a need to work backwards, starting from the existing legislations, 
and thus to come up with the national land policy that will define the guidelines for the 
formalisation of customary and informal land tenure systems in Uganda. Such national 
land policy would have to operate within the framework of the existing privatisation and 
decentralisation policies. 
In summary, Uganda inherited five formal tenure systems from the colonial 
administration, viz. mailo, freehold, leasehold, native freehold and adjudicated freehold. 
Four of these tenure systems were located in different districts, and register the same land 
rights held in perpetuity. Leasehold tenure, which is the fifth, is a derivative tenure 
system with fixed duration and it can be created out of any of the four tenure systems by 
contract. 
The formalisation process, which led to the creation of leasehold titles, also created 
informal relationships because the applicants were not applying for the land, which they 
occupied. This was because all the land belonged to the state and applicants were at 
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liberty to apply to government for any land of their choice anywhere in Uganda. The state 
did not bother to establish whether the land, which the people applied for, had customary 
occupiers or not. Both the formal and informal tenure systems have with time, acquired 
social, cultural and political attachments of the local districts, which are now working 
against the spirit of nationalism. The present study attempted to harmonise the existing 
informal, formal and customary tenure systems into a simple formal tenure structure, 
which should be implemented as a public good by means of a systematic demarcation and 
adjudication approach. 
The next chapter describes the methodology and the research instruments, which were 
used to collect data from the selected survey areas, land records, and from the legislators, 
top land administrators and private land developers. It also describes the data analysis 
methods, which were used to analyse data from the land records, the structured interview 
schedules, and the parishes representing informal, individualised and communal tenure 
systems. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
4.0 Introduction 
The study sought to harmonize statutory, customary and informal tenure systems of 
Uganda into uniform tenure system. Therefore the basic problem was to determine a 
uniform tenure system that would be acceptable to customary landholders living under 
informal tenure, individualised tenure and communal customary tenure. In order to 
achieve this objective, the study focused on three issues. Firstly, the study had to 
understand all the statutory tenure systems in Uganda. This was because the most suitable 
formal tenure system was to be selected from the existing statutory tenure systems. 
Secondly, the acceptability of the selected tenure system had to be tested in three case 
study areas representing informal, individualised, and communal customary tenure 
systems. And thirdly, the selected formal tenure and its acceptability had to be verified 
using structured interview approach which was directed to politicians, land administrators 
and private land developers. 
In order to understand the tenure systems of Uganda, a historical review was adopted and 
the requisite data was collected through documentary review and critical analysis of the 
available primary and secondary sources. The main sources in this regard were the 
archives, the newspapers, the internet, Makerere University'S main library and the main 
library of the University of Cape Town. The data from the land records of the Ministry of 
Water, Land and Environment was extracted using a data extraction form attached at 
Appendix C. 
The survey design for the case study areas took into account all the existing land tenure 
systems in Uganda. For the purpose of this study, the existing land tenure systems were 
re-structured into four categories. The study designated informal tenure as the first 
category of land tenure. Informal tenure exists on four statutory tenure systems, namely, 
native freehold, leasehold, freehold and mailo. The adjudication processes which 
preceded the registration of adjudicated freehold made sure that the land was free of 
customary occupiers before registration. Because mailo covers 10% of the total land mass 
of Uganda, the informal tenure case study was selected on mailo land. The second 
category was individualised (family) customary tenure. This category is found in the 
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western and eastern regions. The third category was communal (clan) customary tenure, 
which is predominant in the northern region; and the fourth was territorial (nomadic) 
customary tenure, which is predominant in north-eastern Uganda but also found in 
patches along the cattle corridor stretching from Karamoja district in the north-east to 
Rukungiri district in the south-west of Uganda. 
No field data for territorial (nomadic) customary tenure was collected, however, because 
the necessary data could be accessed from an earlier study, which had been carried out by 
Kisamba-Mugerwa in 1995. The households of the three parishes representing the three 
land tenure categories mentioned above were sensitised about systematic demarcation 
and adjudication before the research assistants of the Makerere Institute of Social 
Research collected the survey data using questionnaires. Kabigi parish in the Masaka 
district represented informal tenure, Rukarango parish in the Ntungamo district 
represented individualised (family) customary tenure, and Aminit parish in the Sorioti 
district represented the communal (clan) customary tenure. A sample of the 
questionnaire, which was used by the research assistants of Makerere Institute of Social 
Research to collect data, is attached as Appendix F. 
Prior to the collection of data using the questionnaires, Technology Consults, a consulting 
firm based in the faculty of Technology, Makerere University, was contracted by the 
Systematic Demarcation Committee to sensitise the local population in the pilot parishes 
of Rukarango in Ntungamo, Kabigi in Masaka, and Aminit in Soroti districts about good 
agricultural practices, environmental protection measures and to educate them about 
systematic adjudication and demarcation approach. The use of different consultancy 
firms to sensitise and to collect data from the local population was intended to minimise 
the government involvement with the local population and thus to minimise the errors 
that are usually associated with the results acquired through questionnaires. 
The structured interviews were directed to politicians, top land administrators and private 
land developers with the intention of gathering first hand information from the 
technocrats responsible for the actual implementation of the land policies and from policy 
makers and legislators who formulate the laws that guide the implementation of the land 
policies. The sample of the structured interview schedule which was used is attached as 
77 
U
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
Appendix D. The policy makers and legislators who were targeted for the interviews 
included the Prime Minister who is the Leader of Government Business and members of 
opposition in parliament. The top land administrators included Commissioners of the 
departments of Land Registration and of Surveys and Mapping, the Coordinator of the 
Land Tenure Reform Project, private land developers and a senior principal Registrar. 
4.1 Understanding the existing formalisation process 
According to De Soto (2001 :183), the law used to transform unproductive assets into 
productive ones must come from the mouth of the people. When this happens, the 
resultant formal register of land rights offers better security and protection to property 
owners. Secure property rights provide the following benefits: reduced level of land 
disputes over parcel boundaries; easy access to land leading to more transparent land 
transactions; the land owners become more accountable; land becomes safe to use as a 
commodity for commercial transactions by individuals and corporate entities; and the 
government earns revenue from the land through land taxation. 
Ownership by documentary title usually starts with the identification of the ultimate 
owner as controller of the land rights, i.e. the state or head of state that guarantees and 
legitimises the land rights. The ultimate owner becomes the overseer of the whole process 
of distributing land rights to individuals and corporate bodies, who wish to use the land 
for various purposes. After 1900, the head of state was identified as the ultimate owner of 
all land in Uganda. Although the Constitution of 1995 vested all the land in the citizens 
of Uganda in accordance with customary, freehold, mailo and leasehold land tenure 
systems, the ultimate title still vests in the head of state. This implies that all customary 
and informal landowners are obliged to apply to government for documentary titles to the 
land they occupy. The State through its agents will receive the applications and set in 
motion the formalisation process, which will convert customary and informal tenures into 
formal land tenure system. 
The study thus divided the formalisation process into six sections. Data for each of these 
six sections was collected using a data collection form (Appendix C). In Section 1, we 
collected data about how long it takes before the Uganda Land Commission meets to 
approve or reject the applications for lease offers. The data for Section 2 looked at how 
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long ittakC"s for the successful applications to reach the desk of the Commissioner for 
Surveys and Mapping who then issues instn)(;tion~ to condud a survey_ Data for SL'\;tion 
3 inve~ligaleU how long it takes the Surveys anJ Mapping Department to earry out the 
land survey, to process the results and to is~uc certified deed plan~. nata lilr Seclion 4 sd 
out how long it takes the applicants to pay the nece~sa')' ree~ t>elore the certified deed 
plans can be submitted to the Department of Land Registratil'n. Data lin Section 5 
concerned how long it takes to lodge thC" deed plans together with other registrahle 
dOt;uments. And lastly, data for Scdion 6 was about how long it take~ to register the land 
aner the docwnents have been lodged . When the information from all the six section~ 
was pul together, it became possible to identify the weak links in the formalisation 
process. With this information, it was possible to rc-engineer the formalisation proce~s to 
make it morc efficient and su itablC" to mc<-'t the needs ofthe people of Uganda. 
The data collection exercise using a data colle~1:ion fom] brought the researeher in touch 
with the dilapidated records in the land regist,), strong roomS. In Figure 4.1a, it can be 
scen that thC" land records were packed into wooden portable cnpboards, and some 
records were thrown on the tloor. In Figure 4.lh. Ihere were rewer fiks on the shelves 
and some documents were kept on a oroken chair. The rescarcher was told that most of 
Figu,"" 4.1(>1) Figure4.1(h) 
f~lIr •• 4. t ~ & 4.tb: Sr~t"; orland rec<trd, at t~. dis(rict (rv.' 
the documems had in fad t>cenlost during the likration wan; of 1979 and I \lM5. l3eeansc 
the strong rOOmS are seen merely <IS ~Iore~ of old and unused documents. they appear to 
he neglcded. For purposes of this ~tudy, dala was extracted from Mbalc land oflice in Ihe 
79 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
C
pe
 To
wn
northeast, Kampala land registry in the central province, and Mbarara land office in the 
south-west of Uganda. Every effort was made to ensure that the representative sample 
size of 482 land registers was realised. 
4.2 Criteria for the selection of survey areas 
The selected survey areas, as indicated in Figure 4.2, were Rukarango parish in 
Ntungamo district in the south-west, Kabigi parish in Masaka district in central province, 
and Aminit parish in Soroti district in northern Uganda. Rukarango parish was purposely 
selected in an individualised (family) customary area, which has some scattered native 
freehold parcels. The parish is located on a rural and hilly terrain with swampy valleys. 
The residents are crop farmers, and the area is heavily populated with very small 
individual land parcels. Aminit parish was selected in a communal (clan) customary area 
that has a number of leasehold parcels. The parish is located on a generally flat terrain, 
the people practice mixed farming and the land parcels are relatively large. Kabigi parish 
was selected in an informal tenure area, on mailo land and in a rural and undulating 
terrain, which is heavily populated. The residents are basically crop farmers and petty 
traders with a substantial tenancy rate and with medium-sized parcels of land 
4.3 Data collection methods 
4.3.1 Collection of statutory tenure data 
The study design and setting, inclusion procedure, sample SIze determination, and 
sampling and data collection methods are outlined below: 
1) Study design and setting: The historical account of land tenure systems in 
Uganda, which was outlined in chapter three, revealed that mailo tenure was 
systematically introduced in Buganda (central region) through negotiations; adjudicated 
freehold was systematically introduced in Ankole and Rukungiri districts (both in 
western region) and Mbale district in eastern region through pilot projects; native 
freehold was systematically introduced in Ankole and Toro (both in western region) 
through negotiations with native chiefs; freehold tenure was sporadically introduced 
throughout the country, largely for the benefit of non-Africans; and leasehold was 
sporadically introduced throughout the country immediately after independence. The 
historical account confirmed that the land tenure systems were generally clustered all 
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over the country. The study was designed to capture the representativeness of the 
clustered statutory tenure systems in the country. The study population included land 
titles from three main land offices: Kampala in the central region, Mbarara in the west 
and Mbale in the eastern region. The study considered a total population of 443,000 land 
titles distributed among the 5 land tenure systems as follows: 
Mailo = 110,307 
Adjudicated freehold = 46,072 
Native freehold 
Freehold 
Leasehold 
= 54,932 
= 100,118 
= 131,571 
2) Inclusion procedure: Only land titles processed since 1900 up to November 
2003 were considered in the population. 
3) Sample size determination: The modified Kish formula (Kish 1965) quoted 
below was used to determine the sample size. 
n = (Z2p (l-p) D)/e2 
Where: n is the required sample size; 
p is the proportion of the population of the existing formal land titles with respect 
to the total number of titles in the country; 
Z is the percentile value at a confidence level of 95% = 1.96; 
e is the acceptable standard error on the estimated proportion of titles; and 
D is the design effect due to clustering and it is estimated to be at 2.0 (WHO 
standard). 
Parameters e and p in the Kish equation are user defined parameters while Z and D are 
constants. For purposes of this study, the parameter e was fixed at 2.5%. Consequently, 
the parameter p worked out as follows: 
Number of land titles in the population 
P = Expected land titles in the country 
Because the expected number of land titles in the country has never been established, the 
above formula was modified as follows: 
Total acreage of land titles in the population 
P= 
Total acreage of landmass in Uganda 
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_ Average size of plot * Number of titles in the population 
Total acreage of landmass in Uganda 
= 0.022 * 443000 = 0.040 ~ 4% 
241138 
The average size of plot was 2.2 hectares, the number of titles in the population sample 
was 443,000 and the total landmass in Uganda was 241,138 Km. 2 Consequently, the 
following values were derived and substituted in the Kish equation: e = 2.5%; p = 4%; Z 
= 1.96: and D = 2 (WHO standard). Hence the sample size worked out as 472 land titles. 
A 2% (10 land titles) increase in sample size was used to account for land titles with 
partially missing information. Thus, the sample size of 482 land titles was realised and a 
data extraction form was used to collect information from the land title registers. 
The Kish formula is appropriate for the selection of a simple random sample and it takes 
care of the design effect in a situation where the sample is from a clustered population 
and it has the following advantages: 
• It accounts for the statistical measure of precision in the computation of sample size; 
• There is no need for a sampling frame which would be expensive to construct in 
clusters of large differences in size; 
• The formula accounts for the statistical certainty of the sample to be selected; 
• The formula is most applicable in one time surveys that make use of samples from 
clustered populations. 
This sample size of 482 land titles was distributed into 5 land tenure systems using the 
following general formula, which maintains the probability proportional to the size of 
each land tenure system (Kish 1965:217-221): 
s = Total number of titles in a given land tenure system * Sample size of the study 
Total number of titles in the population sample 
Where s = sub-sample size for a given land tenure system. 
Using the above general formula, the sub-sample sizes worked out as follows: 
Mailo = 120 
Leasehold = 143 
Adjudicated Freehold = 50 
Freeholds = 109 
Native Freeholds = 60 
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4) Sampling and data collection: At each of the three land offices (Mbarara, 
Mbale and Kampala), the land titles for each of the five statutory tenure systems were 
kept separately. The land titles for a given tenure system would then be purposively 
divided into three clusters. Using simple random sampling the sample size for the tenure 
system would then be selected from the three clusters. Consequently the sample sizes for 
all land tenure systems were selected and information extracted from them using a data 
extraction form presented at appendix C). 
4.3.2 Collection of baseline survey data using a questionnaire 
The main objective of the household baseline survey was to establish the feasibility of 
using the systematic demarcation approach as a strategy for implementing formal tenure 
in Uganda. The questionnaire was designed by members of the Systematic Demarcation 
Committee and handed over to the Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR) with 
the instruction to collect data on its behalf from the parishes of Kabigi in Masaka, 
Rukarago in Ntungamo, and Aminit in Soroti districts (see Figure 4.2). Because the 
researcher is a member of the Systematic Demarcation Committee, he participated in the 
design of the questionnaire for the household baseline survey and in the selection of the 
parishes where the household baseline survey was to be carried out. This explains why 
the Project Coordinator of the Land Tenure Reform Project did not hesitate to release the 
raw data, which was acquired using the household survey questionnaire to this researcher. 
The permission to use the data is attached as appendix E. 
4.3.3 Collection of data from key informants using a structured interview schedule 
The researcher made appointments with the Prime Minister, members of the opposition in 
parliament, top government land administrators and private land developers before the 
interviews were carried out. In most cases the informants demanded to look at the 
structured interview schedule in advance. The results of the interviews were noted down 
and are presented and analysed in section 5.3. This data was purposely collected to verify 
the data extracted from land records and from the three parishes representing informal, 
individualised and communal land tenure systems. A sample of the structured interview 
schedule form is presented in appendix D 
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4.4 Data analysis methods 
Data analysis was done at two levels: the unvariate and the bivariate levels. This 
approach was used to analyse data acquired through both the questionnaires and the data 
extraction form. Further responses were extracted from the land administrators, 
politicians, and private land developers using the structured interview schedule form. 
These were synthesised to bring out the views of the politicians, land administrators and 
private land developers on uniform land tenure (freehold), the survey process and the 
land registration process. 
1) Univariate analysis: This involved data description and summarisation for some 
of the categorical and numeric variables. The presentation was in the form of histograms 
and frequency tabulations for categorical and mean or median for numeric variables. The 
data included land tenure systems, land disputes, time lag between lodgement and 
registration of a title, time lag between survey request and survey completion, number of 
mortgages, caveats and sub-divisions. These time lags were categorized for easy analysis 
at the second level of analysis (bivariate analysis). 
2) Bivariate analysis: This involved analysis of relationships for categorical 
variables. Cross tabulations were performed between land tenure systems, land disputes 
and policy changes, with respective time lag categories and business transactions 
(mortgages, caveats, sub-divisions) in order to establish whether there exists any 
relationship. 
3) Further tests using a two sample t-test with unequal variances: These tests 
were done to establish whether any two of the land tenure systems were significantly 
different, using time lags for the survey, registration and the first transfer processes. All 
these time lags were of the same units. In other wards, the two sample test dealt with two 
samples and compared them using the means of their common variables. 
The two sample test computes the t-values according to the following procedure: 
1) Select the data for sample 1. 
2) Select the data for sample 2. 
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3) Record the number (n) of replicates for each sample (the number of replicates for 
sample 1 being termed n/ and the number for sample 2 being termed n2) 
4) Calculate mean of each sample (x) andx2 ). 
5) Calculate the variances (cr2) for each sample; call these (712 and (7; 
6) Calculate the variance of the difference between the two means ((7~) as follows 
7) Calculate standard deviation (the square root of (7 ~ ) 
8) Calculate the t-value as follows: 
9) Enter the t-tables at (n/ + n2 -2) degrees of freedom; choose the level of significance 
required (normally a = 0.05) and read the tabulated t-value. 
For a sample of size greater than 30, at 5% assumed level of significance, the absolute t-
value tends to a maximum absolute value of 1.70. Since all our samples were expected to 
have more than 30 observations, the absolute value of 1.70 was adopted as standard 
comparison for all other t-tests. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter outlined how the data collected using the data extraction form was used to 
analyse the formalisation process; and how the survey areas representing the informal, 
individualized and communal customary tenure systems were selected. The rationale 
behind the structured interview schedule which was used to collect information from top 
government administrators, political leaders and private land developers was explained. 
Various methods, which were used to analyse the collected data were also outlined. The 
next chapter analyses the results of the data collected by each research instrument 
separately, tests the hypothesis, discusses the research questions outlined in section 1.5 
and outlines the concluding remarks. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 5.1 analyses the data acquired through 
the data extraction fonn; section 5.2 analyses the data acquired through the 
questionnaires; section 5.3 analyses the data acquired through the structured interview 
schedules; section 5.4 discusses the tests for the research hypothesis; sections 5.5 
discusses the research questions; and section 5.6 outlines the concluding remarks. 
The analysis in section 5.1 examined mailo and freehold - the two competing fonnal 
tenure systems - with a view to identifying the common features that would facilitate 
their integration into a single fonnal land tenure system. A detailed analysis is given of 
the fonnalisation process and the impact it had on the land policies introduced by the 
different regimes in Uganda. This analysis was designed to gain deeper knowledge about 
the fonnalisation process and to identify both the weak and the strong points that could 
be utilized to re-engineer the fonnalisation process in order to make it suitable for the 
new land policy. 
The analysis in section 5.2 examined the existing infonnal and customary tenure systems 
with a view to identifying the prominent social contracts that could possibly be integrated 
into the national social contract. From the national social contract, legal principles were 
extracted and integrated into a fonnal tenure system that is beneficial to all land users and 
developers. The fonnalizing laws were then applied to the national social contract that 
was designed in a participatory manner; and the legal principles were contributed by the 
people themselves. 
The analysis in section 5.3 examined the policy issues and administrative hurdles that the 
selected key infonnants have encountered. These interviews were carried out after the 
data from both the land records and the questionnaires had already been analysed. The 
interviews were intended to consolidate the views of legislators, land administrators and 
developers on unifonn land tenure, the cadastral system and the registration process, and 
to verify the results obtained using the questionnaires and the data extraction fonn. 
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The discussion of the results in sections 5.4 and 5.5 used the information presented in the 
three analyses outlined above to test the hypothesis presented in section 1.4 and to answer 
the research questions presented in section 1.5. 
5.1 Analysis of data from the land records 
5.1.1 Analysis ofthe land policies with respect to the formalisation process 
All five formal tenure systems operating in Uganda, namely, freehold, native freehold, 
mailo, adjudicated freehold and leasehold, were introduced by the colonial 
administration. Mailo, native freehold, and adjudicated freehold were implemented 
through systematic adjudication and demarcation, whereas freehold and leasehold were 
implemented through sporadic adjudication and demarcation. 
Because each regime had its own land policy objectives, some of these tenure systems 
were abolished or repealed at some stage. But the survey process and the land registration 
laws remained the same for all the regimes. This made it possible to study the impact of 
each of these land policies by analyzing the formalisation process with respect to land 
registration and the survey process. In order to spread the sample size of 482 titles evenly 
among the regimes, the corresponding period for each regime was structured as shown 
below: 
Regime 
Colonial administration 
Transition period 
The uniform tenure period 
The liberalised period 
Period 
1900 - 1962 
1963 - 1975 
1976-1995 
1996 - 2003 
One point to note is the fact that the fundamental law that was introduced by the Uganda 
Constitution of 1995 and the Land Act of 1998 has not yet been implemented. The 
government has instructed the Land Sector Strategic Plan, 2001-2011, to work out the 
best possible ways of ensuring the smooth implementation of the new land policy. 
Therefore the frequencies of various categories that are recorded in the tables under the 
liberalised period (1996-2003) do not reflect the outcome of the new fundamental law, 
which was introduced in 1995. Table 5.1 shows how the 482 titles are distributed with 
respect to the five land tenure systems and the land policies of the four regimes. 
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Table 5.1: Distribution of 482 land titles according to land policies and land tenure systems 
Title Category Unique (1900- (1963- (1976- (1996- Total 
titles 1962) 1975) 1995) 2003) 
Adj. Freehold 0 5 21 18 6 50 
Native Freehold 0 21 29 10 0 60 
Freehold 12 1 0 83 13 109 
Leasehold 0 0 0 17 126 143 
Mailo 0 11 55 33 21 120 
Total 12 38 105 161 166 482 
The 12 titles labelled as unique in Table 5.1 were included in the sample because they 
looked different from all the other titles. They were drawn from the population of the first 
freehold titles, which were issued by the colonial administration. While in all the other 
titles each instrument number had the date of registration, time and serial number printed 
on the first page of the title, these particular titles did not show the date and time of 
registration. The researcher thought that this was a serious anomaly since the date and 
time of lodgement is used to determine the date for the curtain principle under the 
Torrens system, which Uganda adopted in 1908. The Commissioner of Land 
Registration, who explained this matter to the researcher much later, pointed out that it 
used to be the practice during the colonial administration not to write the lodgement date 
and time against the instrument number on the front page of the title. He testified that the 
date and time of registration were available and recorded in the lodgement book. 
However, the researcher was not able to access the lodgement book of the colonial 
administration to verifY this fact. It would therefore appear that this anomaly in the 
registration of titles was corrected as soon as it was discovered. It is also possible that 
these unique titles are the outcomes of the subdivisions of the absolute ownership titles 
that were issued before 1908 by Her Majesty's Commissioners (see Table 3.2). 
In the tables below, there are two columns, which are tabulated as 'unusual data' and 
'missing data' under the Means of specified time intervals. This is because the 
frequencies, which are tabulated, were compiled from differences of two specific dates. 
And most of the specific dates were found missing in the files, registers, and other 
registrable documents of the land records office. Where one or all the dates were missing, 
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the results were recorded under missing data, and where the computed values came out 
negative, the results were recorded under unusual data. The negative values had many 
implications wherever they were found or not found, and the reasons can readily be 
identified for each case. For example, no negative values were found under the 
lodgement process (Table 5.6). The implication of this is that all the titles, which were 
inspected by this researcher, were valid. This is because, in practice, whenever some 
anomaly was discovered with the documents after lodgement and the documents had to 
be returned to the owners for rectification of the anomaly, the instrument numbers would 
be cancelled before the documents were handed back to the owner. These documents 
would receive new instrument numbers when the owners return them. The analyses of the 
land policies with respect to the formalisation process are presented in the following 
seven sections, under the following headings: (1) application for the lease offer; (2) 
acceptance of the lease offer by the applicants; (3) survey requests; (4) submission of 
deed plans to the land registration office; (5) the lodgement process; (6) the registration 
process; and (7) presents the analysis of the entire formalisation process. 
1) Application for the lease offer 
After 1967, all the unalienated land was vested in the Uganda Land Commission. Under 
the colonial administration, the land officer on behalf of the Governor of Uganda had 
performed the duties of this Commission. Because all unalienated land was vested in the 
state, anybody who wanted to lease land would apply to public government institutions to 
be allocated the parcel of land he/she wanted. The applicants were free to apply for any 
unalienated parcels of land, which were not necessarily the ones they occupied. This 
section attempts to find out how this was done under different regimes. The time taken to 
consider the applications for lease offers is reflected in Table 5.2. 
The percentages shown in brackets in table 5.2 were computed excluding the missing 
data. The results show that nobody applied to government for a lease offer during the 
colonial and transition periods. This was due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the colonial 
administration granted land titles to particular groups of people. For example, native 
freehold and mailo titles were granted to chiefs, freehold was granted to non-Africans and 
a selected few corporate bodies, whereas adjudicated freehold was allocated to customary 
landholders; moreover, the majority of these titles were prepared through the systematic 
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adjudication approach. 
Table 5.2: Applications for lease offer 
Policy Mean time intervals Total 
changes 0-30 days 31-180 181-365 Above Unusual Missing 
days days 365 days data data 
1900-1962 0 0 0 0 0 38 38 
(%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 
1963-I 975 0 0 0 0 0 105 105 
(%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 
1976-1995 I 1 2 9 0 148 161 
(%) 0.6 (7.7) 0.6 (7.7) 1.2 (15.4) 5.6 (69.3) 0.0 91.9 100.0 
1996-2003 2 25 6 11 3 119 166 
(%) 1.2 (4.2) 15.1 (53.2) 3.6 (12.8) 6.6 (23.4) 1.8 (6.4) 71.7 100.0 
Total 3 26 8 20 3 412 470 
(%) 0.6 (5.2) 5.4 (44.8) 1.7 (13.8) 4.1 (34.5) 0.6 (5.2) 87.5 100.0 
Secondly, the transition government concentrated more on completing the unfinished 
work, which was left behind by the colonial administration. Most of this work had to do 
with processing adjudicated freehold titles in the pilot scheme areas, which were still 
pending at the time of independence. Thirdly, the land policies of the colonial 
administration remained in force until the government introduced the system of applying 
for the lease offers under the Public Lands Act of 1969. 
2) Acceptance of the lease offers by applicants 
After the Uganda Land Commission had met and approved some of the applications, 
letters would be written and forwarded to the successful applicants, informing them about 
the charges, which they had to pay before the formalisation process could be set in 
motion. These formal letters were commonly known as lease offers. The time taken to 
write these lease offers and to forward them to the applicants and the time taken by the 
applicants to respond to these letters and to pay the charges stipulated in the lease offers 
as confirmation that they had accepted the lease offers, are presented in Table 5.3. 
The percentages shown in brackets in table 5.3 were computed excluding the missing 
data. When lease offers were introduced under the Public Lands Act of 1962 and the 
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amount of government subsidy was heavily reduced, the people took a longer time to 
respond to and accept the lease offers. This is the main reason why the time lag from the 
issuance of the lease offer to the confirmation of the lease offer did not follow any 
discernible pattern. 
Table 5.3: Time lag between issuance of lease offer and payment of processing charges 
Policy changes Mean time Intervals Total 
0-30 days 31-180 181-365 Above Unusual Missing 
days days 365 days data data 
1900-1962 0 0 0 0 0 38 38 
(%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 
1963-1975 0 0 0 0 0 105 105 
(%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 
1976-1995 2 3 3 2 2 149 161 
(%) 1.2 (16.7) 1.9 (25.0) 1.9 (25.0) 1.2 (16.7) 1.2 (16.7) 92.5 100.0 
1996-2004 12 12 2 4 10 126 166 
(%) 7.2 (30.0) 7.2 (30.0) 1.2 (5.0) 2.4 (10.0) 6.0 (25.0) 75.9 100.0 
Total 14 15 5 6 12 418 470 
(%) 2.9 (22.6) 3.1 (24.2) 1.0 (8.1) 1.2 (9.7) 2.5 (19.3) 89.2 100.0 
3) Survey requests 
After confirmation of the lease offer, the Land Officer in charge of the Land Inspectorate 
Division would officially request the Commissioner of Surveys and Mapping to survey 
the land according to the specifications laid out in the lease offer. The time lag from the 
receipt of the survey request, through field observations, computing of the traverses, 
preparation of deed plans and having them certified by the Commissioner of Surveys and 
Mapping, is presented in the time intervals shown in Table 5.4. 
The percentages shown in brackets in table 5.4 were computed excluding the missing 
data. One would have expected to see more parcels surveyed at least within six months 
after the Commissioner has received the survey requests. There are a number of reasons 
why this was not the case. Firstly, the survey of parcels after the transition period was 
carried out sporadically and the time taken to complete a survey depended on whether the 
landowner paid whatever extra charges the government surveyors asked for. The survey 
of some parcels took one month, whereas others took more than a year to complete. 
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Table 5.4: Time lag between survey request and certification of deed plan 
Policy Mean time Intervals Total 
changes 0-30 days 31-180 181-365 Above 365 Unusual Missing 
days days days data data 
1900-1962 I 2 0 I 0 34 38 
(%) 2.6 (25.0) 5.3 (50.0) 0.0 2.6 (25.0) 0.0 89.5 100.0 
1963-1975 15 11 7 2 2 68 105 
(%) 14.3(40.5) 10.5(29.7) 6.7 (18.9) 1.9 (5.4) 1.9 (5.4) 64.8 100.0 
1976-1995 II 4 2 7 2 135 161 
(%) 6.8 (42.3) 2.5 (1504) 1.2 (7.7) 4.3 (26.9) 1.2 (7.7) 83.8 100.0 
1996-2003 15 5 3 12 13 118 166 
(%) 9.0 (31.2) 3.0 (lOA) 1.8 (6.2) 7.2 (25.0) 7.8 (27.1) 71.1 100.0 
Total 42 22 12 22 17 355 470 
(%) 8.7 (36.5) 4.6 (19.1) 2.5 (10.4) 4.6 (19.1) 3.5 (14.8) 76.1 100.0 
Secondly, there were few government surveyors and their motivation to work was very 
low. Thirdly, the government has never sensitised the people about the benefits of 
freehold and leasehold land titles. This explains why very few freehold and leasehold 
land titles have been prepared over the years. And fourthly, the violation of the consent 
principle by both the colonial administration and the subsequent governments had made 
the local people suspicious of the entire formalisation process. The people who were 
either worried about security of tenure or wanted to do business using land titles as 
collateral are the ones that acquired land titles in a short time. However, only a limited 
number of people acquired titles for business transactions, and these are the ones whose 
surveys were processed in less than a month. 
4) Submission of deed plans to the land registration office 
The submission of certified deed plans to the land registration department marks the 
beginning of the land title registration process. Fresh certified deed plans are required 
when parcels of land are to be registered for the first time or when land is changing hands 
from one person to another. The deed plans are submitted to the land registration 
department with letters of introduction, if it is a first time survey, or mutation forms, if it 
is a subdivision of an already titled land. On receiving the deed plans, the land 
registration department causes the lease or transfer documents to be made. These are 
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handed over to the landowner or purchaser to have them signed by the controlling 
authority and for the landowner or purchaser to pay stamp duty on them and the 
necessary registration fees. The time lag between the submission of the deed plans at the 
land registry office and the submission of the deed plans together with other relevant 
documents ready for lodgement is the one that has been subdivided into the time intervals 
that are presented in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Time lag between the first submission of deed plans and lodgement 
Policy Mean time Intervals Total 
changes 0-30 days 31-180 181-365 Above Unusual Missing 
days days 365 days data data 
1900-\962 0 0 0 0 4 34 38 
(%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.5(100.0) 89.5 100.0 
1963-1975 3 16 9 7 3 67 105 
(%) 2.9 (7.9) \5.2 (42.1) 8.6 (23.7) 6.7 (18.4) 2.9 (7.9) 63.8 100.0 
1976-1995 42 42 7 12 8 50 161 
(%) 26.1(37.8) 26.1 (37.8) 4.3 (6.3) 7.4 (10.8) 5.0 (7.2) 31.1 100.0 
1996-2003 11 63 29 33 4 26 166 
(%) 6.6 (7.8) 37.9 (45.0) 17.5(20.7) 19.9(23.6) 2.4 (2.8) 15.7 100.0 
Total 56 121 45 52 19 177 470 
(%) 11.6 (19.1) 25.1 (41.3) 9.3 (15.3) 10.8(17.7) 3.9 (6.5) 39.2 100.0 
The percentages shown in brackets in table 5.5 were computed excluding the missing 
data. Because most of the surveys were done under systematic adjudication and 
demarcation during the colonial administration, the people did not have to carry their 
document to controlling authorities for signature, nor did they have to pay the bills at 
each stage. Government handled the whole process from the start until the land titles 
were ready to be collected by the owners on payment of the processing fee. 
During the transition period, the maJonty of the documents for registration were 
submitted by the landowners or purchasers for lodgement within between three and six 
months. During the uniform tenure era, the mailo and freehold owners were feeling very 
insecure, because mailo and freehold tenures had been abolished by the land reform 
decree, and this triggered off the need to increase the security of land ownership, leading 
to a big improvement in the submission of documents. Consequently, 42(75%) of the 
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documents, which were lodged in one month, were lodged during this period. The 
majority of these documents came from applicants who had been avoiding the payment 
of stamp duty and registration charges. At least 121(41.3%) of the valid documents took 
between one month and six months to lodge. When the liberalised period removed all the 
insecurity, however, the new system did not take effect immediately, and in fact it has not 
yet been implemented. The submission of documents for lodgement in the liberalised 
period is currently very slow, taking six months, a year and even beyond. 
5) The lodgement process 
Theoretically, this should be the shortest process, because it merely involves entering the 
registrable documents in the lodgement book. One thus cannot readily understand why in 
some regimes it took more than a year to lodge documents, whereas in others it took less 
than a month (see Table 5.6). 
Table 5.6: Time taken by lodgement process 
Policy changes Mean time Intervals Total 
0-30 31-180 181-365 Above 365 Missing 
days days days days data 
1900-1%2 2 0 0 17 19 38 
(%) 5.3 0.0 0.0 44.7 (89.5) 50.0 100.0 
1963-1975 39 21 6 36 3 105 
(%) 37.1 (38.2) 20.0 (20.6) 5.7 (5.9) 34.3 (35.3) 2.9 100.0 
1976-1995 108 34 4 14 1 161 
(%) 67.1 21.1 2.5 8.7 0.6 100.0 
1996-2003 143 16 4 3 0 166 
(%) 86.1 9.6 2.4 1.8 0.0 100.0 
Total 292 71 14 70 23 470 
(%) 60.6(65.3) 14.7 (15.9) 2.9 (3.1) 14.5 (15.6) 4.9 (5.1) 100.0 
The percentages shown in brackets in table 5.6 were computed excluding missing data. 
During the colonial period, lodgement of documents was done in a batch after systematic 
adjudication, demarcation and survey. During the transition period, about one third of the 
documents would take a month, another third would take a year and the last third would 
take more than a year to lodge. Considerable improvement was realised by the uniform 
tenure era and the liberalised period, where 108(67%) and 143(86%) documents 
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respectively were lodged within one month. However, the equivalent number of the 
lodged deed plans is not reflected in the records of the Surveys and Mapping Department. 
This is because so many people had realised that it was much easier to acquire a mailo 
title than a freehold or leasehold title. This is because land subdivision surveys on mailo 
land were done by private surveyors and the survey data did not have to satisfy the 
rigorous procedures set by the Department of Surveys and Mapping for freehold and 
leasehold surveys. Because the mailo owner was allowed to use a private surveyor of 
hislher choice and the required survey accuracy was not rigorous, surveys on mailo land 
took a short time and this has resulted in vibrant land market on mailo land. 
6) The registration process 
All land titles in Uganda are registered under the Registration of Titles Act, 1958 
(Cap. 230) which is based on the Torrens system. Under the title registration system, the 
legal consequence of the transaction or the right itself (the title), which is transferable to 
the beneficiary, is registered. In essence, the right itself together with the names and 
physical address of the claimant and the object of that right with its restrictions, charges 
and responsibilities are registered. 
Table 5.7: Time taken by land registration process 
Policy Mean time intervals Total 
changes 0-30 days 31-180 181-365 Above 365 Unusual Missing 
days days days data data 
1900-1962 11 1 1 9 5 11 38 
(%) 28.9 (40.7) 2.6 (3.7) 2.6 (3.7) 23.7 (33.3) 13.2{18.5) 28.9 100.0 
1963-1975 31 1 2 39 17 15 105 
(%) 29.5 (34.4) 0.9 (l.l) 1.9 (2.2) 37.1 (43.3) 1 6.2{1 8.9) 14.3 100.0 
1976-1995 54 23 12 52 19 1 161 
(%) 33.5 14.3 7.4 32.3 11.8 0.6 100.0 
1996-2003 118 16 4 16 12 0 166 
(%) 7l.l 9.6 2.4 9.6 7.2 0.0 100.0 
Total 214 41 19 116 53 27 470 
(%) 44.8 (49.1) 8.5 (9.3) 3.9 (4.3) 24.1(26.4) 10.2(10.9) 6.2 100.0 
The security of ownership, the accountability of owners and the enforceability of 
transactions are ultimately concretized by procedures and rules laid out in the 
Registration of Titles Act. The time to prepare land titles, which are acceptable to all 
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banking institutions as collateral, was subdivided into time intervals and is presented in 
Table 5.7. 
The percentages shown in brackets in table 5.7 were computed excluding missing data. 
During the colonial administration and during the transition period, the registration of 
most of the land titles would either take less than one month or more than a year. Those, 
which took less than a month, were mainly subdivisions, whose owners wanted to do 
business, using titles as collateral. There was general improvement during the uniform 
tenure era, where approximately one third of the titles were registered in less than one 
month, another third was registered within a year, and the last third took more than a year 
to register. 
The liberalised period made tremendous improvements, with 118(71 %) of the land titles 
being registered in less than one month. Again this points to the vibrant land market on 
mailo land. It would appear that the change of policy, which was effected in 1995, 
negatively affected the land transactions of leasehold and freehold titles, which required 
elaborate survey procedures that would strictly be carried out by government surveyors. 
7) Analysis of the formalisation process 
The entire formalisation process combines two processes: the cadastral mapping and the 
land registration process. According to De Soto (2001: 216), the cadastral mapping and 
the maps it makes, capture the physical information of assets but they miss the big 
picture. The mapping process is "thus unable to do its real job, which is to help anchor 
the property aspects in physical reality so as to keep virtuality and physicality in 
synchronisation." This job is instead done by the legal process, which fixes property 
concepts in tangible representative form and defines those concepts in statutes. 
According to Simpson (1976: 161), "the land register that fixes property concepts 
presents continuous finality, which is the unique characteristic of registration of title." 
The continuous finality starts right from the date of lodgement of deed plans, transfer 
documents and any other registrable documents. Continuous finality refers to the fact that 
starting from the date of registration there is no need to investigate past titles any longer. 
Consequently there is no use for the registrable instruments such as mutation forms, 
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transfer forms and consent forms apart from being used as reference documents for 
decision making and research. In other words there is no need to keep them in safe 
custody because the registered landowners or the prospective land purchasers do not need 
to refer to them any longer. And fraud by duplication or suppression of these instruments 
is not likely to succeed. 
Since the register is the final authority, mistake as to past title or as to existing burdens 
affecting the land is precluded (Dowson and Sheppard 1968). This continuous finality 
tends to reduce the litigation in regard to land because it removes most of the conditions, 
which give rise to it. Therefore, the relatively large frequency figures that have been 
recorded under the column 'missing data' in all the tables above has no effect on the 
performance of the land registry; the documents, which the researcher looked at are 
merely kept for convenience and certainly not as a legal requirement. However, the 
documents are worth keeping because they serve many other important purposes like 
research, taxation, national census, physical planning and many other decision-making 
activities. 
Through the study of the information contained on these documents, the researcher was 
able to establish that record keeping was poor and that it should be improved. For 
example, tables 5.2 and 5.3 revealed that land record keeping by the Land Inspectorate 
Division, which assists Uganda Land Commission in land administration, was poor; 
tables 5.4 and 5.5 also revealed that land record keeping by the Surveys and Mapping 
Department was also poor; and tables 5.6 and 5.7 revealed that land record keeping by 
the Land Registration Department was poor during the colonial days but it has improved 
over time, and right now the department is able to account for all its registrable 
instruments. 
Similarly, the column marked 'unusual data' revealed the type and quality of records one 
should expect to find in the same departments. For example, tables 5.2 and 5.3 revealed 
that reliable land records stored by the Land Inspectorate Division go as far back as the 
uniform tenure period (1976 - 1995). The files and documents before that date are likely 
to have been lost due to past wars or through poor record keeping or they could have 
been removed and damped in unattended archives where nobody can access them; and 
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the)' we either destw)'ed by cockroaches or they are full of dus\. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 
revealed that the officers in the Surveys and Mapping Department have kept land records 
of the eolOilial period and most of them we sti ll in use. Tables 5.6 revealed thaI the 
officers in the Land Registralioo Department managed Ihe lodgement process very well 
during and after the colonial period. Table 5.7 revealed thallhe registration process was 
nOI satisfactory during the colonial pt:riod (I Q(){)-1962), il worsened up to the unifonn 
knure period (1976-1995). and it is now beginning to show some improvement 
5. 1.2 An .. l~ sis "r Ihe general Irend of land transactions 
The land transactions that were identifie<.l indud~d transfers. mortgages. ~avcalS and 
sulxiivisions. These were analysed at two levels: The general trend was mapped at the 
first leveL while the relationship of each transaction with either the land title <;ategories 0.-
the land policies was mapped at the second level. 
1) 1.and tntnders 
All the 482 land titles were examined to establish how many times ea<;h title ha~ been 
transferred. The study established that 118 (24.5%) titles had been tr.lnsferred at least 
once. and that 190 titles have never been used in any business transw;tions. The trend 01" 
the transfers was sununarised and mappe<.l in Figure 5.1. 
Summ .. ry tabl~ of transfer Iransactlons per land tille 
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trans 1 trans 2 tr .. n,.3 Irans4 l,ans;5 1, .. ns;6 
NI"" ber of transf"rs 
Th" nature ol"the tr~JJSl~r transactions underlying the whole trend I-\'lIS also an~lysed. 
It was established that Joost of the transactions were from one mao to anoth<:r. The details 
of the analysis are summarised in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8: The nature of transfer transactions 
Nature of transfer transactions Code Frequency 
Man to man 1 107 
Man to woman 2 30 
Man to corporate 3 8 
Man to administrator 4 25 
Man to joint ownership 5 13 
Woman to man 6 9 
Woman to woman 7 1 
Woman to corporate 8 1 
Woman to administrator 9 1 
Corporate to man 10 47 
Corporate to woman 11 12 
Corporate to corporate 12 7 
Corporate to joint ownership 13 7 
Administrator to woman 14 I 
Joint ownership to man 15 5 
Joint ownership to woman 16 2 
Joint ownership to corporate 17 I 
No transfers 190 
Total 482 
The above transfer transactions were mapped to highlight the mam five vendors and 
purchasers (see Table 5_9)_ 
Table 5.9: Number of transfers ofland between vendors and purchasers 
Vendors Purchasers Total 
Man only Woman Corporate Administrator Joint 
only body owaership 
Man only 107 30 8 25 \3 183 
(%) 36.6 to.3 2.7 8.6 4.4 62.7 
Woman only 9 1 1 1 
- t2 
(%) 3.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 4.1 
Corporate 47 12 7 -- 7 73 
(%) 16.1 4.1 2.4 2.4 25.0 
Administrator 15 I -- -- -- 16 
(%) 5.1 0.3 
Joint 5 2 I -- - 8 
(%) 1.7 0.7 0.3 2.7 
Total 183 46 17 26 20 292 
(%) 62.7 15.7 5.8 8.9 6.8 100.0 
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2) Mortgages 
Th~ study established that 92 (190/0) tit1e~ have been mortgaged allea~l OnCc. /\ total of 
357 (74%) land ti lles were acquired for SlXurily of litle oll1y 10 avoid being enclosed by 
rich and influenlial people who used to turn customary oc~upien; into 'quaUers Oil their 
own land. The trend of mortgages was summarised ,md mapped in Figure 5.2. 
Summary IlIbl~ of ... o~(g~g~ 'r"dnsac.ions 
I MO 'Ml 
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-r--- - ----
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3) Caveats 
The study established that cav~a1S have h.,en lodged on 65 (13.5%) titles at kast once. 
Th" trend of caveats was summarised and mapped in Fig~ 5.3. 
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Fieu re 5.3: T r end of caveats o n lilled bnd 
CAVEAT TAANSA.CTIONS 
C6 C 1 0 C1 1 
~mber of Cav,, ~b 
-I) Lantl "uhtli~i" ion" 
The ~lluJy e~tablishetlthat 60 (12.4%) titlcs have becn subdividcd at least ollce. A totul of 
401 (83%) lantllitlcs have never been subdivided. This shov."S that formal land tenure 
minimizes the ~u~l()mary inheritance practices, which encourage subdivision of land to 
give each child hisihcr share ofland. The trend of subdivisioos is presented in Tabk 5.10. 
Summary tablc ofland subdivisions 
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The test for relationships boetween land tram,lClions and the categories of land tenure 
yielded the Jollowing rc~ults: 
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1) Land Transfers 
The numbers of titles that have been transferred in each of the formal land tenure systems 
are listed in Table 5.10 below. The percentages for each category are also shown. 
Table 5.10: Summary ofland transfer transactions 
Category of title Transfers Total 
No transfers Transfers 
Adj. Freehold 16 34 50 
(%) 32.0 68.0 100.0 
Native-freehold 18 42 60 
(%) 30.0 70.0 100.0 
Freehold 12 97 109 
(%) 11.0 89.0 100.0 
Leasehold 126 17 143 
(%) 88.1 11.9 100.0 
Mailo 18 102 120 
(%) 15.0 85.0 100.0 
Total 190 292 482 
(%) 39.4 60.6 100.0 
Only 17 (12%) of the leasehold titles have been transferred while 102 (85%) of mailo, 
97 (89%) of freehold, 42 (70%) of native freehold and 34 (68%) of adjudicated freehold 
have been transferred. Because the leasehold titles were issued after the country's 
independence in 1962, the people lost confidence in the government, as they had 
expected the government to revert to customary land ownership, which used to be held in 
perpetuity. They became suspicious as they thought that the government wanted to take 
away their customary land. This is why they started to acquire land titles, in other words, 
for security purposes only and not for investment. It is also possible that transfers due to 
inheritance were not implemented because the formal inheritance laws made the transfer 
ofland even harder. 
2) Mortgages 
The numbers of titles that have been mortgaged in each land tenure category are listed in 
table 5.11. The percentages for each category are also shown. 
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Table 5.11: Summary of mortgages iu land transactions 
Category of tenure Mortgages Total 
No mortgages Mortgages 
Adj. Freehold 41 9 50 
% 82.0 18.0 100.0 
Native-freehold 43 17 60 
% 71.7 28.3 100.0 
Freehold 55 54 109 
% 50.5 49.5 100.0 
Leasehold 132 II 143 
% 92.3 7.7 100.0 
Mailo 86 33 119 
% 72.3 27.7 100.0 
Total 357 124 481 
% 74.2 25.8 100.0 
Only the freehold land tenure category presents a 50-50 chance of being mortgaged. lIDs 
is because freehold titles were mainly issued to non-Africans who were familiar with 
mortgage transactions. About 80(33%) of freehold, native freehold, mailo and 
adjudicated freehold titles have at least been mortgaged once compared to only 11(8%) of 
leasehold titles. This confirms that leasehold titles were mainly acquired for security of 
title and not for purposes of investment. 
3) Caveats 
The numbers of titles on which caveats have been placed in each land tenure category are 
listed in table 5.12. The percentages for each category are also shown. 
Table 5.12 shows that 51 (42.9%) and 26 (43.3%) were the highest numbers of caveats on 
mailo and native freehold respectively. This is due to informal relationships on these 
tenure systems. Leasehold titles do not have many caveats because they are not involved 
in business transactions, since they were mainly acquired for security of title. Freehold 
titles also do not have many caveats because they were issued to non-Africans and 
corporate bodies who could afford to keep these titles in the banks for safe custody. 
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Table 5.12: Summary of caveats in land transactions 
Category of tenure Caveats Total 
No caveats Caveats 
Adj. Freehold 38 12 50 
% 76.0 24.0 100.0 
Native-freehold 34 26 60 
% 56.7 43.3 100.0 
Freehold 100 9 109 
% 91.7 8.3 100.0 
Leasehold 136 7 143 
% 95.1 4.9 100.0 
Mailo 68 51 119 
% 57.1 42.9 100.0 
Total 376 105 481 
0/0 78.2 21.8 100.0 
4) Sub-divisions 
The numbers of titles, which were subdivided in each land tenure category, are listed in 
table 5.12. The percentages for each category are also shown. 
Formal land tenure tends to minimise land subdivisions, which are normally carried out 
to resolve inheritance issues. The process of registering one's name on the land title is 
quite cumbersome because of two reasons: Firstly, the subdivisions are complex and 
costly to most people and secondly, the transfer process is complicated particularly if the 
subdivision was to be carried out on mailo land for inheritance reasons. The 0% 
subdivision rate in leasehold tenure shown in Table 5.13 can be attributed to the fact that 
nobody could subdivide the land without the consent of the controlling authority. The rate 
of subdivisions in mailo and native freehold is high because it is carried out by private 
surveyors and that is why there is a substantial land market in these tenure systems. 
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Table 5.13: Summary of subdivisions in land transactions 
Title category Subdivisions Total 
No subdivisions Subdivisions 
Adj. Freehold 42 8 50 
% 84.0 16.0 100.0 
Native-freehold 29 31 60 
% 48.3 51.7 100.0 
Freehold 100 7 107 
% 
93.5 6.5 100.0 
Leasehold 143 0 143 
% 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Mailo 87 33 120 
% 72.5 27.5 100.0 
Total 401 79 480 
0/0 83.5 16.5 100.0 
5.1.4 Land transactions with respect to land policies 
The test for relationships between land transactions and land policies yielded the 
following results. 
1) Land transfers 
The numbers oftransfers that were carried out in each regime are listed in table 5.14. The 
corresponding percentages are also shown. 
Table 5.14: Summary oftransfers in land 
Policy Transfers Total 
changes No transfers Transfers 
Unique 1 11 12 
% 8.3 91.7 100.0 
1900-1962 11 27 38 
% 28.9 71.1 100.0 
1963-1975 32 73 lOS 
% 30.5 69.5 100.0 
1976-1995 31 130 161 
% 19.2 80.7 100.0 
1996-2004 115 51 166 
% 69.3 30.7 100.0 
Total 190 292 482 
% 39.4 60.6 100.0 
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Steady progress in land transfers was achieved during the colonial period and was 
maintained up to 1995, whereafter a sharp decline was recorded. This shows that the long 
delay in implementation of the new policy, after the change from the colonial policy, has 
had a negative effect on land transactions. The government may have to act swiftly to 
reverse this trend. 
2) Mortgages 
The numbers of mortgages that were carried out in each regime are listed in table 5.14. 
The corresponding percentages are also shown. 
The mortgage transactions under the colonial policies (1900-1975) were about 53(34%), 
but the delay in implementing the new policy after 1995 has caused a decline up to 
1 0(6%). This shows that there is a need to implement the new policy in order to reverse 
the decline in mortgages because land needs to be used to generate capital for investment. 
However, without a capitalist culture in the society, the government will have to make 
prior explanations and instruction before the people can safely operate the mortgage 
system. 
Table 5.15: Summary of mortgages in land 
Policy Mortgages Total 
changes No mortgages Mortgages 
Unique 6 6 12 
% 50.0 50.0 100.0 
1900-1962 20 18 38 
% 52.6 47.4 100.0 
1963-1975 76 29 105 
% 72.4 27.6 100.0 
1976-1995 99 61 160 
% 61.9 38.1 100.0 
1996-2004 156 10 166 
% 94.0 6.0 100.0 
Total 357 124 481 
0/0 74.2 25.8 100.0 
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3) Caveats 
The numbers of caveats, which were placed on land titles under each regime, are listed in 
table 5.14. The corresponding percentages are also shown. 
Table 5.16: Summary of caveats in titled land 
Policy changes Caveats Total 
No caveats Caveats 
Unique 8 4 12 
% 66.7 33.3 100.0 
1900-1962 25 12 37 
% 67.6 32.4 100.0 
1963-1975 57 48 105 
% 54.3 45.7 100.0 
1976-1995 133 28 161 
% 82.6 17.4 100.0 
1996-2004 153 13 166 
% 92.2 7.8 100.0 
Total 376 105 481 
0/0 78.2 21.8 100.0 
The caveats transactions under the colonial policies (1900 - 1975) were about 64(41.5 %) 
but they have declined to 13(8%). Since caveats have a negative effect on business 
transactions because they help to put the register out of date, this decline is actually a 
healthy development. The caveat cases need to be minimized and this decline should be 
maintained. 
4) Subdivisions 
The numbers of subdivisions that were carried out in each regime are listed in table 5.17. 
The corresponding percentages are also shown. 
Table 5.17 shows that the subdivisions under the colonial policy including the unique 
titles stood at 29 (59.2%), which has declined to 3 (2%) under the liberalised period. The 
decline could be due to the effect of the complicated succession laws, which have never 
been adapted to the Uganda conditions. It could also be due to the costly surveys because 
the Torrens system ofland registration requires accurate surveys, which are expensive to 
carry out. 
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Table 5.17: Summary of subdivisions in land 
Policy changes Subdivisions Total 
No subdivisions Subdivisions 
Unique 8 3 11 
% 72.7 27.3 100.0 
1900-1962 12 26 38 
% 31.6 68.4 100.0 
1963-1975 71 34 105 
% 67.6 32.4 100.0 
1976-1995 147 13 160 
% 91.9 8.1 100.0 
1996-2004 163 3 166 
% 98.2 1.8 100.0 
Total 401 79 480 
0/0 83.5 16.5 100.0 
5.1.6 Concluding remarks 
Through the analysis of the formalisation process, we have been able to establish that the 
cadastral process would be improved greatly if the survey services can be privatised, as is 
currently the case with mailo surveys. However, it is absolutely necessary that the office 
of Commissioner for Surveys and Mapping should coordinate the private surveyors, 
process the survey data, which the private surveyors will submit to his office and keep it 
in a data bank. This is because there is need to establish reliable data for land information 
systems. It was also established that the land policy, which was introduced in 1995 has 
not yet been implemented. It was further established that the land tenure systems, which 
were held in perpetuity had better land transactions than leasehold, which was created by 
contract or by operation of the law. It would therefore appear that the formalisation 
process would be simplified, even further, if systematic adjudication and demarcation 
could be adopted and used throughout the whole country. The next section will analyse 
and investigate the data from the household baseline survey, which was carried out in the 
parishes of Rukarango in Ntungamo, Kabigi in Masaka and Aminit in Teso districts. The 
investigation is likely to throw more light about the suitability and acceptability of 
systematic adjudication and demarcation approach by the local population. It will also 
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underline and confirm whether the communal, individualised, informal and territorial 
customary tenure systems are ready to be formalised into a single formal tenure system. 
5.2 Analysis of the data from the questionnaires 
This section analyses the household baseline survey data with respect to the three types of 
tenures, namely, informal, individualised (family) and communal (clan) customary 
tenures. The data collected from Rukarango parish in Ntungamo district provided 
information about individualised (family) customary tenure; the data from Kabigi parish 
in Masaka district provided information about informal tenure; and the data from Aminit 
parish in Soroti district provided information about communal (clan) customary tenure. 
The four land tenure systems, namely, mailo, freehold, leasehold, and native freehold, 
which have informal relationships, were represented by mailo tenure for three reasons. 
Firstly, there is lack of consensus among the mailo landowners as to why the government 
has selected freehold to become the formal land tenure system for Uganda. Secondly, 
mailo tenure has the biggest coverage (10% of the total landmass of Uganda). And 
thirdly, the registered owners of leasehold and freehold have no objection against 
freehold becoming the integrated land tenure system for Uganda. The study was therefore 
intended to collect the views of both landowners and tenants on mailo land in order to 
establish whether they have any strong objections against the democratisation of mailo 
tenure. 
The analysis of customary tenure was restricted to individualised (family) and communal 
(clan) customary tenure systems. This is because the results of the territorial (nomadic) 
customary tenure had already been analysed. The relevant study on territorial customary 
tenure, which had been carried out by Kisamba-Mugerwa in 1995, had established that 
the individualisation of communal pastoral resources in territorial customary areas 
intensifies as population density increases, and that it is enhanced in areas nearer to urban 
centres where population density is higher than in rural areas. This research finding tallies 
very well with the evolution theory of land rights, which represents the mainstream 
economic approach to understanding and modelling land issues (Fourie 2000(a): 1). 
Essentially, this approach suggests that under increasing population pressures and 
decreasing availability of land, competition for land would increase. Those systems that 
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are communal will become unstable, land will be overexploited, and mismanagement will 
occur. The operators of the land would then be forced into conflict, and struggles over 
rights of access and use of the land would emerge. This state of affairs would result in a 
natural solution, being a move towards the increased individualisation of land holdings 
and sales of properties (Attwood 1990). 
The data from the questionnaires concerning the three tenure systems was analysed under 
the following sub-sections: socio-economic profile; land transactions; dispute resolution 
mechanisms; access to land and security of tenure; informal tenure relationships; 
awareness of other land uses; and systematic adjudication and demarcation. The 
presentations in the following sub-sections highlight the questions which were posed to 
households, and then tabulate the responses in terms of frequencies of the households 
representing informal, individualised and communal tenure systems respectively. At the 
end of each sub-section there is a summary of results from the various investigations. 
5.2.1 The socio-economic profile 
The purpose of this sub-section was to map the general level of socio-economic 
development in the respective villages. The socio-economic profile was expected to 
provide some information about the general living conditions in the villages, which 
would show whether the people were capable of operating within a formal land tenure 
system. The parameters on which data was collected included the following: household 
size, parish settlement patterns, location of households, nature of housing, land 
ownership, age, sex, marital status, level of education, household production and food 
purchase levels, and household income. The summary of results from all these parameters 
is presented at the end of the sub-section. 
1) Household size 
According to Kisamba-Mugerwa (1995: 1 04), a household is a group of persons who 
normally live and eat together. The mean household size was established at 6.7 people in 
informal tenure, 5.6 people in the individualised customary areas, and 7.8 people in the 
communal customary areas (see Table 5.20). The mean household size for the whole 
country, which was reported in the Uganda population census of 2002, was 4.7 people. 
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Thus, although all the mean household sizes in the three chosen parishes are slightly 
above average, they do belong to the same population. 
Table 5.20: The mean household sizes under informal, individualised and communal 
tenures 
Tenures Total No. of Mean Min. size Max. size 
bousebolds bousebold size 
Informal 101 6.7 I 16 
Individualised 107 5.6 I II 
Communal 140 7.8 I 23 
Total 348 6.8 I 23 
2) Parish settlement characteristics 
In all the parishes, the settlement pattern is widely spaced, although in Ntungamo district, 
19(18%) of the households are closely spaced (see Table 5.21). The settlement pattern of 
households provides some information about the standards of living within the respective 
parishes. 
Table 5.21: Parish settlement pattern 
Tenures Otber type of Closely Widely Wide & Total No. of 
pattern spaced spaced clustered HlHs 
Informal 0 9 (9%) 88 (87%) 4 101 
Individualised 0 19 (18%) 88 (82%) 0 107 
Communal 5 (4%) 3 130 (93%) 2 140 
Total 5 31 306 6 348 
3) Land ownership 
Table 5.22 shows that all the households under the individualised and communal tenures 
own land while four households under the informal tenure did not qualify for the legal or 
bona fide occupancy. The definition of land ownership, under this study, had to conform 
to the four land tenure systems namely, mailo, freehold, leasehold and customary, and the 
rights of occupancy for the bona fide and legal occupants, which are recognised under the 
Uganda constitution, 1995. 
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Table 5.22: Level of land ownership within each tenure system 
Tenures Otber rigbts Ownersbip of No land Total No. of H/Hs 
land parcels 
Infonnal 2 97 (97%) 2 (2%) 101 
Individualised 0 107 (100010) 0 107 
Communal 0 140 (100%) 0 140 
Total 2 344 2 348 
4) Location of households 
The majority of households in the selected districts are in the rural setting (see Table 
5.23). In all the three tenure systems, most of the people live in normal household 
settings, although under individualised tenure, 21 (20%) of the households live in 
homesteads (see Table 5.24). A normal setting is where a household owns approximately 
2 acres of land whose boundaries are clearly marked with drought-resistant plants. 
Table 5.23: Location of households within the district 
Tenures Don't know Trading centre Rural setting Total No. of H/Hs 
Infonnal 5 6 90 (89%) 101 
Individualised 4 2 101 (94%) 107 
Communal 0 0 140 (100%) 140 
Total 9 8 331 348 
Table 5.24: Location of households within the rural setting 
Tenures Don't know Normal Homestead Rural Total No. of 
setting wetland H/Hs 
Infonnal 0 92(91%) 6 3 101 
Individualised 1 85(79%) 21(20010) 0 107 
Communal I 133(95%) 6 0 140 
Total 2 310 33 3 348 
5) Type of housing 
The nature of housing was analysed in terms of the building materials used for the walls, 
floors and roofs of the main house under the three tenure systems. and the results are 
shown in Table 5.25. The overall assessment shows that the people living in the informal 
tenure system have slightly better living conditions than the individualised and communal 
customary tenure systems. According to the Uganda population census of 2002, only 
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17% of the dwelling units in the whole country were constructed with permanent roof. 
wall and floor materials. The statistics shown here seem to conform to the type of 
housing used in the Uganda. 
Table 5.25(a): Types of houses in the households 
Tenures Other type Mud& Un-burnt Burnt Plastered Total No. 
of wall wattle bricks bricks walls ofWHs 
Informal 2 26 (26%) 37 (37%) 13 (13%) 23 (23%) 101 
Individualised 0 73 (68%) 0 1 33 (31%) 107 
Communal 1 43 (31%) 76 (54%) 8 (6%) 12 (<)010) 140 
Total 3 142 114 21 68 348 
Table 5.25(b): Types of floor 
Tenures Other type of Cemented floor Rammed earth Total No. of 
floor H1Hs 
Informal 7 32 (32%) 62 (62%) 101 
Individualised 3 6 (6%) 98 (92%) 107 
Communal 3 20 (14%) 117(84%) 140 
Total 13 58 277 348 
Table 5.25(c): Types of roof 
Tenures Other type of Grass thatch Corrugated Tiles Total No. of 
roof roof HlHs 
Informal 1 6(6%) 94 (94%) 0 101 
Individualised 1 18 (17%) 87 (81%) 1 107 
Communal 2 115 (82%) 23 (16%) 0 140 
Total 4 139 204 1 348 
6) Age 
The maXImum age of the respondents was 80 years, while the mInImUm age was 
20 years. The mean of the ages under both individualised and communal customary 
tenures was 46.1 years, while under informal tenure it was 51.5 years. This also confirms 
that the people living under the informal tenure system have slightly better living 
conditions and thus higher life expectancies, than those living under individualised and 
communal customary tenures (see Table 5.26). 
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Table 5.26: The mean age of respondents per tenure 
Tenures Total No. of Mean (yrs) Minimum (yrs) Maximum (yrs) 
households 
Infonnal 97 51.52 23 80 
Individualised 104 46.25 20 80 
Communal 140 46.12 20 79 
7) Sex 
The number of female-headed households at the time of the survey was estimated at 50% 
in all the tenure systems. This was due to many factors, including the liberation wars of 
1979 and 1985, the effect of HIV / AIDS in the rural areas, plus the fact that some of the 
husbands were reported to be living in the towns, working as casual labourers to support 
their families (see Table 5 27). 
Table 5.27: Distribution of sex among the households 
Tenures Female Male Total No. of HlHolds 
Infonnal 51 (50010) 50 (50010) 101 
Individualised 54 (50%) 53 (50%) 107 
Communal 68 (49%) 72 (51%) 140 
Total 173 175 348 
8) Marital status 
Monogamous marriages are predominant in all the three districts, although polygamous 
marriages do also exist (see Table 5.28). The number of widows is also relatively high in 
all districts. This is again due to the liberation wars of 1979 and 1985, and also due to the 
scourge of HIV / AIDS, which has ravaged the villages in Uganda. 
Table 5.28: Marital status within the three tenure systems 
Types of marriages Informal individualised communal Total 
Missing data 0 0 1 1 
Monogamous marriage 59 (59%) 59 (55%) 87(62%) 205 (59%) 
Polygamous marriage 11 (11%) 27 (25%) 27(19%) 65(19%) 
Single 4 0 0 4 
Separated 4 3 0 7 
Widowed 19 (19%) 17 (16%) 24 (17%) 60 (17%) 
Cohabiting 4 1 1 6 
Total No. ofWHs 101 107 140 348 
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9) Education level 
Table 5.29 shows that the majority of the household heads have primary education. The 
education at primary level is 69% under the informal tenure, 50% under individualised 
customary tenure and 54% under communal customary tenure. According to the 2002 
results of the Uganda population census, literacy rate is 68% of the population aged 10 
years and above in the whole country. 
Table 5.29: Education levels within the three tenure systems 
Education Level Informal Individualised Communal Total 
No education 18 (18%) 43 (40%) 40 (21)010) 101(29%) 
Primary 1-4 28 (28%) 26 (24%) 16 (ll%) 70 (20%) 
Primary 5-7 41 (41%) 28 (26%) 60 (43%) 129 (37%) 
Secondary 1-3 8 5 13 26 
Secondary 4-6 3 2 5 10 
Tertiary certificate 2 3 3 8 
Tertiary diploma 0 0 I 1 
University I 0 2 3 
Total No. of HlHs 101 107 140 348 
10) Household production and food purchase levels 
Table 5.30(a) shows that beans were the main crop grown on the family piece of land in 
all the districts. Overall, beans had the highest percentage (52%), followed by maize 
(27%) and bananas (13%), with the least grown crop being cassava (0.3%). 
Table 5.30(a): Main crops grown on the family piece of land 
Main Crops Informal Individ ualised Communal Total 
Beans 52 (54%) 48 (45%) 79 (57%) 179 (52%) 
Maize 34 (35%) 42 (40%) 18 (13%) 94 (27%) 
Coffee I 0 2 3 
Bananas 7(7%) 11(10%) 26 (19%) 44 (13%) 
Potatoes I 3 3 7 
Cassava 0 0 I 1(0.3%) 
Groundnuts 1 0 I 2 
Millet 0 0 7 7 
Peas 1 2 2 5 
Total No. of HlHs 97 106 139 342 
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Table 5.30(b) shows that a higher percentage of households buy food for consumption 
and that the communal customary households present the highest percentage (98%) of 
food purchases. The differences in household food purchases seem to reflect the existing 
differences in soil types and climates and also the fact that the food-crop production 
policy, which was meant to supplement the colonial cash-crop production policy, may not 
have been consistently implemented in all the districts. 
Table S.30(b): Food purchase levels 
Food purchase Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Don't know 3 0 0 3 
Food purchase 53 (56%) 76 (72%) 134 (98%) 263 (78%) 
No food purchase 42 (44%) 29 (28%) 3 (2%) 74 (22%) 
Total No. of HlHs 98 lOS 137 340 
11) Household income 
The household income was estimated in terms of the average amount of money earned by 
the household from cash crop farming which is the main economic activity and from 
food-crop farming which is the second economic activity. The average amount of money 
earned by the spouse per week was also estimated. Table 5.31 shows the breakdown of 
all the money, in Uganda shillings, earned in those different activities in the last month. 
The exchange rate at the time of research was approximately shillings 1800/= to a dollar. 
Table 5.31: Household income 
TENURES HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
lS'I Source i"D Source Monthly Weekly (spouse) 
Informal 46,906.83 ($26) 21,548.33 ($12) 63,169.05 ($35) 23,189.15 ($13) 
Individualised 27,562.98 ($15) 9,392.75 ($5) 34,529.77 ($19) 4,729.03 ($3) 
Communal 27,983.\0 ($15) 9,966.98 ($6) 33,471.86 ($19) 6,711.67 ($4) 
Total 33,489.83 ($19) 12,755.32 ($7) 44,917.56 ($25) 10,197.40 ($6) 
The results show that the households under informal tenure earn slightly higher income 
than their counterparts on customary land. The households under customary tenures are 
below the poverty line since they earn less than one dollar a day while those under 
informal tenure are on the poverty line because they earn just one dollar a day. 
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12) Summary of results 
• The mean household size was established at 6.7, 5.6 and 7.8 people in informal, 
individualised, and communal customary areas respectively. 
• The parish settlement pattern was established at 88 (87%), 88 (82%), and 130 
(93%) sparsely spaced households in informal, individualised, and communal 
customary areas respectively. 
• Apart from 4 households under informal tenure which had no land of their own, 
every household had its own land. Although De Soto (2001: 58) carried out his 
study in urban informal areas where the people did not own the land which they 
occupied, it would appear that his theory on poverty eradication would work well 
in Uganda where the majority of the people live on their own land in the rural 
areas. 
• The majority of households were located in rural setting and they lived in normal 
setting where each household had approximately 2 acres of land to live on. 
• Under the communal tenure 76 (54%) households live in houses with un-burnt 
brick walls, rammed earth floors, and grass thatch roofs; 73 (68%) households 
under individualised tenure live in houses with mud and wattle walls, rammed 
earth floors, and corrugated roofs; and 37 (37%) households under informal 
tenure live in houses with un burnt brick walls, rammed earth floors, and 
corrugated roofs. According to the Uganda IX>pulation census of 2002, only 17% 
of the dwelling units in the whole country were constructed with permanent roof. 
wall and floor materials. 
• The maximum age was 80 years and the minimum was 20 years. The average age 
for households under individualised and communal tenures was 46.1 years and for 
informal tenure it was 51.5 years. 
• In all parishes, 50% of the households were female-headed. 
• Monogamous marriages were predominant in all parishes. 
• Primary education level was established at 69%, 50%, and 54% in informal, 
individualised and communal households respectively. The high level of 
education in informal areas was expected because the sample on informal area 
was selected in the central region where civilisation started. According to the 
2002 results of the Uganda population census, literacy rate was 68% of the 
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population aged 10 years and above in the whole country. Because infonnal 
relationships exist on fonnal tenure, the higher level of education in the infonnal 
areas suggests that there could be a link between fonnal tenure and literacy 
growth rate. 
• Maize and beans are the main food crops grown in all parishes. The level of food 
purchases was established at 98%, 69%, and 54% in the communal, 
individualised, and infonnal households respectively. 
• The household income was slightly higher in the households under infonnal 
tenure relationships. This suggests that there could be a link between agricultural 
production and fonnalland tenure. 
5.2.2 Land transactions 
This sub-section presents the general views of the people with regard to the land. The 
purpose of this section is to understand the existing land transactions in order to establish 
whether the local people in the parishes are ready for a fonnal land tenure system. The 
issues, which were handled under this sub-section, include access to credit, awareness of 
the existing land laws, and land markets. The sub-section was concluded with a summary 
of results. 
1) Access to credit 
In order to establish whether the landholders in the parishes were already using land as 
collateral in their daily business transactions, they were asked a series of leading 
questions. The first question was, "Have you ever tried to borrow money?" The responses 
show that 25(26%) of the households under infonnal tenure, 71 (67%) of the households 
under individualised tenure and 36 (26%) of the households under communal tenure have 
borrowed money at some stage (see Table 5.32(a». 
Table 5.32(a): Level of awareness of credit facilities 
Tenures Not sure Credit facilities No facilities Total No. of HlHolds 
Infonnal I 25 (26%) 72 (73%) 98 
Individualised I 71 (67%) 34 (32%) 106 
Communal 16 36 (26%) 87 (63%) 139 
Total 18 132 (38%) 193 (56°/.) 343 
The landowners were further asked to state where they borrowed the money from and to 
name the person from whom they received the money. Only 9 (2.6%) households stated 
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that they had ever borrowed money from a village bank, and 1 (0.3%) household stated 
that it borrowed money from the Entandikwa micro finance scheme. Most of the money 
was borrowed through the traditional methods, as shown in Table 5.32(b). The traditional 
methods include borrowing from a friend, against a written agreement or without it or 
pledging farmlhousehold items. This shows that the majority of the people participate in 
extralegal transactions. 
Table 5.32(b): Existing financial institutions in the villages 
Institutions Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Don't know I 0 I 2 
Entandikwa I 0 0 1 (0.3%) 
MFI Village bank 5 4 0 9 (2.6%) 
Any other 94 (93%) 103 (96%) 139 (99%) 336 (97%) 
Total No of H1Hs 101 107 140 348 
The landowners were asked, "Were you required to give any security before you got the 
money?" Ten households (19%) under informal tenure, forty households (50%) under 
individualised tenure and twelve households (10%) under communal tenure stated that 
they were indeed required to give security. Twenty nine (56%), ten (12%) and eighty four 
(69%) households under informal, individualised and communal tenure systems 
respectively, have never asked for loans (see Table 5.32(c». 
Table 5.32(c): Conditions for disbursement of loans 
Tenures Not Applicable Loans No loans Total No. of 
Households 
Informal 29 (56%) 10 (19%) 13 (25%) 52 
Individualised 10 (12%) 40 (50010) 30 (38%) 80 
Communal 84 (69%) 12 (10%) 25 (21%) 121 
Total 122 62 68 253 
The landowners were further asked to state what kind of security was required. Land, 
household property and written agreements were the only securities mentioned. Out of 13 
households under informal tenure, 5(38%) pledged land and 6(46%) signed written 
agreements. Out of 35 households under individualised customary tenure, 12(34%) 
pledged land and 23(66%) signed written agreements. Out of 11 households under 
communal tenure, 1(9%) pledged land, 6(55%) signed written agreements and 4(36%) 
120 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
offered household properties. The written agreements specify the terms of repayment in 
the form of farm produce, such as animals or crops in case of default. 63(83%), 57(62%), 
and 99(90%) households of informal, individualised and communal tenure systems 
respectively, have never given any securities for loans (see Table 5.32(d)). 
Table 5.32(d): Types of securities for loans 
Tenures Not Applicable Land Household Written Total No. of 
property agreement HlHs 
InfonnaI 63 (83%) 5 (38%) 2 (15%) 6 (46%) 76 
Individualised 57 (62%) 12 (34%) 0 23 (66%) 92 
Communal 99 (90"10) 1(9%) 4 (36%) 6 (55%) 110 
Total 218 18 6 35 278 
The landowners were probed further to establish whether they actually received the 
requested loans. The responses show that 23 (27%) households under informal tenure, 
65 (67%) households under individualised tenure and 26 (21 %) households under 
communal tenure did receive loans (see Table 5.32(e)). 
Table 5.32(e): Levels ofsuccess with respect to loan acquisition 
Responses informal individ ualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 58 (68%) 31(32%) 94 (76%) 181(59°1.) 
Success 23 (27%) 65 (67%) 26 (21%) 114 (37%) 
No success 4(5%) 1(\%) 3 (3%) 8(3%) 
Total No. ofHlHs 85 97 123 305 
The eight (8) households which had not been successful were asked to explain why they 
did not succeed. The responses to this question indicate that these households did not 
want to give any further information. This kind of reaction shows that the people prefer to 
hide information if the questions are not presented tactfully (see Table 5.32(t)). 
Table 5.32(t): Reasons for failure to obtain loan 
Responses informal individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 83 106 120 309 
Loan I 0 0 1 
No loan \ 0 \ 2 
Total No. ofHlHs 85 106 121 312 
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2) Existing land laws 
The households were asked, "Have you ever heard of the 1998 land law?" The responses 
to this question indicate that less than one third of the households in each parish have 
heard about the Land Act, 1998. At least 21 (21%) under infonnal tenure, 16 (15%) under 
individualised customary tenure and 38 (27%) under communal customary tenure have, 
however, heard about the Land Act, 1998 (see Table 5.33). 
Table 5.33: Level of awareness of land laws 
Tenures Not applicable A ware of land Not aware Total No. of 
laws Households 
Informal 6(6%) 21 (21%) 73 (73%) 100 
Individualised 13 (12%) 16 (15%) 77 (73%) 106 
Communal 16 (12%) 38 (27%) 85 (61%) 139 
Total 34 75 235 345 
Out of the 21 households under infonnal tenure, which had heard about the Land Act, 
1998, 14 (67%) had heard about it over the radio; out of the 38 households under 
communal tenure, 14 (37%) had also heard about it over the radio; and out of the 16 
households under individualised customary tenure, 6 (38%) had heard about it through 
the village social communication system (see Table 5.34). 
Table 5.34: Means of communication in tbe parisbes 
Tenures Not Village Radio Local Other Total No. of HlHs 
applicable system officials 
Informal 64 (70%) 6 14 (67%) 1 7 92 
Individualised 87 (84%) 6 (38%) 3 4 3 103 
Communal 97 (72%) 8 14 (37%) 8 7 134 
Total 248 20 31 13 17 329 
The landowners were asked, "Please tell me three things you know about the Land Act?" 
70(74%), 95(89%), and 105(79%) households of infonnal, individualised and communal 
tenure systems respectively, declined to say anything about the Land Act. Out of 25 
infonnal tenurc households, who volunteered to give infonnation about the Land Act, 15 
(60%) households admitted that they pay ground rent of 1000 shillings per year, 4(16%) 
households stated that the law gives freedom to tenants, and 3(12%) households stated 
that the laws favour tenants. Out of 12 individualised tenure households who volunteered 
to give infonnation about the Land Act, 3(25%) households want the people to give their 
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consent, 3(25%) households want land titles, and 2(17%) households want freehold titles. 
Out of 27 communal households who volunteered to give information about the Land 
Act, 12(44%) households want freehold titles, 3(11%) households want the people to give 
their consent and 3(11) households want land titles (see Table 5.35). 
Table 5.35: What land laws means to the people in Masaka, Ntungamo and Soroti 
Responses Informal Individual Communal Total 
Not applicable 70 (74%) 95 (8<J01o) 105 (79%) 270 (81%) 
Land is for the government 1 3 (25%) 1 5(8%) 
Any land should have a title I 3 (25%) 3 (11%) 7 (11%) 
Land belongs to the people forever (freehold) 0 2 (17%) 12 (44%) 14(22%) 
The law gives freedom to tenants 4 (16%) 0 I 5(8%) 
The land laws favour tenants 3 (12%) 0 0 3 
Tenants pay ground rent of 1000 15 (60%) 1 0 16 (25%) 
The people should consent I 3 (25%) 3 (11%) 7 (11%) 
The law is about dispute resolution 0 0 3 3 
Land demarcation to be effected 0 0 1 I 
Government to implement tenure systems 0 0 3 (11%) 3(5%) 
Total number of households 95 107 132 334 
3) Land markets 
A period of six months was considered to be short enough for the people to remember 
clearly what had taken place in their parishes. Based on this assumption, the households 
were asked, "Have you heard of anyone buying land in this parish?" At least 8 (8%) of 
the households under informal tenure, 44 (42%) of the households under individualised 
customary tenure and 15 (11%) of the households under communal customary tenure 
stated that they had heard of people buying land in their areas (see table 5.36). 
Table 5.36: Confirmation of land purchases in the parishes 
Tenures Not Land No land Total No. 
applicable purchases purchases ofHlHs 
Informal 4 (4%) 8 (8%) 88 (88%) 100 
Individualised 0 44 (42%) 62 (58%) 106 
Communal 17(12%) 15(11%) 108 (77%) 140 
Total 21 67 258 346 
The households who had heard about the buyers were probed further to establish whether 
they also knew how many they were. Out of 20 households under informal tenure, 
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4 (20%) said they had heard about one buyer; out of 39 households under individualised 
customary tenure, 14 (36%) said they heard that there had been only one buyer, and out 
of 10 households under communal customary tenure,S (50%) said they also had heard of 
one buyer. The sharp drop in the numbers of people who responded to the last question 
shows that some of the people may not be very sure of what they were talking about (see 
Table 5.37). 
Table 5.37: Numbers of land purchasers under the respective tenures 
No. of land Purchasers Informal I ndivid ualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 69 (77%) 46 (54%) 108 (89%) 226 (77%) 
None 9 5 0 14 
One (1) 4 (20%) 14 (36%) 5 (50%) 23 (33%) 
Two (2) 3 5 3 11 
Three (3) 1 6 1 8 
Four (4) I 3 1 5 
Five (5) 0 4 0 4 
Ten (10) 2 2 0 4 
Total No. of HIHs 89 85 121 295 
The households were probed further to establish whether any of the land buyers were 
successful and had actually moved to settle on the land they had purchased. Three (3) 
households under informal tenure and five (5) households under individualised customary 
tenure stated that they had seen at least one settler in their parishes. Only one (1) 
household under communal tenure confirmed that two (2) settlers had come to live in the 
parish. Judging from the way the numbers dwindled in response to further probing, it is 
most likely that there were none or possibly one or two successful purchasers under 
informal and individualised tenures, but it is most unlikely that any purchaser succeeded 
in buying communal land (see Table 5.38). 
Table 5.38: Numbers of successful land purchasers 
No. of Settlers Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 65 (77%) 45 (58%) 110 (92%) 220 (780/0) 
None 14 26 9 49 
One (I) 3 (14%) 5 (15%) 0 8 (12%) 
Two (2) 1 1 1 3 
Four (4) 1 0 0 1 
Total No. of H/Hs 84 77 120 281 
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4) Summary of results 
• The households in all the parishes mainly access credit through extralegal means. 
They pledge land, written agreements, and household property as collateral. 
• All households were aware of the Land Act 1998 (Cap. 227). 
• There is sizable land market in all parishes. 
5.2.3 Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
The households were asked, "Have you had any land dispute over your parcel in the past 
one year (2002)7" The responses show that 22 (22%) households under informal tenure, 
10 (9%) households under individualised customary tenure and 28 (20%) households 
under communal customary tenure have had disputes over their land parcels. The 
majority of the households in all the three parishes have not had dispute (see Table 5.39). 
Table 5.39: Confirmation of the existence of disputes in the parishes 
Tenures Don't know Not Disputes No disputes Total No. of 
applicable HfHs 
Infonnal I 2 22 (22%) 76 (76%) 101 
Individualised 0 7 IO (9"10) 90 (84%) 107 
Communal 0 19 28(20%) 93 (66%) 140 
Total I 28 60 (17%) 259 (74%) 348 
The next question was, "How many times have you experienced land conflicts on your 
parcel since January 20037" Out of 18 households under informal tenure which admitted 
that they have had conflict, 12(67%) had experienced one dispute; out of the 5 
households under individualised tenure, 2(40%) had experienced one dispute; and out of 
the 18 households under communal tenure 11 (61 %) had experienced one dispute (see 
Table 5.40). 
Table 5.40: Number of disputes experienced in 2003 
Number of disputes Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 83 (82%) 102 (95%) 122 (87%) 307(88%) 
One (I) 12 (67%) 2 (40%) 11(61%) 25(61%) 
Two (2) 2 2 5 9 
Three (3) 2 I I 4 
Four (4) 0 0 I I 
Ten (10) I 0 0 1 
Eleven (I I) I 0 0 I 
Total No. of bousebolds 101 107 140 348 
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The households were further asked, "What were these conflicts about?" A wide range of 
conflicts is shown in Table 5.41. 
Table 5.41: Types of land conflicts in the villages 
Types of conflicts Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 78 (77%) 97 (91%) 117(84%) 292 (84%) 
Inheritance 0 2 0 2 
Exceeding boundaries 8 1 8 17 
Compensation 0 0 0 0 
Land sales 1 1 0 2 
Trespass 3 0 5 8 
Encroachment 2 4 7 13 
User rights 3 0 0 3 
Illegal settlement 4 1 0 5 
Evictions 1 0 2 3 
Resettlement 0 0 I 1 
Any other conflict 1 1 0 2 
Total No. of households 101 107 140 348 
The households were asked to mention with whom they had had the conflict. 78(77%), 
97(91 %), and 117(84%) households under informal, individualised and communal tenure 
systems respectively, stated that they have not had any conflicts (see Table 5.42). Out of 
23 informal tenure households which admitted to have had conflict, 9(39%) had conflict 
with neighbours, 5(22%) with errant occupants, and 4( 17%) with tenants. Out of 10 
individualised tenure households which admitted to have had conflict, 2(20%) had 
conflict with neighbours and 2(20%) with other relatives. Out of 23 communal tenure 
households which admitted to have had conflict, 16(70%) had conflict with neighbours 
and 6(26%) with other relatives. This shows that conflicts on informal tenure were 
widespread, while those on customary tenures (both individualised and communal) were 
mainly between other relatives or neighbours. It would therefore appear that land issues 
under informal tenure are open to a much wider community than under customary 
tenures. It would appear, moreover, that the formal tenure will widen the scope of land 
transactions and disputes, and that therefore dispute resolution mechanisms will have to 
be planned for in the villages. 
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Table 5.42: Names of entities that are usually involved in land disputes 
Opponents Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 78 (77%) 97 (91%) 117 (84%) 292 (84%) 
Family member 0 I 1 2 
Neighbours 9 (39%) 2 (20%) 16 (70%) 27 (48%) 
Errant occupants 5 (22%) 0 0 5 
Other relatives 2 2 (20%) 6 (26%) 10 (18%) 
Landlord 2 0 0 2 
Tenant 4 (17%) 0 0 4 
Government officials 0 0 0 0 
Any other entities 1 5 (50%) 0 6 (11%) 
Total No. of Households 101 107 140 348 
The households were then asked, "Where did you first go for settlement of the disputes?" 
Their responses highlighted local councils, other mechanisms and the magistrate's court 
as the main dispute resolution mechanisms. This shows that the formal dispute resolution 
mechanisms do already exist within the parishes (see Table 5.43). 
Table 5.43: Conflict resolution mechanisms 
Village Courts Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 79 (78%) 97 (91%) 117 (84%) 293 (84%) 
Clan/Elders 3 0 7 10 
Neighbours 1 0 0 1 
Local Council 8 6 9 23 
Magistrate's Court 3 0 2 5 
Police 0 0 0 0 
Any other mechanisms 7 4 5 16 
Total No of households 101 107 140 348 
The next question was, "Why did you choose this level/office?" The responses tabulated 
in Table 5.44 show that their choices were not based on whether the dispute resolution 
mechanism/office performed best or most effectively. For example communal tenure 
households preferred dispute resolution mechanisms which were more responsive; 
individualised households preferred those which were more knowledgeable; and the 
informal households preferred those to which they were referred or advised. 
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Table 5.44: Reasons for selecting the dispute resolution mechanisms 
Reasons Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 85 (84%) 100 (93%) 117 (84%) 303 (87%) 
More responsive I 0 5 6 
More knowledgeable I 2 2 5 
Easily accessible 3 I 5 9 
Protocol dictates 4 0 4 8 
Was referred/advised 4 2 I 7 
Other reasons 2 2 6 10 
Total No. ofWHs tOt t07 140 348 
The concluding question m this section was, "State how the disputes were finally 
resolved?" The households under informal, individualised and communal tenures stated 
that they used Local Councils to resolve conflicts and that most of the cases were still 
pending. This shows that the Magistrate's Court is not functioning properly in all parishes 
(see Table 5.45). 
Table 5.45: Active dispute resolution mechanisms 
Village Courts Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 79 (78%) 97 (91%) 117 (84%) 293 (84%) 
Clan/Elders 3 (13.6%) 0 7 (30.4%) to (18.1%) 
Neighbours I 0 0 1 
Local Council 8 (36.3%) 6 (60%) 9(39.1%) 23 (41.8%) 
Magistrate's Court 3 (13.6%) 0 2 5 
Police 0 0 0 0 
Still pending 7 (31.8%) 4 (40%) 5 (21.7%) t6 (29.t%) 
Other mechanisms 0 0 0 0 
Total No. ofWHs tOt 107 140 348 
Summary of results 
• It was established that land disputes exist in all parishes. 
• Local Councils and Magistrate's Courts were the main formal dispute resolution 
mechanisms. 
• The Magistrate's Court was not functioning properly in all the parishes. 
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5.2.4 Access to land and security of tenure 
The questions under this sub-section were focused on identifying two legal principles: the 
consent and the ownership principle. Here we were interested in the names of individuals 
who would either singly or jointly/in common be registered on the register of titles. It was 
necessary to establish these names for each of the three tenure systems because the 
registered persons would be the ones to give consent in the subsequent land transactions. 
The first question was, "How many land parcels do you own within the parish?" The 
average number of land parcels per household was established at 4.34 for informal 
tenure, 5.35 for individualised customary tenure and 3.96 for communal customary tenure 
(see Table 5.46(a)). 
Table 5.46(a): Number of parcels per household 
Tenures Mean 
Informal 4.34 
Individualised 5.35 
Communal 3.96 
Total 4.50 
The locations of the homesteads within each of the three districts are presented in Table 
5.46(b). 
Table 5.46(b): The location of home parcels in the parishes 
Tenure Any other Town Trading Rural Total No. of 
Council Centre HlHs 
Informal 1 1 5 94 (93%) 101 
Individualised 0 0 4 103 (96%) 107 
Communal 1 0 0 139 (100%) 140 
Total 2 1 9 336 348 
According to De Soto (2001: 177), when people acquire property, they have their own 
ideas about how to use and exchange it. Cardinal to the exchange of land is the 
knowledge about its size, because the size quantifies the amount of land to be exchanged. 
Basing on this theory, the households were asked, "How big is the home parcel ofland?" 
The responses presented in Table 5.47(a) show that 19 households in Rukarango 
(individualised), 6 in Kabigi (informal) and 1 in Aminit (communal) did not know how to 
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estimate the sizes of their parcels of land. This was expected because the sizes of parcels 
are not easy to determine; only qualified land surveyors can determine them accurately. 
Table 5.47(a): Estimated sizes of family land parcels in the parishes 
Parcel sizes Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Vague 8 7 1 16 
Don't know 6 19 1 26 
Not applicable 1 0 0 1 
o ~ 1.0 acres 8 6 1 15 
1.0 " 19 (19%) 40 (37%) 36 (26%) 95 (27%) 
2.0 " 27 (27%) 18 (17%) 36 (26%) 81 (23%) 
3.0 " 10 6 10 26 
4.0 " 2 4 13 19 
5.0 " 6 1 8 15 
6.0 " 2 2 10 14 
7.0 " 2 1 1 4 
8.0 " 1 2 4 7 
9.0 " 0 1 1 2 
10.0 " 3 0 8 11 
More than 10 acres 6 0 10 16 
Total No. of HlHs 101 t07 140 348 
The systematic adjudication and demarcation pilot project has thus far only been 
completed in Rukarango parish. The minimum, median and maximum sizes of the plots 
in Rukarango parish, which were determined after completion of the systematic 
adjudication and demarcation project, are highlighted in grey colour in Table 5.47(b). For 
comparison purposes, the corresponding values of the median, minimum and maximum 
sizes, which were extracted from the values provided by the village residents, are also 
presented in Table 5.47(b). 
Table 5.47(b): The maximum, minimum and median sizes of parcels (in acres) 
Tenure Maximum Median Minimum 
Informal 80.0 1.70 0.20 
Individualised 9.0 48.678 I.32 1.730 0.25 0.015 
Communal 50.0 1.50 0.25 
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A comparison of the two sets of figures shows that there is no significant difference 
between the two sets of values. This shows that the local residents either know how to 
determine the sizes of their parcels, or that they took the trouble to find out how big their 
parcels are. This is a positive development because the people will have greater 
confidence in the surveyors, and also trust the plot sizes determined by these at the end of 
the systematic adjudication and demarcation exercise 
The landowners were asked to state how they had acquired their home parcels of land. 
Their responses show, that land was mainly acquired through inheritance, with the next 
important being through purchase (see Table 5.48). 
Table 5.48: Methods of land acquisition 
Access to land Informal Individ ualised Communal Total 
Don't know I I I 3 
Purchased 42 (42%) 16 (15%) II (8%) 69 (20%) 
Inherited 32 (32%) 80 (75%) 123 (88%) 235 (68%) 
Given as a Gift 24 (24%) I I 26 
Just settled 0 2 I 3 
Other methods 2 7 3 12 
Total No. of HlHs 101 107 140 348 
The landowners were further asked, "From whom did you buy/acquire this parcel of 
land?" The statistics show that most of the land was acquired from parents either through 
inheritence or as a gift. Because of extended family relationships, some people acquire 
land as a gift from their uncles, grandfathers and aunties (see Table 5.49). 
Table 5.49: Previous landowners 
Previous landowners Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Don't know 3 2 0 5 
Parents 48 (48%) 71 (66%) 1\0(79%) 229 (66%) 
Other relatives 2 3 17(12%) 22 (6%) 
Registered owner 17 (17%) 4 (4%) 2 (1.4%) 23 (7%) 
Another tenant 21 (21%) 0 0 21 (6%) 
Other (Vendor) 10 (\0%) 27 (25%) 11(8%) 48 (14%) 
Total No. of WHolds 101 107 140 348 
The households were asked, "Do you have any document to show ownership of this 
home parcel of land?" The responses show that 56 (55%) of the households under 
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infonnal tenure, 34 (32%) of the households under individualised customary tenure, and 
15 (11 %) of the households under communal customary tenure had documents (see Table 
5.50). 
Table 5.50: Ownership with documentary evidence or without documents in the parishes 
Types of ownership Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 8 7 7 22 
Documentary evidence 56 (55%) 34 (32%) 15(11%) 105 (30%) 
No documentary evidence 37 (37%) 66 (62%) 118 (84%) 221 (64%) 
Total No. ofHlHs 101 107 140 348 
The households were further asked, "What type of document do you have?" The types of 
documents held by the landowners included land titles, purchase agreements, and 
inheritance/gift documents. However, the majority of households in all parishes did not 
have documentary evidence (see Table 5.51). 
Table 5.51: Types of land documents 
Types of land documents Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 45 (44%) 71 (66%) 125 (89%) 241 (69%) 
Land title II (11%) 0 0 tt (3%) 
Purchase agreement 35 (35%) I3 (12%) 6 (4%) 54 (16%) 
Inheritance/gift document 10 (10%) 23 (21%) 9(6%) 42 (12%) 
Total No. of Households 101 107 140 348 
The households were asked, "In whose names is the document?" The investigation 
established that purchase agreements and inheritance/gift documents were in the names 
of the household heads, spouses, parents, clan elders, and relatives. Only one person 
declared that he was a registered landowner ofmailo land (see Table 5.52). 
Although 11 people (see Table 5.51 above) had declared that they had mailo land titles, 
only one person declared that he was a registered owner (see Table 5.52). This means that 
most of the beneficiaries living on inherited titled mailo land are holding onto land titles, 
which are in the names of their grandfathers or great-grandfathers. These land titles have 
never been transferred because the beneficiaries do not understand the system or how to 
use it. Firstly, most of the beneficiaries do not understand the procedures laid out in the 
Succession Act (Cap. 162), which is currently in force. This Act commenced on 15th 
February 1906 and it is full of English legal principles, which have little bearing on the 
traditional way of landholding in Uganda. Secondly, there is only one central office based 
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in the capital city, Kampala, which deals with succession matters. In essence, then, the 
beneficiaries are holding onto title documents that are almost useless to them because 
they cannot borrow money on them. This problem had not been anticipated when the 
questionnaires were being designed. It should, however, be noted that 235 (68%) 
households in all the parishes do understand the concept of landownership and the 
categories oflandownership (see Table 5.52). 
Table 5.52: Categories of landowners 
Categories of landowners Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 41(41%) 74 (69%) 120 (86%) 235 (68%) 
Self 33 (33%) 16 (15%) 12 (9%) 61 (18%) 
Self & spouse 0 6 (6%) I (0.7%) 7 (2%) 
Self. spouse & children 0 0 0 0 
Spouse 13 (13%) 8 (7%) 4 (3%) 25 (7%) 
Self & children 0 0 0 0 
Spouse & children 0 0 0 0 
Parents 7 (7%) 0 I (0.7) 8 (2%) 
Relatives I 0 0 1 
Registered owner I 0 0 I 
Other (Clan/Elders) 5 (5%) 3 (3%) 2 (1.4%) 10(3%) 
Total No. of Households 101 107 140 348 
The 221 (64%) households that did not have documents were asked, "Would you like to 
get documents to show ownership of your parcel of land?" The responses to this question 
show that 58% of households want to own land by document (see Tables 5.53). 
Table 5.53: How land owners want to own their land 
Choices Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not Applicable 56 (55%) 36 (34%) 21 (15%) 113 (32%) 
Documentary evidence 39 (39%) 55 (51.4%) 107 (76.4%) 201 (58%) 
No documents 6(6%) 16 (15%) 12 (9%) 34 (]O%) 
Total No. of Households 101 107 ]40 348 
The next question was, "In whose names should the land titles be?" The households 
under individualised tenure recommended the household head and hislher spouse, the 
households under informal tenure recommended the household head only, and the 
households under communal tenure recommended the household head, children and clan 
elders. These recommendations seem to be consistent with individual, family and clan 
tenure systems of traditional landholding respectively (see Table 5.54). 
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Table 5.54: Persons recommended to be registered on the Land Register 
Choices Informal Individ ualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 57 (56%) 46 (43%) 22 (16%) 125 (36%) 
Self 26 (26%) 19 (18%) 50 (36%) 95 (27%) 
Self & spouse 6 (6%) 14 (13%) 3 23 (7%) 
Spouse 0 14 (13%) 2 16 (5%) 
Self & children 5 (5%) 3 23 (16.4%) 31 (9%) 
Spouse & children 3 5 5 13 
Parents I 0 3 4 
Relatives 0 0 4 4 
Registered owner 0 0 6 6 
Other (Clan/Elders) 3 6 22 (16%) 31 (9%) 
Total No. of Households 101 107 140 348 
The next question was, "What is the existing tenure status of the home parcel of landT' 
Fourteen (14%) households under informal tenure, who are holding on to mailo titles that 
they cannot transfer, simply said that they did not know. Nine (6%) households under 
communal customary land who had been made squatters on their own land without their 
consent also said that they did not know. And two (2%) households under individualised 
customary tenure, which are on native freehold land, also said that they did not know. It 
was further established that ten (10%), one hundred and five (98%), and one hundred and 
twenty-three (88%) households on informal, individualised and communal tenure systems 
respectively, live on customary land (see Table 5.55). 
Table 5.55: Existing tenure systems 
Existing tenure systems Informal Individ ualised Communal Total 
Don't know 14 (14%) 2 (2%) 9 (6%) 25 (7%) 
Kibanja on mailo 64 (64%) 0 I 65 (19%) 
Kibanja on leasehold I 0 0 1 
Kibanja on freehold 4 0 I 5 
Leasehold title I 0 I 2 
Mailo title 6 0 0 6 
Freehold title I 0 5 6 
Customary land 10 (10%) 105 (98%) 123 (88%) 238 (68.4%) 
Total number of households 101 107 140 348 
The landowners were asked, "Who decides what should be grown on the home parcel of 
land?" The responses show that in most cases the head of the household decides. 
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Otherwise the decision is taken by the household head and hislher spouse, or by the 
spouse alone (see Table 5.56). 
Table 5.56: Persons who take major decisions on what to grow on the home parcel 
Decision makers Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 4 1 1 6 
Self 52 (52%) 48 (45%) 79 (56%) 179(51%) 
Self & Spouse 34 (34%) 42 (39%) 18 (13%) 94 (27%) 
Self, spouse & children 1 0 2 3 
Spouse 7 (7%) 11(10%) 26 (19%) 44 (13%) 
Self & children I 3 3 7 
Spouse & children 0 0 1 1 
Parents 1 0 1 2 
Relatives 0 0 7 7 
Other 1 2 2 5 
Total number of households 101 107 140 348 
The next question was, "Who should make the final decision if the parcel of land is to be 
sold?" The informal tenure households want the household head to take the decision; the 
individualised households want it to be taken by the household head and spouse; and the 
communal tenure households want it to be taken by the household head, the spouse and 
the clan elders (see Table 5.57). 
Table 5.57: Persons who should control the disposition of land 
Decision makers Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not Applicable 3 0 3 6 
Self 59 (59%) 38 (36%) 42 (30%) 139 (40%) 
Self & Spouse 17 (17%) 44 (41%) 7 (5%) 68 (20%) 
Self. spouse & children 4 4 2 10 
Spouse II (11%) 6 (6%) 25 (18%) 42 (12%) 
Self & children 5 7 5 17 
Spouse & children 0 0 0 0 
Parents I 0 5 6 
Relatives I I 18 (13%) 20 (6%) 
Other (Clan/Elders) 0 7 (7%) 33 (24%) 40 (11%) 
Total No. of households 101 107 140 348 
It is not clear why the households under communal tenure do not want the wife to appear 
on the land title, but they do want her to decide when the land is being sold. This sudden 
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replacement of the children by the spouse in decision-making calls for further 
investigation before the systematic adjudication and demarcation project starts in any of 
the communal customary areas. 
The investigation in this subsection concluded with the question, "How long has your 
household lived in this parish?" The mean period of 30 years, which the households have 
lived on their customary land, is consistent with the national life expectancy, which was 
estimated around 45 years in the 1990s. The mean, minimum and maximum values are 
presented in Table 5.58. 
Table 5.58: Mean, minimum and maximum years lived on the family parcel of land 
Tenures No. of Households Mean (yrs) Minimum Maximum 
Informal 101 29.95 1 70 
Individualised 107 30.08 1 69 
Communal 140 29.28 1 70 
Summary of results 
• The average number of land parcels per household was established at 4.34, 5.35, 
and 3.96 for informal, individualised and communal households respectively. 
• The majority ofthe parcels were located in the rural areas. 
• The average size of plots in all parishes was between 1-3 acres ofland. 
• The majority of households inherited land from their parents. 
• The majority of households in all parishes would like to own land by document 
under a formal tenure. 
• The households under individualised tenure recommended that the names of man 
and wife should appear on the land title. The households under informal tenure 
recommended the household head, while households under communal tenure 
recommended the man, children and clan elders. 
• 105(98%) households under individualised and 123(88%) households under 
communal tenures live on customary land while 64(64%) households under 
informal tenure live on Kibanja on mailo land. 
• In all parishes, the household heads take major decisions on what to grow on 
home parcels. 
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• The households under individualised tenure recommended that disposition of land 
should be done by man and wife. Households under communal tenure 
recommended man, wife, and clan elders. Households under informal tenure 
recommended household head. 
• The majority of households under communal and individualised tenures own land 
without documents while the majority of households under informal tenure have 
documents. 
5.2.5 Informal tenure relationships 
The landlords and tenants are extremely sensitive when it comes to talking about land 
matters. The researcher decided that the best way to obtain detailed and personal 
information from each of them was to deal with them separately. This sub-section thus 
analyses the data obtained from the two separately under two sub-headings: Rights of 
occupancy on registered land and registered landowners. 
1) Rights of occupancy on registered land 
The tenants were asked, "Do you know the owner of this land?" Eighty households 
(80%) of informal tenure knew their landlords. Some six (5.6%) households under the 
individualised customary tenure said that they did not know their landlords. These six 
households are living on native freehold land, whose owners they have never seen. The 
140 (100%) communal households, which were interviewed, said that they did not have 
any landlords (see Table 5.59). 
Table 5.59: Differences between informal tenure and customary tenure 
Tenure Not applicable Aware of landlords Not aware of Total No. of H/Hs 
landlords 
Informal 15 (15%) 80 (80%) 6 101 
Individualised 101 (94%) 0 6 107 
Communal 140 (100%) 0 0 140 
Total 256 80 (80%) 12 348 
The tenants were further asked, "Have you ever had any misunderstanding with the 
registered owner?" Seventy-nine informal households (79%) said that they had never had 
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misunderstandings, with only four households admitting that they had had 
misunderstandings with their landlords (see Table 5.60(a)). 
Table 5.60(a): Prevalence of disputes 
Disputes Not applicable Disputes No disputes Total No. of H1Hs 
Infonnal 18 (18%) 4 (4%) 79 (79%) 101 
Individualised 107 (100%) 0 0 107 
Communal 140 (100%) 0 0 140 
Total 250 4 79 348 
The next question was, "What was the misunderstanding about?" One of the four 
admitted that the misunderstanding was about fraudulent sale of land by the landlord; the 
other three did not want to disclose anything (see Table 5.60(b)). 
Table 5.60(b): Possible causes of misunderstanding 
Reasons Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 98 (98%) 107 (100%) 140 (100%) 345 
Non-payment of rent 0 0 0 0 
Fraudulent sale I 0 0 I 
Boundary conflict 0 0 0 0 
Other 2 0 0 2 
Total number of households 101 107 140 348 
The tenants were further asked, "Have you ever had any misunderstanding with your 
neighbours over this parcel of land?" Eight persons admitted to having had 
misunderstandings (see Table 5.61). 
Table 5.61: Misunderstandings between neighbouring tenants on titled land 
Tenure Not applicable Misunderstandings None Total No. of Households 
Infonnal 44 (44%) 8 49 (49%) 101 
Individualised 107 (100%) 0 0 107 
Communal 140 (100%) 0 0 140 
Total 291 8 49 348 
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These 8 households were asked to clarify what the misunderstandings with the 
neighbours had been about. Five (5) households stated that they had conflict over 
boundaries, and three (3) households stated that they had conflict over trespass. 
The tenants were then asked, "Do you pay any ground rent (Busuulu) to the registered 
owner?" Twenty-three households (23%) stated that they did pay ground rent, while sixty 
(60%) said they did not pay any rent (see Table 5.62). 
Table 5.62: Payment of ground rent on informal land 
Tenure Vague Missing Not Ground No ground Total No. of 
data applicable rent rent Households 
Infonnal 7 0 II 23 (23% 60 (60%) 101 
Individualised 0 0 107 0 0 107 
Communal 3 7 130 0 0 140 
Total 10 7 248 23 60 348 
The tenants were asked, "How much ground rent do you pay to the landlord?" The 
responses show that shillings 1000/= are paid yearly as per the current Land Act (Cap. 
227). Shillings 11, 9 and 8 were paid by different people during the colonial period. And 
shillings 5000/= is likely to be a total sum of what the person has paid over the last five 
years, or it could be an amount privately agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant 
as yearly ground rent (see Table 5.63). 
Table 5.63: Standard charges for ground rent 
Amount payable in rent Number of Households 
Not applicable 80 
No standard charge 1 
Ushs 8/= 1 
UShs 9/= 1 
UShs 11/= 1 
UShs 1000/= 15 
UShs 5000/= 2 
Total number of households 101 
The sixty households (60%) that did not pay ground rent were asked to clarify why they 
did not pay. The majority said that they had never been asked by the landlords to pay, 
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while others said that the government abolished the payment of rent. Those who said that 
the government abolished payment of rent implied that the recommended shillings 
1,0001= per year was too little compared to the respective sizes of land that were 
occupied by tenants (see Table 5.64). 
Table 5.64: Reasons for non-payment of ground rent 
Reasons for non-payment of rent Number of households 
Not applicable 53 (53%) 
The land belongs to my relatives 2 (2%) 
Government abolished payment of rent 10 (10%) 
I do not know the owner 4(4%) 
Never been told to pay 16 (16%) 
I inherited the land 7 (7%) 
There is a dispute over the land 1 
The parcel is just a small plot 1 
Weare yet to know what to pay 1 
No need to pay, I own this land 3 (3%) 
Owner deceased 1 
Too poor to pay 1 
Landlord refused (1000/=) as ground rent 1 
Total number of households 101 
The tenants were further asked, "Would you be willing to buy your self out ( Okwegula) 
and get your own title?" Fifty-six households (56%) said that they were willing to buy 
themselves out, while twenty-three households (23%) said that they were not willing (see 
Table 5.65). Those who pledged to pay for the parcels were asked to state how much they 
would be willing to pay. However, some of the figures quoted in Table 5.65 are too low 
to purchase any sizable parcel of land. This is because the quoted figures are meant to top 
up what they have already paid to the landlords because no tenant can be admitted to 
settle on the mailo land without paying for the cost of the land. What most of the tenants 
are proposing to pay are the inducement charges, depending on the size of parcel of land, 
which are usually demanded by the landlords and are referred to as 'kanzu charges.' The 
mailo landowner cannot give consent to a tenant to process a land title out of his mailo 
land before the tenant has paid the kanzu charges. 
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Table 5.65: Amount of money that tenants are willing to pay to become landowners 
Amount payable for the plot Number of households 
Not applicable 54(54%) 
Don't want to pay 2 
Ushs 4/= I 
Ushs 1,000/= I 
Ushs 2.000/= 3 
Ushs 3.000/= I 
Ushs 5,000/= 2 
Ushs 6,000/= 2 
Ushs 7.000/= 3 
Ushs 10.000/= 4 
Ushs 20,000/= 3 
Ushs 30,000/= 2 
Ushs 40,000/= 2 
Ushs 50,000/= 5 
Ushs 80,000/= I 
Ushs 100,000/= 3 
Ushs 150.000/= 2 
Ushs 200.000/= 4 
Ushs 300,000/= I 
Ushs 400,000/= I 
Ushs 500,000/= 3 
Ushs 800,000/= 1 
Total number of bousebolds 101 
The fifty-six households (56%), which were willing to buy themselves out (Okwegula), 
were asked, "Have you discussed this option with the registered owner?" Five households 
stated that they had indeed discussed the matter with their landlords. Furthermore, one 
landlord had agreed to sell the land, but four landlords refused to sell the land. 
The twenty-three tenants (23%) who did not want to buy themselves out were asked, 
"Why don't you want to buy yourself out?" Some of them said that they thought the 
owners would ask for too much money. Others said that they did not know where their 
landlords lived, while yet others felt comfortable because they were paying ground rent 
(see Table 5.66). 
141 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Table 5.66: Reasons for not holding dialogue with the landlords 
Reasons for not discussing with registered owners Number of households 
Not applicable 33 (33%) 
Not aware of this possibility 7 
No off-spring with my spouse I 
No problem with parcels owned I 
Whereabouts of owner not known / it's government land 10 (10%) 
Owner may ask for unaffordable money / no money to pay 18 (18%) 
Owner will not agree to sell / other tenants will not agree 5 
Not necessary, have been paying ground rent 10 (10%) 
Have never considered the idea 5 
No need, I own this land 7 
I inherited the land 3 
Owner deceased I 
Total number of households 101 
2) Registered owners 
The registered owners were asked, "Do you have tenants on this parcel of land?" Eight 
households (8%) stated that they have tenants, whereas seven households (7%) said that 
they did not have tenants. Some five households, under the individualised customary 
tenure, living on native freehold, did not want to be referred to as tenants. Eighty-six 
households (86%) are living on Kibanja on mailo land (see Table 5.67). 
Table 5.67: Tenanted and untenanted registered land 
Tenure Own Kibanja Tenanted untenanted Number of households 
Informal 86 (86%) 8 7 101 
Individualised 102 (95%) 0 5 107 
Communal 140 (100%) 0 0 140 
Total 323 8 12 348 
The registered owners were asked, "How many tenants do you have on this parcel of 
land?" One landowner stated that he had 30 tenants, whereas the other said that he had 20 
tenants. Two registered owners had 5 tenants each and the other three registered owners 
had 1, 2 &3 tenants respectively. The majority of households (93%) live without tenants 
on their own mailo or Kibanja on mailo land (see Table 5.68). 
The registered owners were further asked, "How many of these tenants do you recognise 
or have agreements with?" One landowner said that he recognised 20 tenants, whereas 
another landowner said he recognised 10 tenants (see Tables 5.69) 
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Table 5.68: Number of tenants per registered owner 
Number of tenants Number of households 
Not applicable 93 (93%) 
None 1 
One (1) 1 
Two (2) 1 
Three (3) I 
Five (5) 2 
Twenty(2O) 1 
Thirty (30) I 
Total number of households 101 
Table 5.69: The number of legal tenants 
Number of tenants Number of households 
Not applicable 93 (93%) 
None 3 
Two (2) 1 
Four (4) I 
Seven (7) 1 
Ten (10) 1 
Twenty(2O) 1 
Total number of households 101 
The landlords were asked, "How many tenants pay ground rent to you?" The results show 
that 3 landowners are receiving ground rent, and 4 landowners are not. This is because 
the Land Act, 1998 (Cap. 227) fixed the maximum rent payable per year at Shillings 
1000/= (US$ 0.50) and the majority of landowners do not want to receive this nominal 
rent from the tenants (see Table 5.70). 
Table 5.70: Tenants who have sound relationships with their landlords 
Number of tenants Number of households 
Not applicable 94 (94%) 
None 4 
Three (3) I 
Four (4) I 
Eight (8) I 
Total number of households 101 
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The landlords were further asked, "How much does each tenant pay?" Two registered 
owners said that the tenants were not paying any ground rent; two landlords said that the 
tenants were paying shillings 1000/=; and one landlord said that the tenants were paying 
shillings 85/=. Since mailo tenure was abolished in 1975 and restored in 1995, and the 
rent of shillings 1000/= was fixed by parliament in 1998, it would appear that the quoted 
rent of shillings 85/= was paid before 1975 and possibly during the colonial 
administration period. 
The eight (8) registered owners who admitted that they had tenants on their land were 
asked, "Are you willing to sell the land to the tenants if the tenants proposed to buy it 
from you?" Five (5) landlords agreed to sell the land, whereas three (3) refused to sell. 
The reasons to support their views are presented in Table 5.71. 
Table 5.71: Reasons why landlords want/do not want to sell land 
Reasons why landlords want/do not want to sell the land Number of households 
Not applicable 93 (93%) 
Wi1ling to sell because I need to get money for my children 3 
Wining to sell because I need money for household welfare 0 
Willing to sell for health reasons 0 
Willing to sell to avoid disputes with tenants 1 
Wi1ling to sell due to low ground rent paid / I get nothing from it 1 
Not willing to sell because land is for my children 2 
Not willing to sell because land is for grazing 1 
Total number of households 101 
The (8) landlords were asked, "Have you discussed with any of the tenants the possibility 
of them buying their interest in the landT' Two (2) landlords confirmed that they had 
discussed this, whereas six (6) said that they had not discussed the issue with the tenants. 
Some of the tenants who had discussed the matter with their landlords had been allowed 
to buy their parcels of land. Then six (6) landowners were asked to clarifY why they had 
not discussed with the tenants. The responses show that the landowners may not have 
enough land to sustain themselves (see Table 5.72). 
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Table 5.72: Reasons why the landlords do not want to enter into dialogue with tenants 
Why landlords do not want to sell the land No. of H!Holds 
Not applicable 97 (97%) 
Land is for animal grazing 2 
Land is for my off-springs 1 
Wanted consent from Local Councils 1 
No good relationship with tenants 0 
Total number of households 101 
3) Summary of results 
• Land under infonnal tenure is owned by landlords. 
• The majority of tenants on mailo land do not have disputes over land with the 
landlords or their fellow tenants. 
• Some tenants pay ground rent while others do not pay any rent to their landlords. 
• Some tenants want to buy themselves out. 
• Some landlords are willing to sell to sitting tenants while others are not willing to 
sell. 
• Some landlords are receiving rent from the tenants while others have refused to 
take the shillings 1,0001= per year, which is paid irrespective of the size of the 
plot, as recommended in the land Act 1998 (Cap. 227). 
5.2.6 Awareness of other land uses 
These land uses include natural lakes, rivers, wetlands, forest reserves, game reserves, 
national parks and any land to be reserved for ecological and tourist purposes for the 
common good of all citizens. It is important to find out whether the people know that 
some land has to be held in trust for the good of all citizens, so that when it comes to 
systematic demarcation nobody claims, insists or demands to include such lands inside 
their demarcated parcels. 
The households were asked, "Is there any land for common use by all in the village?" 
Forty-three households (41%) under individualised, thirteen households (13%) under 
infonnal and eight households (6%) under communal customary tenure accepted that 
there was indeed land allocated for common use (see Table 5.73). 
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Table 5.73: People's awareness of other land uses 
Tenure Not applicable Positive response Negative response Total No. of HlHs 
Informal 16 I3 (13%) 70 (71%) 99 
Individualised 3 43 (41%) 58 (56%) 104 
Communal 30 8 (6%) 99 (72%) 137 
Total 49 64 (19%) 227 (67%) 340 
The next question was, "What are the common lands used for?" The households under 
informal tenure used common lands for cultivation, brick making and village gatherings. 
The households under individualised tenure used the common lands for cultivation, 
recreation and fuel wood. The households under communal tenure used the common 
lands for cultivation, animal grazing and hunting. The majority of the households (80%) 
in all the three parishes seem to have no access to the common lands (see Table 5.74). 
Table 5.74: List of uses for common land 
Uses for common lands Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 76 (84%) 54 (57%) 124 (94%) 254(80%) 
Normal arable cultivation! farming 6 (7%) 21(22%) 3 (2%) 30 (9%) 
Brick making! commercial gains / fuel wood 3 (4%) 7 (8%) I 11 
Animal grazing I 2 2 (1%) 5 
Recreation 2 II (12%) 0 13 
Village gathering 3 (4%) 0 0 3 
Hunting 0 0 2 (1%) 2 
Total number of households 91 95 132 318 
The households were asked, "Who controls the use of this common land?" The landlords 
or their caretakers control the common lands under informal tenure. Under individualised 
tenure, the Local Council II Committee and the parish chief control the common lands. 
There was no clear response from the landowners under communal tenure (see Table 
5.75). 
The households were further asked, "What are the conditions for using this common 
land?" It was established that there were no conditions for using common land under 
communal tenure. Under individualised tenure, one had to obtain permission from the 
chairman of the Local Council II before using the land, and the land had to be used for 
the recommended use or activity. There was also a standard levy, but all the people were 
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free to use the land whenever there was a famine. In respect of informal tenure, the 
conditions were not clearly articulated (see Table 5.76). 
Table 5.75: Controllers of common lands 
Controllers of common land Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 84 (88%) 68 (67%) 125 (94%) 277 (84%) 
No body 0 0 2 2 
The village committee 0 7 (7%) 1 8 
AIJ people 0 2 3 (2%) 5 
Church leaders 1 4 0 5 
Local Council II Committee 1 11(11%) 1 13 
Parish chief 0 8 (8%) 0 8 
School administrators 2 1 0 3 
Landlords/caretakers 5 (5%) 0 0 5 
Government 2 (2%) 0 I 3 
Total No. of households 95 101 133 329 
Table 5.76: Conditions for using common land 
Conditions for using common land Informal Individ ualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 80 (86%) 61 (60%) 12795%) 268 (82%) 
Don't know 4 4 0 8 
None I 0 4 5 
Standard levy 2(2%) 6(6%) 0 8 
There are no conditions under famine 1 7(7%) 0 8 
Recommended use/activities 2(2%) 14(14%) I 17 
Need permission from LC II Chairman I 7(7%) 0 8 
No one is alJowed to cultivate it 0 2 1 3 
Permission from Institutional administrators. 2(2%) 0 0 2 
Total number of households 93 101 133 327 
The households were asked, "What do you use wetlands for in this parish?" The 
responses show that households under communal tenure use wetlands for fuel wood, 
hunting and for irrigation. Households under individualised tenure use wetlands for 
collecting thatch for houses, for hunting and for obtaining mulch for the plantations. 
Households under informal tenure use wetlands for hunting, growing fruits, food crops 
and vegetables, and fuel wood (see Table 5.77). 
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Table 5.77: Uses of wetlands 
Uses of wetlands Informal Individ ualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 1 5 5 11 
Don't know 6 5 2 13 
Nothing 17 13 18 48 
Collect thatch for houses 4 27 (27%) 0 31 
Tree planting 4 4 0 8 
Fishing for esonzi (type of mud fish) 6 1 0 7 
Collect fuel wood 6 (6%) 1 12 (9%) 19 
Get plantation mulch 1 6 (6%) 0 7 
Collect fodder for cows and goats I 4 0 5 
Collect water for irrigation 6 1 38 (27%) 45 
Growing fruits, crops and vegetables 7 (7%) 3 7 17 
Hunting 39 (39%) 30 (30%) 49 (35%) 118 (35%) 
Sand for building or brick laying 0 0 8 8 
Total number of households 98 100 139 337 
The next question was, "Who controls the use of wetlands in this parish?" The 
households under communal and individualised tenures pointed out that government 
through the Local Councils controls the wetlands, although everyone freely uses them. 
Under informal tenure, the wetlands are controlled by both the landlords and the 
neighbours adjacent to the wetlands (see Table 5.78). 
Table 5.78: Controllers of wetlands 
Controllers of wetlands Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 0 12 9 21 
Don't know 12 11 24 47 
Nobody I 2 13 (9%) 16 
The Government through LCs 7 (7%) 22 (21%) 24 (18%) 53 
They are freely used by everyone 4 14 (13%) 40 (32%) 58 
Wetlands division 1 3 3 7 
Neighbours adjacent to the wetlands 12 (12%) 8 9 29 
Individually controlled 3 15 (14%) 9 27 
Landlords 60 (60%) 17 (16%) 5 82 
Total No. of households 100 104 136 340 
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The households were asked, "Are there any problems in the use of these wetlands?" The 
majority of the households (68%) testified that there were no problems (see Table 5.79). 
Table 5.79: Restrictions in the use of wetlands 
Tenures Not Don't Conditions No Total No. of 
applicable know exhist conditions households 
Informal 2 7 20 (21%) 67 (70%) 96 
Individualised 9 1 36 (38%) 50 (52%) 96 
Communal 13 0 18 (13%) 108 (78%) 139 
Total 24 8 74 (22%) 225 (68%) 331 
The investigation concluded with the question, "What problems are these?" Households 
under communal tenure said that both the landlords and government were putting 
restrictions on the use of wetlands. They also pointed out that there were some 
herbivorous animals, which stray from game parks and hide in the wetlands. The 
households under individualised tenure also reported that there were government 
restrictions in place, which outlined how the wetlands should be used. For example the 
wetlands would be open to everybody during famine and the crops to be planted would 
be specified by the government representative. They emphasised that wetlands could 
cause erratic weather if they were destroyed and converted into farmlands. The 
households under informal tenure reported that the misuse of wetlands through digging 
trenches and burning grass could lead to erratic weather (see Table 5.80). 
Table 5.80: List of problems associated with the use of wetlands 
Problems of wetlands Informal Individualis Commun Total 
ed al 
Not applicable 57 (67%) 62 (62%) 87 (74%) 206 (68%) 
Don't know 5 5 I 11 
Distance from homes 0 I 0 1 
Government restrictions/landlords 4 (4%) 22 (22%) 16 (14%) 42 
Misuse/ burning! digging trenches 4 (4%) 2 I 7 
Cultivation affects climate 3 3 0 6 
Erratic weather 5 (6%) 5 (5%) 0 10 
Stray animals/theft of food 2 0 10 (9%) 12 
Rent that is not affordable 3 0 0 3 
Land disputes 2 0 2 4 
Total number of households 85 100 117 302 
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Summary of results 
• Land for common use exists in all parishes. 
• The majority of the people under individualised, communal, and informal tenures 
do not have easy access to the common lands. 
• The use of common lands in all parishes is under some restrictions. 
• Wetlands are reserved for public use in all tenure systems. 
• Wetlands under communal and individualised tenures are controlled by local 
councils but they can be freely used by everyone. Under informal tenure they are 
controlled by landlords. 
5.2.7 Systematic adjudication and demarcation 
The three parishes of Rukarango in Ntungamo, Kabigi in Masaka, and Aminit in Soroti 
districts were sensitised about systematic adjudication and demarcation by Technology 
Consults on behalf of the Systematic Demarcation Committee before the research 
assistants from Makerere Institute of Social Research carried out the household baseline 
survey in August 2003. 
The first question was, "Have you heard of the systematic demarcation program?" The 
responses show that 91 (85%) households under individualised tenure, 55 (55%) households 
under informal tenure and 60 (43%) households under communal tenure had indeed heard 
about the systematic demarcation program. These results show that the sensitisation 
exercise in Aminit parish was poorly handled (see Table 5.81). 
Table 5.81 Levels of sensitisation in the parishes 
Tenures Not applicable Level of sensitisation No sensitisation Total No. of H/Hs 
Informal 1 55 (55%) 45 (45%) 101 
Individualised 0 91 (85%) 16 (15%) 107 
Communal 6 60 (43%) 74 (53%) 140 
Total 7 206 (59%) 135 (39%) 348 
The households were asked to point out who actually told them about the systematic 
demarcation program. It turned out that the overall total of 80(23%) households had 
heard about the program through the village communication system, 59(17%) households 
had heard about it through village sensitisation meetings and 21(6%) heard about it over 
the radio. The households in Aminit parish emphasised that they heard about the program 
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mainly through local officials, the radio and the village communication system (see Table 
5.82). 
Table 5.82: Channels of communication in the parishes 
Communication Channels Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 51 (51%) 23 (21%) 78 (56%) 152(44%) 
Village meeting 14 (14%) 35 (33%) 10 (7%) 59 (17%) 
Radio 10 (10%) 1 10 (7%) 21 (6%) 
Local official 7 (7%) 5 (5%) 18 (13%) 30 (9%) 
Church/School 1 4 1 6 
Village communication system 18 (18%) 39 (36%) 23 (16%) 80 (23%) 
Total number of households 101 107 140 348 
The households were asked, "Have you ever attended any meeting about the program?" 
The results show that the overall total of 84 (24%) households attended meetings while 
120(34%) households did not attend. In Aminit parish, ten (7%) households attended 
village meetings that had been mounted by the Systematic Demarcation Committee 
members, while eleven (8%) households attended meetings at venues, which were not 
disclosed (see Tables 5.82 and 5.83). 
Table 5.83: Levels of attendance at parish meetings 
Tenures Not applicable Level of attendance No attendance Total No. of WHs 
Informal 47 23 (23%) 31 (31%) 101 
Individualised 18 40 (37%) 49 (46%) 107 
Communal 79 21 (15%) 40 (29%) 140 
Total 144 84 (24%) 120 (34%) 348 
The households were asked, "Where was the meeting held?" The responses show that the 
20(14%) households, which attended meetings in Aminit parish, did not disclose where 
their meetings had been held. In Rukarango parish, 23(21 %) households attended 
meetings at the church. In Kabigi, 7(7%) households attended meetings at the trading 
centre, 6(6%) attended at the school and 9(9%) attended at the village gathering (see 
Table 5.84). 
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Table 5.84: Places where systematic demarcation meetings were held 
Meeting Places Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 78 (78%) 63 (59%) 115 (82%) 256 
Village gathering 9 (9%) 6 I 16 
Mosque/Church I 23 (21%) I 25 
Trading centre 7 (7%) 5 0 12 
School 6 (6%) 5 3 14 
Any other 0 5 20 (14%) 25 
Total number of households 101 107 140 348 
The households were asked, "What do you understand is to be done in systematic 
demarcation?" Forty households (37%) in Rukarango, thirty-seven households (26%) in 
Aminit and twenty-four households (24%) in Kabigi parishes stated that systematic 
demarcation means marking boundaries for every parcel ofland (see Table 5.85). 
Table 5.85: What systematic demarcation means to the people in the parishes 
People's views Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 48 (47%) 16 (15%) 79 (56%) 145 (42%) 
Nothing 0 0 I 1 
Confused! don't understand it 6 14 4 24 
Evidence to land ownership 2 9 I 12 
To mark boundaries for every parcel 24 (24%) 40 (37%) 37 (26%) 101 (29%) 
Landowners will acquire land titles 0 6 4 10 
Give certificates II 15 I 27 
Give full land rights I 0 0 1 
Free demarcation I 4 4 9 
Government to help land matters 4 I 9 14 
An alternative to help the landless 2 0 0 2 
A system to oppress the landlords 2 0 0 2 
Total number of households 101 107 140 348 
The households were asked, "What is your opinion about systematic demarcation?" 
Fifty-seven (63%) households in Rukarango, twenty-nine (53%) households in Kabigi, 
and thirty-three (49%) households in Aminit parishes stated that systematic demarcation 
was a good program. The baseline survey report (Uganda Government 2003), which was 
compiled from the same data, reported that 64% households in Rukarango, 58% 
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households in Aminit and 55% households in Kabigi welcomed systematic demarcation 
program. This report was considered and approved by the Systematic Demarcation 
Committee. Because a high percentage of households (63%) in Rukarango parish had 
welcomed systematic demarcation, the pilot project went on smoothly from the start-up 
to the finish (see Table 5.86). 
Table 5.86: People's opinions about systematic demarcation 
People's opinions Informal Individua Communal Total 
lised 
Not applicable 40 (42%) 16 (15%) 80 (58%) 136 (40%) 
SD Program is good! welcome 29 (53%) 57 (63%) 33 (49%) 119 (59%) 
Program will end conflicts/ evictions 4 6 3 13 
Do not know what program is about 2 5 0 7 
Have no opinion I 6 5 12 
Will reduce amount paid for land titles 0 0 0 0 
I am opposed to it 6 6 5 17 
Government officials may grab land 2 1 2 5 
Good on certain conditions 1 2 2 5 
More sensitization 4 4 6 14 
Acquire land titles 0 2 0 2 
Favour tenants not land lords 2 0 0 2 
Help tenants 2 0 0 2 
Help landlords 0 0 0 0 
Balance of power relations 2 2 1 5 
Total number of households 95 107 137 339 
When the systematic adjudication and demarcation pilot project was extended to Aminit 
parish in Soroti district, the residents resisted it, and the whole exercise resulted in 
bloodshed. According to the New Vision, a government newspaper, of January 21, 2005 
some 200 angry residents of Kamuda sub-county, accusing the government officials of 
having not educated them about the systematic demarcation project and of wanting to 
grab their land, severely injured three government surveyors and three other officials 
(Anonymous 2005: 2). The residents pointed out that the government officials had only 
sensitized the public through publication of literature in English, and in the local 
languages of Ateso and Kumam. Because most of the landowners do not read newspapers 
and they also do not listen to radio regularly, they missed the message that was the 
subject of sensitisation. The residents thus ran away with money and mobile phones from 
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the government officials but left the survey equipment intact. The government officials 
had on the previous day planted markstones to demarcate land parcel boundaries in 
Aminit parish, but were ambushed as they drove to Agulemado the next day. 
On January 22, 2005 the editorial of the New Vision attributed this ugly incident to the 
lack of coordination that commonly afflicts many official government operations 
(Anonymous 2005: 8). It asserted that land is a very sensitive issue among Ugandans, and 
that therefore a more comprehensive approach in the form of public rallies, local council 
meetings, house-to-house visits, and proper timing was needed. The editorial further 
pointed out that land is the primary unit of wealth in Uganda, whether in urban or rural 
settings, and therefore needs to be given due recognition. 
Lack of coordination and proper timing was emphasized because the government had just 
submitted a White Paper to parliament in which it had proposed compulsory acquisition 
of land for investment, and yet very few Ugandans seemed to understand the current land 
tenure system. Because both the colonial administration and the subsequent governments 
failed to determine the land question decisively, the people are highly suspicious of the 
present government's intention to acquire land compulsorily for investors. Therefore, the 
proposal contained in the White Paper was a delicate issue that required extensive debate 
and publicity. It was unfortunate that the public was being incited over land issues before 
the proposal had even been discussed by parliament. According to the New Vision of 
February 17,2005, the government was forced to drop its proposal which was intended to 
acquire land for investment from the White Paper, following this nasty incident. 
Perhaps Sue Nichols (1997: 4) was right when she said, 
In the rush for reform there are far too often insufficient emphases on 
finding out what the real problems and real requirements are; particularly 
when driven by the availability of large financing or by vendors and 
consultants, the temptation is to 'know what the solution is.' The results 
can only be partially successful and the jurisdiction is still faced with the 
solving of the problems long after the consultants have gone home. Any 
154 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 T
wn
successful reform project must be based on understanding the needs and 
the problems - and this may take time. 
It would appear that the report of the consultant would have been more exhaustive and 
balanced if it had reported that eighty households (58%) in Aminit parish, forty 
households (42%) in Kabigi parish, and sixteen households (15%) in Rukarango parish 
declined to give their opinion about systematic demarcation (see Table 5.86). 
The households were further asked, "Do you think, you as a person will gain from the 
program?" Sixty-two households (68%) in Rukarango parish, forty-six households (85%) 
in Kabigi parish and forty households (67%) in Aminit parish agreed that they would 
benefit from the program (see Table 5.87). 
Table 5.87: Individual views about the systematic adjudication and demarcation program 
People's Views Informal Individ ualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 40 (43%) 16 (15%) 77 (56%) 133 (39%) 
Acceptable 46 (85%) 62 (68%) 40 (67%) 148 (72%) 
Not acceptable 3 9 4 16 
Not sure 5 20 16 41 
Total number of households 94 107 137 338 
The households were further asked, "Why do you think like that?" The households in 
Aminit parish said that the program would lead to security of tenure, which would in turn 
lead to reduced land conflicts. The households in Rukarango parish concurred with the 
views of Aminit parish. And the households of Kabigi parish said that there would be no 
more evictions and that the program would lead to security of tenure (see Table 5.88). 
The households were asked, "What do you think the other people in the household will 
gain from it?" Sixty-four (19%) of the total households in all the parishes said that their 
children would be assured ofland (see Table 5.89). 
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Table 5.88: The rationale behind people's views 
People's opinions Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 38 16 77 131 
Security of tenure 13 (14%) 22 (21%) 19 (14%) 54 (16%) 
Protection of female spouses 2 7 1 10 
No more evictions 11(12%) 4(4%) 8 (6%) 23 (7%) 
Assured collateral 3 7 1 II 
Can plan what to do with my land 5 4 0 9 
Reduced land conflicts 8 (9%) 17(16%) 12 (9%) 37 (II%) 
False expectations 3 0 I 4 
I do not understand the program 1 I I 3 
Women will be left out 0 2 1 3 
Boundaries are already known 0 2 I 3 
I may be forced off my land 0 2 0 2 
Fear of government intentions 3 0 1 4 
Inter-family wrangles 0 3 0 3 
The process may not be free and fair 0 2 0 2 
Need more sensitization 5 (5%) 15 (14%) 10(7%) 30 (9%) 
Program may have hidden agenda 0 2 5 7 
Total number of households 92 106 138 336 
Table 5.89: How the program would benefit other members of the family 
People's Views Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 44 28 81 153 
Nothingll do not know 9 (9%» 19(18%) 18(13%) 46 (14%) 
Assurance of ownership 4 16 6 26 
Will use the land more productively 3 0 0 3 
Wait until program is implemented 1 2 2 5 
The children are assured of land 29 (29%) 18(17%) 17(12%) 64 (19%) 
Tenure security 4 II 7 22 
Reduced land conflicts 2 9 5 16 
Assured collateral 0 0 3 3 
Total number of households 96 103 139 338 
Since the household is also a unit within the community, the households were asked, 
"What will the community gain from it?" Ninety-four (28%) of the total households in all 
the parishes agreed that land conflicts would be reduced; and thirty six (11 %) of the total 
households did not know how the program would benefit the community (see Table 
5.90). 
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Table 5.90: How the program would benefit the community 
Views of the households Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 42 18 79 139 
Don't know 3 14 2 19 
Nothing 0 I I 2 
Reduced land conflicts 31(31%) 34 (32%) 29(21%) 94 (28%) 
I cannot tell/ do not know 5 (5%) 17(16%) 14 (10%) 36 (ll%) 
Selling land without a reason will stop 0 3 2 5 
Better boundaries/ land rights 9 5 7 21 
Development! use certificates for loans 3 6 2 11 
Better food security 0 I 1 2 
Work of the parish chiefs will be eased 1 3 0 4 
False expectations 2 3 2 7 
Total number of households 96 105 139 340 
The households were asked, "What would be your responsibility as an individual in the 
program?" Ninety-five (28%) of the total households in all the parishes agreed that they 
would support the teams responsible for marking the boundaries (see Table 5.91). 
Table 5.91: The role of households as individuals in the program 
Role of the households Informal Individualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 40 15 78 133 
Don't know 3 7 4 14 
Cannot tell! No responsibility 8 (8%) 24 (23%) 21(15%) 53 (16%) 
Support teams marking the boundaries 27 (27%) 42 (40%) 26 (19%) 95 (28%) 
Witness the demarcation of boundaries 3 5 2 10 
Inform! educate/ advise people opposed 9 7 3 19 
Ensure certificates for parcels are secured 1 2 0 3 
Secure funds to acquire titles/ certificates 0 I 2 3 
Oppose the program 4 1 1 6 
Total number of households 95 104 137 336 
The households were further asked, "Is there any other member of the household who 
will have any responsibility in the program?" Ninety-eight (30%) of the total households 
in all parishes did not want to involve other members of the household. Fifty-three (16%) 
of the total households in all the parishes felt, in contrast, that other members of the 
household should be involved (see Table 5.92). 
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Table 5.92: Role of other members of the family 
Role of other members of family Informal Individ ualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 45 21 87 153 
Support the program 12 (13%) 26 (25%) 15 (11%) 53 (16%) 
Members should not support program 26 (28%) 48 (46%) 24 (18%) 98 (30%) 
Not sure 11 10 7 28 
Total number of households 94 105 133 332 
The households were asked, "What will the other members do?" The duties, which were 
identified for other members of the household, included showing boundaries to 
government officials and supporting the demarcation team (see Table 5.93). 
Table 5.93: Responsibilities of other members ofthe household 
Views of the households Informal Individ ualised Communal Total 
Not applicable 65 69 115 249 
Show boundaries to officials 11 (12.2%) 12 (11.4%) 12 (8.8%) 35 (10.6%) 
Support the demarcation team 13 (14.4%) 22 (20.9%) 8 (5.9%) 43 (13%) 
Help as required 1 2 I 4 
Total number of households 90 105 136 331 
Summary of results 
• The households in all the tenure systems know that their plot boundaries will be 
marked under systematic adjudication and demarcation exercise. 
• Out of the households which were interviewed, 57(63%), 29(53%), and 33(49%) 
households under individualised, informal and communal tenure systems 
respectively, accepted the systematic adjudication and demarcation program. 
• The majority of the households agree that systematic demarcation will reduce 
disputes. 
• The majority of the households know that systematic adjudication and 
demarcation will assure their children of land. 
5.2.8 Concluding remarks 
The analysis of the data acquired through the questionnaires has confirmed that the 
households in the rural areas own the land they occupy. And that the dispute resolution 
mechanisms, land transfers through inheritance or sale, and the use of land as collateral 
do exist although they are not functioning properly. The people have a fair knowledge of 
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the land law and policy. And the informal relationship between the tenants and landlords 
on mailo land is quite healthy. The investigation has also established the names of the 
individual persons who should appear on the register. For example the individualised 
customary tenure recommended that the household head and spouse should appear on the 
register. The informal tenure recommended the household head, while the communal 
customary tenure recommended the household head, children and clan elders. Systematic 
adjudication and demarcation approach was accepted on condition that it is preceded by 
sensitisation. The next section will analyse the views of the politicians who enact the land 
laws and the top land administrators and private land developers who implement them. 
5.3 Analysis of data acquired through interview schedules. 
The researcher interviewed the Prime Minister and Leader of Government Business, 
some members of opposition in Parliament, the Commissioner of Land Registration, who 
is a lawyer by profession, the Commissioner of Surveys and Mapping, who is a land 
surveyor by profession, the Coordinator of Land Tenure Reform Project, who is a land 
surveyor by profession, a Senior Principal Registrar, who is a lawyer by profession, and 
private land developers. The views of these senior government officers and private land 
developers are presented below against each question that was discussed. The responses 
from the politicians, land administrators and private land developers were synthesised 
and presented in section 5.3.4 as a unified contribution to the study. 
5.3.1 Views of the Prime Minister on the land tenure policy 
Question 1: The 1995 constitution of Uganda recognises mailo, freehold, leasehold and 
customary tenure systems. In your view, can the Uganda government sustain all four land 
tenure systems running concurrently? 
Responses: 
• The government would like to introduce uniform tenure but the timing IS 
inappropriate. 
• The market forces will remove customary tenure. 
• The market forces will in the long run work in favour of freehold. 
• The East African Community requires Uganda to have a well structured land tenure 
system. 
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Question 2: Do you think a uniform land tenure system would be better for Uganda? 
Response: 
• Yes. Freehold should be adopted. 
Question 3: The existence of the four land tenure systems is a legacy of the colonial 
indirect rule policy. These systems do not work towards the creation of a national state. 
Why has the Uganda government taken so long to come up with a uniform tenure 
system? 
Responses: 
• The colonial indirect rule policy helped to entrench tribalism. This is why there are 
low levels of national integration in Uganda. For example, the Bakiga are being 
resented in Bunyoro. It is only the Baganda who have been very accommodative. 
• Some regions have enjoyed economic dominance over others. For example, in the 
northern region, the people fear being economically swamped. 
• Uganda has had persistent wars and poor leadership since independence. 
• Market forces have not been strong enough to remove the customary tenure system. 
Question 4: In your view, why did the Constituent Assembly hesitate to recommend 
freehold as the uniform land tenure for Uganda? 
Responses: 
• Some people were suspicious that people from other ethnic areas would steal their 
land. 
• Ignorance is rampant in Uganda because a good number of our people are still 
illiterate. 
• Mortgaging of land is still being feared in some quarters. 
• The unelected leaders of Mengo (Headquarters of the Buganda kingdom) resisted the 
full-blooded democratization of mailo land tenure system. They contended that since 
mailo and freehold are the same; both systems could run concurrently without 
causing any problem. They did not want to accept that it is costly for the government 
to run two similar systems instead of one. 
• Some politicians and religious leaders III Buganda want to restore Buganda's 
historical position of privileged status. However, some of the people who wish to 
obtain federal status for Buganda do not understand federalism. They wrongly 
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associate the safeguarding of monarchical institutions with according monarchical 
areas with federal status (Nsibambi 2004: 14, 19). 
• In short, the hesitation was because the government thought it politically expedient 
not to antagonise the proponents of mailo and customary tenure who wanted to 
safeguard the.ir existing systems. 
5.3.2 Views of top land administrators on land policy and technical issues 
Question 1: The 1995 constitution of Uganda recognises mailo, freehold, leasehold and 
customary tenure systems. In your view, can the Uganda government sustain all four land 
tenure systems running concurrently? 
Responses: 
• I would say yes because to say no would entail going against the Constitution of 
Uganda, and you know what that means to a civil servant. However, it ought to be 
accepted, because to say no is to be more realistic. 
• Let us first define the tenure systems so that both of us know what we are talking 
about. Firstly, leasehold is a must because it refers to the holding of an estate for a 
given period. Secondly, freehold has been recommended and it is defined under the 
Land Sector Strategic Plan 2001-2011 as the holding of private land rights in 
perpetuity, free from over-riding interests. Thirdly, mailo was defined under section 
2 of the Possession of Land Law of 1908. Fourthly, there are no proper definitions of 
native and adjudicated freeholds. Each of these terms simply depicts the method of 
acquisition and who acquired what. For example, native freehold was for native 
chiefs, and adjudicated freehold was acquired through land adjudication for the 
indigenous people. Fifthly, the customary system derives its definition from the local 
law and custom. It was first recognised by the Uganda Constitution of 1995. 
• The Constituent Assembly simply adopted the middle of the road position to 
accommodate different political sentiments. 
• The Constituent Assembly lost the debate for the uniform tenure because they 
yielded to emotions rather than principles. 
• The fight between mailo and freehold was allowed to take centre stage. 
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Question 2: Do you think a uniform land tenure system would be better for Uganda? 
Responses: 
• Yes. Uganda should adopt a uniform tenure system. Firstly, the cost of stationary 
would be greatly reduced. Secondly, the interest being registered is the same: interest 
in perpetuity cuts across mailo, native freehold, adjudicated freehold, and freehold. 
Thirdly, uniform tenure is likely to foster nationalism in many ways. For example, the 
effects of indirect rule would be minimized; and the social, cultural and political 
sentiments, which are now impeding nationalism, would be removed. Fourthly, we 
would end up with a simple and easy system to manage. 
• Uniform land tenure would ease land administration, it is the safest tenure, and it 
offers the best security. 
• The way freehold was presented as the uniform tenure to the Constituent Assembly 
did not make clear the distinction between mailo and freehold. The representatives for 
customary tenure took advantage of the confusion and used the example of poverty 
among the local people negatively to entrench customary tenure. 
• The government is still reading the sentiments in the people. 
• Uganda has for a long time lacked popular and dynamic leadership. 
• I t needs time to overturn tribal sentiments. This is why the people do not want the 
government to acquire land compulsorily for investment. The issue has in fact 
become a vote catcher phrase. 
Question 3: The existence of the four land tenure systems is a legacy of the colonial 
indirect rule policy. These systems do not work towards the creation of a national state. 
Why has the Uganda government taken so long to come up with a uniform tenure 
system? 
Responses: 
• The reasons are largely embedded in Uganda's social, cultural, and political 
sentiments. Indirect rule also played a big role. 
• Freehold could not be adopted by the Constituent Assembly simply because the 
representatives of mailo owners took advantage of the simplistic way in which 
freehold was introduced for debate. The main argument was that mailo and freehold 
are the same, and therefore the government should adopt freehold. The 
representatives of mailo owners counteracted this simple argument by saying that if 
162 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
mailo and freehold are the same, then there was no need to do away with mailo 
tenure. The whole problem had to do with the way freehold was packaged and 
presented to the Constituent Assembly for debate. 
• The Bahima of Ankole rejected freehold because they thought that it was an 
enclosure system. They thoughts that grass would be scarce, and this was purely 
politics of scarce resources, and not because there was anything wrong with freehold. 
• Most people have land titles strictly for security of ownership. They fear mortgaging 
lest they lose their land. 
• The government has not adequately sensitised the people. For example, why did the 
people in the northern region resist leasehold titles after independence? They say that 
they have perpetual interest under customary tenure and that adjudicated freehold 
titles did not offer anything better than customary tenure. In the case of leasehold, 
they do not see why their customary land, which is held in perpetuity, should be 
converted into leasehold for 49 years; they also do not see why they should be asked 
to pay ground rent or even lose the customary land when they default. The whole 
scheme of formalizing customary land was therefore construed to mean that the 
government deliberately wanted to take away customary land. 
• The illiterate people are completely unable to manage forfeiture of land since they do 
not have alternative forms of livelihoods. 
• The land market in the northern region has remained intra family and clan. 
Question 4: In your view, why did the Constituent Assembly hesitate to recommend 
freehold as the uniform land tenure for Uganda? 
Responses: 
• The Baganda shot down the proposal. 
• Political expedience was practiced by the central government because the main focus 
was on the war in northern region. 
• Because the Constituent Assembly was held just before election time, the problem 
was shelved, expecting the elected government to solve it. 
• The elected government did not do much because the tribal sentiments are still 
entrenched. This is why the Land Act of 1998 did not do anything beyond what the 
Constituent Assembly agreed on. 
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Question 5: Mailo, native freehold, and adjudicated freehold are registered under the 
block and plot system, while freehold and leasehold are registered under the volume and 
folio system. Do you think there is a need for one registration system throughout the 
country? 
Responses: 
• Mailo was originally under the volume and folio system but it was converted to the 
block and plot system in the late 1950s. 
• The policy of Parcel Identification Numbers (PIN) is evolving, and the block and 
plot system has already been recommended. 
• The block and plot system is good for the Land Information System (LIS), which has 
also been recommended. 
• Parcel description should include an element of location. The block and plot system 
is better than the volume and folio system, which is not clearly understood by many 
people. However, the management of titles under volume and folio within the 
registry office is better than the block and plot system. 
• Spatial location of parcels works well under the block and plot system. 
• The volume and folio is a simple land management system, which is abstract, and it 
supports sporadic systems. 
• The block and plot system is preferred because it is likely to work well under the 
proposed decentralization policy; every district will handle its land management 
Issues. 
Question 6: The certificates of customary ownership are to be issued at sub-county level 
by the recorder, while the registrar of titles at the district will issue mailo, leasehold and 
freehold titles. Why is customary tenure treated so differently? 
Responses: 
• Customary tenure uses rudimentary methods of survey because they are cheaper and 
affordable by the poor. These methods are not acceptable under the Registration of 
Titles Act (Cap 230). 
• It was a deliberate policy intended to bring services nearer to the people. The majority 
of the people in the rural areas are poor, and the government wanted to take security 
of land ownership to them. 
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• If the rudimentary survey is accepted under Registration of Titles Act (RTA) , it will 
undermine the development of the land information system. 
• When customary land is surveyed accurately, we can register it under RTA as 
freehold. 
• Certificate of customary ownership is an inferior title because sketches cannot 
describe a parcel of land comprehensively although they are useful during systematic 
adjudication. 
• The existence of elements of low levels of education in the countryside played a 
pivotal role towards the recommendation of certificates of customary ownership. 
• The land market is more vibrant in Buganda where all the land is under mailo tenure 
and being surveyed by private surveyors. Other areas that are predominantly under 
freehold and leasehold tenure do not have vibrant markets. Therefore, there is no 
justification for the retention of very expensive land survey methods which are 
implemented by government surveyors to convert customary land to freehold. 
• Customary landowners in the villages have no alternative to land for survival. 
• Many adjudicated freehold titles are still lying in the district land offices. 
• Economic activity varies from place to place throughout the country. Therefore those 
who can afford land titles should go to the district and those who cannot afford should 
acquire certificates of customary tenure at the sub-county level. 
Question 7: Customary tenure can either be issued in form of certificate of customary 
ownership or it can be issued in the form of freehold land titles. In your view, do you 
think the creation of a new register for recording certificates of customary ownership at 
the sub-county level is sustainable? 
Responses: 
• Section 9 of the Land Act clarifies that customary tenure does not change under 
certificate of ownership. It only changes when it is registered under freehold. 
• It is possible to achieve security oftenure under certificate of customary ownership. 
• Micro finance and land markets can also develop under certificates of customary 
ownership. 
• Ownership by document reduces land disputes. 
• Certificates of customary ownership were created because surveys are very 
expenSIve. 
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• Unqualified surveyors will take the upper hand and cheat the public. 
• So far no sub-county has instituted the system for the issuance of certificates of 
customary ownership. The certificate of customary ownership system may in fact 
never be implemented. 
• Land adjudication needs to be followed by survey in order to eradicate disputes. This 
is because land sketches can, at best, lead to temporary solutions of land disputes. 
• The argument was derailed by the seemingly high cost of surveys. Now that survey 
methods have changed and GPS is coming on, there is no need to entertain anything 
to do with certificates of customary ownership. 
Question 8: Do you think the different land tenure systems are so entrenched that it 
would be a useless venture for government to introduce uniform land tenure? 
Responses: 
• The main debate is still about mailo and freehold. 
• Mailo is an entrenched system, because it emphasizes tribal sentiments; mailo 
owners never think of nationalism. 
• In the short term, customary tenure appears to be entrenched to such an extent that 
conversion to freehold may not be possible. But in the long term, with sensitisation 
through systematic adjudication and demarcation, which is optional, freehold will be 
achieved. Generally, customary tenure is not as entrenched as mailo. 
• Compulsory land acquisition according to the Constitution will not succeed. 
• Mailo will have to be converted to freehold, which it actually is. 
• Only mailo and customary tenure are entrenched. Customary landowners have very 
low understanding of tenure issues, however, whereas mailo owners are too proud to 
trade off mailo which they believe could be used as bargaining power in the struggle 
to convince government to accord federal status to Buganda kingdom .. 
• There is laxity in implementing the planning laws. Otherwise the uniform land tenure 
system should suffice. 
• It will take a long time before uniform land tenure is implemented. This is because 
there is poor leadership; the dynamism of power in politics is not committed; there is 
the issue of the multiparty system, which only criticizes government; the opposition 
does not compliment government on any of its achievements; and nationalism is non-
existent among Ugandans. 
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Question 9: In your view, has the privatisation of cadastral services improved the land 
delivery process? 
Responses: 
• The number of surveyors available is so small that there has not been any significant 
change. 
• Yes, they have improved the delivery system because they have checked the rampant 
corruption, which used to exist among government surveyors. The people would pay 
survey fees to government, and the government surveyors would thereafter charge 
their own fees, which amounted to double payment for survey services. The private 
surveyors have resolved this problem once and for all. 
• Survey equipment is still a very big problem. Government may have to step in and 
provide loans to private surveyors to buy equipment. 
• There are very few registered surveyors and these few are concentrated in the capital 
city, Kampala. 
• The World Bank would like to see the private surveyors take over the survey 
activities all over the country. 
• Guidelines, regulations and quality control should be defined and implemented by 
government. 
• Community based sensitisation is essential and should be carried out by government, 
but the actual execution of the surveys should be done by private surveyors. 
• With private cadastral surveyors, the services will be brought nearer to the people. 
• Private surveyors are preferred because of gains in efficiency; private involvement is 
certainly more efficient than government or public involvement in service delivery. 
• Government only needs to provide an enabling environment. 
• Capacity building must be for both private and public institutions. 
Question 10: Are the privati sed cadastral services likely to be of any help under the 
systematic adjudication and demarcation approach? 
Responses: 
• Yes. Surveyors will take up the work in lots, and this may speed up the delivery of 
services. 
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• The privati sed cadastral services would be of help, although the differential GPS is 
not available to them. And the use of total station is not feasible. 
• GPS equipment is becoming cheaper. Perhaps the private surveyors will see how to 
get along. 
• Definitely. Land adjudication and survey must go together. And private surveyors 
must do the survey work. 
Question 11: Is the government taking any steps to make the survey costs more 
affordable to the customary landholders? 
Responses: 
• Although the private survey costs under systematic adjudication have not been tested, 
it is believed that systematic adjudication and demarcation will reduce the costs. 
• The factors that make surveying expensive include the following: methods of survey; 
lack of control; and level of acceptable accuracy for registration purposes. These 
factors can be contained and the costs reduced, if we use the latest technology, such 
as the DataGrid GPS system. 
• The experience acquired from the Rukarango systematic demarcation pilot project has 
shown that it is possible to improve on the methodology, particularly when the survey 
teams and the adjudication teams go together. The improved methodology will reduce 
implementation costs. 
• Computerization of survey equipment has improved the survey process, and the 
survey results can be delivered in a very short time. 
• Private surveyors are more likely to institute customer care in the whole process. 
• Survey methods did not change and procedures are still the same; this is because 
standards have to be maintained. The costs will only be reduced by improved survey 
equipment. 
Question 12: How would the uniform land tenure improve the cadastral survey system? 
Responses: 
• Uniform land tenure would be the best system but it will remain a dream because the 
mailo landowners are not likely to abandon mailo in favour of freehold. A good 
Muganda must pay homage to the Kabaka, which means that he cannot question the 
Kabaka. For example, mailo land benefited only the people around the Kabaka but 
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the tenants on mailo are still not able to admit this. This is because tribal identity is 
still a very big problem, which the Baganda cannot overlook. 
• Quality control was poor under the previously sporadic system. The systematic 
approach will ease the operations, costs will decrease, and efficiency gains will be 
realised. 
• Once control is established in an area, it becomes easier to survey a block of plots 
cheaply and systematically. 
• Systematic adjudication and demarcation was designed by the colonial system to 
serve those who could afford to support their system; we must now use it to serve the 
entire population of Uganda. 
5.3.3 Views of Private land developers and members of opposition in Parliament 
1) In search for a harmonised land tenure system 
• The four land tenure systems recognised under the 1995 constitution were defined by 
members of Parliament as follows: Freehold is titled land held in perpetuity; 
Customary is untitled land held in perpetuity; Mailo is titled land held in perpetuity; 
and leasehold is titled land held for a specified period. From the definitions it was 
clear that mailo, freehold and customary are all held in perpetuity. The 
Parliamentarians confessed that they do not see any difference between mailo and 
freehold. They revealed that mailo land owners do recognise that mailo is the same as 
freehold but the Baganda mailo owners simply refused to convert their mailo titles to 
freehold. They also revealed that although the government recognised four tenure 
systems namely, freehold, leasehold, mailo and customary, it is not clear how long 
the government will keep on sustaining freehold and mailo both of which are 
statutory tenure systems held in perpetuity. 
• Too many tenure names and the formalities for their implementation seem to be the 
main problem. 
• Customary tenure IS deemed to be either claimed land or unclaimed land or 
designated/reserved land. Claimed customary land is usually misinterpreted and taken 
to be settled land but there is no customary land which is unclaimed in any district of 
Uganda. Designated/reserved land such as wetlands, forest reserves and game parks 
are customary lands held by local government or central government on behalf of the 
people. 
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• Individualisation of customary land throughout Uganda is inevitable due to 
population pressures. Where customary land is already individualised, land 
adjudication, demarcation and survey should be carried out simultaneously and land 
titling should follow immediately. 
• The formalisation of customary land into freehold is considered to be a modernisation 
process since both freehold and customary tenures are held in perpetuity. Therefore, 
the general public supports the government policy of replacing customary tenure by 
freehold. 
• Although the District Land Boards are now behaving as though they are landowners, 
their role is that of facilitator in the land administration process. 
• Customary tenure should not be converted into leasehold since leasehold is not held 
in perpetuity. Customary tenure should only be converted into freehold. 
• Freehold should be recommended for both urban and rural areas. This is because the 
people are likely to resist whenever the government attempts to extend the urban 
areas or create new ones. 
• Mailo land owners should focus more on leasing mailo land than selling it to willing 
buyers for investment. This would go a long way towards poverty eradication in the 
Buganda region. 
• Leaseholds of both 49 and 99 years should be issued depending on the nature of the 
investment. However, Physical planners prefer short term leases of 49 years because 
49 years are considered to be long enough for recovery of any investment expenses. 
However, non-citizens should never be given leaseholds exceeding 99 years. 
• The extension of any leasehold should always attract revised ground rent. 
• The issue of eminent domain is unnecessary under the current arrangement. The 
government should be able to lease land from District Land Boards for public use. 
There is absolutely no need for government to acquire any land compulsorily. 
• The guaranteeing of land titles by government is not necessary. The banks should 
issue loans basing on the value of the titles presented as collateral. 
• Undeveloped land should be penalised. The proceeds from the penalty would 
compensate for the unpaid rates for the undeveloped piece of land. 
• There should be a national land use plan which should identify forest reserves, 
settlements, agricultural land, and transportation networks. The land use plan would 
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assist government to identify suitable land which it can lease from District Land 
Boards. 
• The government, through Uganda Investment Authority, should press for leaseholds 
of more than 99 years to allow for reversionary interest in case the land is sub-leased 
to investors. 
2) In search of an appropriate land registration system 
• The certificates of customary tenure and certificates of occupancy were recommended 
by the Constituent Assembly because they could be implemented by cheap methods 
of survey. These certificates provide security of tenure and they are affordable by the 
customary landholders. 
• The Customary landholders do not want to see land surveyors because they consider 
them to be fronting government to grab customary land. 
• Because the communal customary landholders were prejudiced against the 
government they would not trust it with their customary land. Since prejudice takes a 
long time to reconcile, it was necessary to introduce certificates of customary tenure 
and certificates of occupancy which are convertible to freehold. 
3) In search for an appropriate cadastral survey system 
Systematic adjudication, demarcation and survey should be carried out in individualised 
customary areas by government surveyors because these are likely to maintain low costs 
of survey. The use of private surveyor is quite risky because they will, most likely, hike 
the survey fees to enrich themselves within a short time. This will, no doubt, run down 
the systematic adjudication, demarcation and survey exercise which should be 
implemented as a public good. 
5.3.4 Synthesis of the structured interview schedule results 
The structured interview schedule was intended to establish the views of Government, 
members of opposition in Parliament, Public land administrators and Private land 
developers on ways and means of harmonising land tenure systems, land registration and 
cadastral survey systems. The synthesised views of all these members are outlined in the 
following sub-sections. 
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1) Uniform land tenure 
The structured interview schedule expected the political, private and public land 
administrators to give their views (personal and/or official) that would clarify the 
following three issues: to verify whether freehold should be the recommended option; to 
explain why Uganda does not have uniform tenure up to now; and to justify why the 
Constituent Assembly did not recommend freehold as the uniform tenure for Uganda. 
a) Reasons in favour of freehold as uniform land tenure for Uganda 
On the issue of the appropriate land tenure structure for Uganda, the following views 
emerged: Firstly, it was established that freehold was rejected in the past because the 
colonial administration introduced it without explanation and instruction. For example, 
the Bahima of Ankole rejected freehold because they thought that it was an enclosure 
system. They thoughts that freehold would lead to scarcity of grass for their animals; this 
was purely politics of scarce resources, and not because there was anything wrong with 
freehold. Secondly, leasehold was also rejected in northern Uganda because it was 
thought to be inferior to customary tenure. The people did not see why their customary 
land, which was held in perpetuity, should be converted into leasehold for 49 years; be 
asked to pay ground rent, or even lose the customary land when they default. Thirdly, the 
market forces which are likely to evolve after freehold is introduced, will remove 
customary tenure. Fourthly, Uniform tenure is an instrument which could be used to unite 
Ugandans and also help to overturn divisive tribal sentiments. Fifthly, the East African 
Community requires Uganda to have a well structured tenure system. And finally, the 
political and technical leadership in charge of land administration recommended that the 
government should, firstly, introduce a tenure structure composed of freehold and 
leasehold although they were of the view that the timing was still inappropriate; and 
secondly, they want the State to assume the ultimate ownership of land which confers to 
it the powers to acquire land compulsorily and to guarantee land titles. However, the 
politicians who are opposed to the government position are of the view that the ultimate 
ownership of land should vest in the community which would in tum do away with 
compulsory land acquisitions and guaranteeing of land titles. 
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b) Reasons for the delay in adopting uniform tenure 
The following are the reasons which were put forward to explain why Uganda has taken 
so long to come up with a uniform tenure system: Firstly, the colonial indirect rule helped 
to entrench tribalism in the districts. Secondly, some regions have enjoyed economic 
dominance over others. Thirdly, Uganda has had persistent wars and poor leadership 
since independence. And fourthly, the market forces have not been strong enough to 
remove customary tenure. 
c) Reasons against freehold as uniform tenure for Uganda 
The following reasons were put forward to explain why the Constituent Assembly 
hesitated to recommend freehold as the uniform tenure for Uganda: Firstly, some people 
were suspicious that people from other ethnic areas would steal their land. Secondly, 
ignorance is still rampant in Uganda because a good number of the people are illiterate. 
Thirdly, there was resistance from the unelected leaders of Mengo, the headquarters of 
Buganda kingdom because some politicians and religious leaders in Buganda want to 
restore Buganda's historical position of privileged status. Fourthly, divisive tribal 
sentiments are still entrenched in the districts. And lastly, the government thought that it 
was politically expedient not to antagonise the proponents of mailo and customary tenure 
who want to safeguard their existing systems. 
2) The land registration process 
The land administrators observed that Uganda is using two processes to register land 
titles: the block and plot process and the volume and folio process. They also observed 
that according to the Land Act, 1998 (Cap. 227), a third system to register certificates of 
customary ownership, was provided for. These three processes are discussed below. 
a) Certificate of customary ownership system 
The advantages of the certificate of customary ownership system were identified as 
follows: Firstly, customary tenure has to use rudimentary methods of survey because they 
are cheaper and affordable by the poor. Secondly, the majority of the people in the rural 
areas are poor and the government wanted to take security of tenure to them. Thirdly, the 
element of low levels of education in the countryside played a pivotal role in favour of 
certificates of customary ownership. Fourthly, customary landowners have no alternative 
to land for survival; they should not be hurried into formal land tenure systems. Fifthly, 
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economic activity varies from place to place throughout the country. Anybody who can 
afford land titles should go to the districts and those who cannot afford should acquire 
certificates of customary ownership at the sub-county. And finally, it is possible that 
micro-finance and land market can develop under certificate of customary ownership. 
However, the land administrators also felt that the certificates of customary ownership 
were inappropriate due to the following reasons: Firstly, the rudimentary survey methods 
are simply not acceptable under the Registration of Titles Act (Cap. 230) because they 
would undermine the on-going development of the Land Information System (LIS). 
Secondly, the certificates of customary ownership are inferior to freehold. This is because 
sketches cannot describe a parcel of land comprehensively. Thirdly, unqualified 
surveyors are likely to take the upper hand and cheat the public. And fourthly, land 
adjudication needs to be followed by survey in order to eradicate disputes. This IS 
because land sketches can, at best, lead to some temporary resolution of land disputes. 
After considering both sides, the land administrators came to the following conclusions: 
Firstly, they observed that no sub-county has instituted the certificate of customary 
ownership system. Therefore the system of certificates of customary ownership appears 
to be redundant and it may never be implemented. Secondly, the Constituent Assembly 
recommended the system of certificates of customary ownership because of the 
seemingly high costs of survey. Now that survey methods have changed and GPS is 
coming onto the scene, there is no need to entertain anything to do with certificates of 
customary ownership. The general view of the land administrators was that the system of 
certificates of customary ownership should be abandoned while that of legislators and 
political leaders was that the system should be allowed to operate as an intermediate 
stage; the final stage being freehold, which is considered to be the tenure of the future. 
b) The volume and folio process 
The land administrators felt that the volume and folio system manages the register in a 
better way than the block and folio process. They also felt that it is a simple land 
management system which works well under the sporadic adjudication and demarcation 
approach. They supported the view that the volume and folio approach should be 
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abandoned because it is inappropriate for systematic adjudication and demarcation, which 
is the approach recommended to implement freehold. 
c) The block and plot process 
The land administrators felt that the block and plot system would support the spatially-
based land information systems (LIS) due to a number of reasons: Firstly, spatial location 
of parcels works well under the block and plot system. Secondly, the block and plot 
system is ideal for the decentralisation policy of government, where every district will 
handle its land management issues. Thirdly, the block and plot system works well under 
systematic adjudication and demarcation approach. And finally, the land administrators 
revealed that the government has already adopted the block and plot system as the 
uniform system for the whole of Uganda. They also revealed that there is, already in 
place, the policy of Parcel Identification Numbers (PIN) which will be used to implement 
the systematic adjudication and demarcation. 
d) Entrenchment of tenure systems 
The land administrators confirmed that it is only customary and mailo tenure systems 
which are entrenched. They also clarified that mailo is more entrenched than customary 
tenure which is basically untitled freehold since it is held in perpetuity. They were 
optimistic that with sensitisation, mailo tenure will also convert to freehold. They 
however warned that it will take a long time to have uniform land tenure because of poor 
leadership, which is characterised by uncommitted dynamism of power in politics; the 
loyalty of the Baganda to their Kabaka; the multiparty system, which only criticises 
government; the opposition, which never compliments government; and the non-
existence of nationalism. 
3) The Cadastral survey system 
The land administrators, private land developers and members of parliament discussed 
the survey process under three sub-headings: private cadastral services, reduction of 
survey costs, and the cadastral survey systems. 
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a) Private cadastral services 
It was observed that private cadastral servIces would be of great help although the 
differential GPS equipment is not yet available to most of the private surveyors. 
However, GPS equipment is increasingly becoming cheaper and therefore there is no 
reason why the private surveyors should not acquire GPS equipment for their firms. The 
land administrators proposed that in case a competent survey firm is unable to purchase 
the GPS equipment, the government should step in and provide a loan to the survey firm 
to purchase the equipment. 
The land administrators agreed that the privatisation of cadastral services had improved 
the land delivery process by checking the rampant corruption, which used to exist among 
government surveyors. They observed that the people would pay survey fees to 
government and the government surveyors would on top of that, charge fees for 
themselves, which would amount to double payment for the survey services. 
The use of the private surveyors to take over the survey activities all over the country is 
also supported by the World Bank. The World Bank prefers private surveyors because 
they are likely to introduce efficiency gains. The World Bank believes that private 
involvement is certainly more efficient than government or public involvement in service 
delivery. With private cadastral surveyors, the services will be brought nearer to the 
people. The private surveyors will take up the work in lots and this may speed up the 
delivery of services. 
It was further observed that community sensitisation, which is a pre-requisite for 
systematic adjudication and demarcation approach, is essential and should be carried out 
by government although the surveys should be done by private surveyors. Guidelines, 
regulations and quality control measures should be introduced and implemented by 
government. The government is also expected to provide an enabling environment and to 
build capacity for both private and public involvement in the systematic adjudication and 
demarcation. This is because land adjudication, land demarcation and survey have to go 
together. However, it was observed that there are very few registered surveyors and these 
few are concentrated in the capital city, Kampala. 
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b) Reduction of survey costs 
Although the private survey costs under systematic adjudication and demarcation have 
not been tested, it is believed that the costs will be reduced. Given that the survey 
expenses are influenced by methods of survey, lack of control, and the level of acceptable 
accuracy for registration purposes, these factors can be contained and costs reduced if the 
latest technology such as DataGrid GPS system is used. The experience acquired from 
the Rukarango systematic demarcation pilot project where DataGrid GPS was used has 
shown that it is possible to improve on the methodology and to minimise the 
implementation costs. 
The computerisation of the survey equipment has improved the survey process and 
results can be delivered in a very short time. Moreover, the private surveyors are likely to 
institute customer care. Although the old survey methods did not change, and the 
previous survey standards were maintained, the improved survey equipment will 
certainly reduce costs. 
c) Cadastral Survey systems 
The land administrators expressed their reservations about the implementation of uniform 
tenure in Uganda. They observed that although uniform land tenure would be the best 
system but it will remain a dream because the mailo landowners are not likely to abandon 
mailo in favour of freehold. This is because a good Muganda has to pay homage to the 
Kabaka, which means that he cannot question the Kabaka. For example, mailo land 
benefited only the people around the Kabaka but the tenants on mailo are still not able to 
admit this. This is because tribal identity is still a very big problem, which the Baganda 
cannot overlook. 
However, because systematic adjudication and demarcation was designed by the colonial 
system to benefit those who supported their system, we must now use it to serve the 
entire population of Uganda. Sporadic adjudication and demarcation which had poor 
quality control must be replaced by the systematic approach which will ease the 
operations, lower survey costs, and increase efficiency gains. Once the survey control is 
established in the area, it will become a lot easier to systematically survey blocks of plots 
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cheaply. The next sections will discuss the hypothesis tests and answer the research 
questions presented in section 1.5. 
5.4 Testing the hypothesis 
Hypothesis: The British colonial administration made no effort to administer the national 
land assets as a single unit, and this continued to be so throughout the entire period of its 
administration. As a result, Uganda inherited several formal land tenure systems from the 
British colonial administration. To improve the existing land tenure structure for Uganda 
and to minimize the operational costs, the existing systems need to be harmonised into a 
single formal tenure structure. 
1) The criteria for selecting uniform tenure model 
In 1894 when Britain took over Uganda Protectorate, the customary tenure structure was 
as follows: Buganda kingdom in the central region was under feudal tenure system; the 
high population centres in the eastern and western regions were under individualised 
(family) customary tenure while the low population centres were still under sedentary 
communal (clan) tenure system; the northern region was predominantly under sedentary 
communal (clan) customary tenure; and the cattle corridor stretching from Karamoja 
district in the north-east to Rukungiri district in the south-west was under territorial 
(nomadic) customary tenure. 
The land reforms which were introduced by the British administration did not 
significantly antagonize the customary tenure arrangements. For example, mailo tenure 
which is a feudal system was introduced in Buganda kingdom through negotiations with 
the regents and principal chiefs; native freehold was donated to the kings and principal 
chiefs of Toro and Ankole districts for accepting the protection of the British Empire 
while Bonyoro kingdom which resisted the protection of the British Empire had to lose 
Buyaga and Bugangaizi counties to Buganda kingdom which was the nucleus of Uganda 
protectorate; adjudicated freehold was demanded by the high population centers of 
Ankole, Bugisu and Kigezi districts and it was introduced through well-planned pilot 
schemes; and leasehold was mainly introduced after independence as uniform tenure for 
the whole of Uganda. 
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Although the British administration ended up with five formal tenure systems namely, 
freehold, native freehold, adjudicated freehold, mailo, and leasehold, its original plan was 
to introduce the universal tenure system composed of freehold and leasehold (West 
1964:2). Therefore the main objective of the study was to establish whether the five 
tenure systems which were introduced in Uganda by the British administration are still 
serving the original objective. In other words the test is intended to confirm whether 
reverting to freehold and leasehold would not require major institutional changes. 
The statutory tenure systems, namely, adjudicated freehold, native freehold, freehold, 
leasehold and mailo were SUbjected to the two-sample t-test with unequal variances. The 
cadastral process, registration process, and transfer process for the five tenure systems 
were compared to establish differences and similarities. To simplify the presentation of 
results, the five tenure systems were given the following codes: 
Tenure Code 
Adjudicated Freehold 1 
Native Freehold 2 
Freehold 3 
Leasehold 4 
Mailo 5 
The t-values were calculated using version 8.0 of Stata statistical software. In order to 
compare all the tenure systems with respect to survey, registration and transfer processes 
a total of 26 tests were run and 26 t-values were obtained. The researcher had intended to 
run 30 tests but freehold did not have any data on the cadastral process. It is also likely 
that the actual land titles which the statistical software selected and used to test the 
registration process for land tenures 1&3 were less than 30. Basing on this assumption, 
the researcher accepted the t-value of 1.81 between 1&3 land tenures because of its 
closeness to the standard comparison value of 1.70. The results of the t-values from the 
26 tests are tabulated in Table 5.94. 
This statistical test allows us to make statements with a degree of precision, but it does 
not actually prove or disprove anything about the tenure systems. A significant result at 
the 95% probability level tells us that our data are good enough to support a conclusion 
with 95% confidence (but there is a 1 in 20 chance of being wrong). 
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T ahle 5.94: CompllCisons of cad""t,.,>.!, regi>tration und tran,fe r proce»e> 
Com pori'o" grour. 
~---I·, aim's (absol.le ,·al ... ). III 
(Laod Tenures) ~. I Tran,rer 'pm",,,, I C.d.,lral rruce" Regi,lrnlion rroces, 
1 "00 2 0,1,669 1,.1456 1111.133 
, 
1 },2)88 
""'" 
I .... 1,8073 
I 1 0,0]% 
, 
""'" 
1.08'15 2,8726 
,~; 2,3077 ],6268 
2andS ORRRR 1.M7() i 3.1401 
hndS 2.73Cl1l 1 0,1210 , 
4 mJd 1 1.0113 2,449'l ' 0 ,23909 
~"OO 2 0.7311 2.7866 0,0976 
, 
,~; 2.102,\ 1 4.1092 
4 and, 11.1413 3.8770 3.4278 
from the above table it is eviocnt that : 
I) The cadastral pmees<; for all the compari:;on gmups (land tenll"'s) 1&2, 1&5. 1&4, 
2&4, 2&5, and 4&5 is ~ignificantly the same b,;,eallse the I-values <Ire less than 1.70. 
2) The registration proces<; for enmpari'iOn gmups (land tenures) 1&2. 1&3. 1&5 and 
2&5 is <;ignificamly the same but their transfer process;s signiJ1caml;.' different 
3) The transfer process for the compllrison groups (land tenures) 1&2, 1&4,2&4 anJ 
3&5 is <;ignifieantl} the same 
4) The eada<;lra!. regi<;lration and transfer proce<;sc:; nf land tenure group 1&2 are 
,ignifieantly the same. 
We can therefore conclude that land tenures code·named I, 2, 3 & 5 arc signit1cantl;.' the 
same in the survey and registration processes, and hence they belong In One category. 
1 hus adjudicated freehold. native freehold and mailn tenure <;y<;[ems belong It) Ihe 
freehold category. Since the tenure <;y<;lems ~<.xle-n<lmed 1 & 2, representing adjudi~ated 
freehold and native freehold, exi:;t sioc h} side in nnl} one district. the Ankole district, it 
is therd"ore not surprising that these two tenure :;}SlemS have the three proo.:esse<; 
(eada<;1Tat regi<;lration and transfer) trn. t are ,ignili~anlly the same, This is because the 
three processes were applied On individualised custom<lry tenure where land market 
already exists, 
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The cadastral process is significantly the same for all five tenure systems but the transfer 
and registration processes for leasehold are different from the rest. This is because 
leasehold is different from the other tenure systems which are held in perpetuity. 
Therefore, the test confirmed that it is possible to reduce the five formal tenure systems to 
two, namely freehold and leasehold, without incurring major institutional changes. 
2) Testing the acceptability of the selected land tenure model 
The questionnaire for the household survey had key questions which were intended to 
establish the people's views on the proposed new land tenure structure which will be 
implemented under systematic adjudication and demarcation approach. The first question 
was, "Do you think there are likely to be any obstacles in the implementation of the 
systematic adjudication and demarcation program?" The people's assessment predicted a 
50-50 chance in all the parishes (see Table 5.95). 
Table 5.95: Prediction of the possibility of success of the program 
Tenures Not applicable Success No success Total No. of HlHs 
Informal 33 25 (49 %) 26 (51 %) 84 
Individualised 20 41 (51%) 39 (49%) 100 
Communal 86 26 (51%) 25 (49%) 137 
Total 139 92 (50%) 90 (50%) 321 
The households were further asked, "Give reasons to support your viewpoint?" The 
following reasons in favour of the 50-50 chance of success were advanced: The 
households in Aminit parish cautioned that the program would fail if the government 
were to ask the people to meet the costs of systematic demarcation. They also pointed out 
that the people must be adequately sensitised. The households in Rukarango parish were 
cautious of the fact that native freehold registered owners who had not been consulted, 
might resist the program. They also reiterated that the program would fail if the 
government asked the people to meet the costs of systematic demarcation. And the 
households of Kabigi parish were of the view that the existing conflicts between 
landowners and tenants could cause problems. They thought that the landowners were the 
ones most likely to cause trouble (see Table 5.96). 
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Table 5.96: Factors underlying the success of the program 
Factors likely to lead to failure of Informal Individualised Communal Total 
program 
Not applicable 40 35 87 162 
Asking for money for the program 7 15 (15%) 15(11%) 37 (12%) 
Prevalence of land conflicts 11(13%) 14 3 28 (9%) 
Husbands may hide wrongs committed 5 5 6 16 
Resistance from some landowners 19 (22%) 17 (17%) 5 41(13%) 
Officials/ surveyors changing positions 3 3 3 9 
Incorrect! improper demarcations 0 3 4 7 
Inadequate sensitization 2 7 11(8%) 20 (6%) 
Total number of households 87 99 134 320 
The 50-50 chance of success can be construed to be significant in favour of the proposed 
tenure system due to the following reasons. Firstly, the customary landholders who were 
interviewed knew that the majority of the people were prejudiced against the 
government's attitude towards customary tenure. Therefore they would not commit the 
majority on such a sensitive issue. Secondly, very few people had attended sensitisation 
meetings which were held at the parishes. And thirdly, the customary landholders were 
not sure whether the government would implement the proposed formal tenure as a 
public good. However, because a 50-50 chance of success was not highly conclusive, 
there was need for further interviews with government officials, politicians, private land 
developers and public land administrators before a firm conclusion could be reached. 
3) Verification of the acceptability of the selected land tenure model. 
The members of opposition in parliament and the private land developers pointed out that 
in effect there are three tenure systems, namely freehold, leasehold and customary. 
Customary tenure was defined as unclaimed land which would automatically becomes 
freehold once it is claimed and documented. The re-classification of the four tenure 
systems recognised under the 1995 Uganda constitution into three tenure systems namely, 
customary, freehold and leasehold seem to be in line with the doctrine of estate as defined 
in Section 2.1.1. 
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5.5 Discussion of the research questions 
The foregoing part of the study identified most of the issues, which now need to be 
consolidated and used to explore the hypothesis further under the four research questions. 
This discussion will be guided by the research questions; and it will make use of the 
salient issues outlined in the detailed analyses of the data from the land records, 
questionnaires and interview schedules. 
5.5.1: What are the existing land tenure systems that need to be integrated into a 
formal land tenure system? 
There are two competing formal tenure systems, which need to be integrated into a single 
system. These are freehold and mailo, which were introduced one after the other in 1900. 
Mailo was the first to be established through negotiations with the regents and chiefs of 
the Buganda kingdom. While discussing the Buganda land settlement question, 
Thompson (2003: 45) quotes Fallers (1964: 180,181) as having said, "Most Baganda, 
most of the time, have concluded that, everything considered, they drove a remarkably 
good bargain." Thompson then says, "The British, too, considered it a good deal," but 
hastens to add, "What had proved convenient to British authorities in 1900 was to pose 
huge problems for their successors, both colonial and post colonial" (my italics). 
Both parties signed the 1900 Uganda Agreement, which concluded the Buganda land 
settlement, on March 10, 1900. The signed copy was sent to the Foreign Office, who 
considered it and acquiesced to commit the Buganda kingdom to a cadastral survey that 
at the time was without parallel in the African dependencies (West 1964: 10). 
The legitimacy of the chiefs, which entered into the association with Britain, was not 
known at the time. It was realised much later that the chiefs who had negotiated the land 
agreement were not elected leaders; they were chiefs who had been nominated by the 
Kabaka of Buganda. It was also realised that the deal had tilted in favour of the chiefs, 
thereby inflicting grave injustice upon the vast majority of peasant occupiers (West 
1964: 58). The net outcome was that mailo tenure, which had resulted from these 
negotiations, took all the available arable land, leaving behind land, which was marginal 
for agriculture and largely unsaleable (West 1971: 4). Sir Harry Johnston admitted (West 
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1971: 18) in the memorandum he drafted in 1903, that the protectorate government came 
off relatively cheaply in the settlement, with regard to the satisfaction given to the land 
claims of the King, Queen, Princes, Princesses and important chiefs. This was because 
the Baganda chiefs were permitted to take their share first. The Protectorate Government 
was disillusioned by this result, and this is why a different approach was used in the other 
parts of Uganda. 
Because the colonial administration was determined to secure the Uganda territory and 
then incorporate it into the world economy and promote production and consumption in 
order to ensure that the Uganda Protectorate was financially viable, it went ahead and 
imposed freehold tenure in the other parts of Uganda through the quickest means 
possible, unfortunately involving the use of the force of law. Moreover, freehold was a 
foreign tenure, which the colonial administration believed could not be understood by the 
local population, who were thought to be incapable of adapting to the Western forms of 
private ownership; the British Empire thus authorised the governor through the land 
officer to alienate freehold titles to non-Africans, who were expected to introduce large-
scale agricultural farms in Uganda. 
This approach turned out to be a sad miscalculation, because the land, which was to be 
alienated in freehold titles was literally not there; it was already occupied by Africans 
who were using it to produce their own food, look after their animals and satisfy the 
government tax obligations and consumer wants by growing cash crops (Thompson 
2003: 42). Even the territorial (nomadic) customary land was effectively occupied. This 
was observed by Cohen (1959: 67, 70), quoted by Thompson (2003: 325), when he said, 
"In Karamoja, the initiative in attempting to save the land comes almost entirely from the 
British officers. It is an uphill task, for the people are intensely resistant to change and 
inclined to violence if pressed too far." 
It did not take long before Britain realised that it would not make good political sense to 
alienate land in an African territory and give it to foreigners without bribing the chiefs 
and a few local residents with some land grants. This is how the local chiefs came to 
acquire native freeholds, and how the indigenous people were given adjudicated 
freeholds. And the colonial indirect rule policy, together with the divide and rule 
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approach, both of which were introduced in the districts, helped to entrench tribal 
sentiments, which have now proved to be a big hindrance to the cause for national unity. 
The exercise, which started with the intention of establishing one tenure system for the 
whole of Uganda, ultimately created four different tenure systems, namely, mailo, 
freehold, native freehold and adjudicated freehold. The politicians and top land 
administrators have observed, however, that the interest being registered is the same in all 
four tenures, because each is held in perpetuity. This makes it very expensive to maintain 
all four tenure systems in terms of stationary, manpower and office space. At the national 
level, moreover, the tribes remain far apart and the spirit of nationalism suffers; and the 
land market never grows beyond the borders of each district. As was pointed out in 
Section 2.4 and also confirmed by the Prime Minister of Uganda, there is need to 
harmonise the tenure systems of Uganda. 
It stands out clearly that the underlying factors, which forced the colonial administration 
to create many statutory formal tenure systems, were not in the interests of the local 
population. In order to address this problem, the study attempted, as one of its objectives, 
to integrate the four tenure systems into a single formal tenure system. In this regard, the 
study has adduced some empirical evidence (see section 5.4), which suggests that it is 
indeed possible to integrate the four statutory tenure systems into a single formal tenure 
system. 
The empirical evidence displayed in Table 5.94 suggests that freehold, native freehold, 
adjudicated freehold and mailo are significantly the same in terms of the survey and 
registration processes. The implication of this finding is that it provides strong backing 
and support to freehold, which the government has already entrenched in the Uganda 
Constitution of 1995. The significance of this finding is that the customary tenure and 
informal tenure in all the districts will be directly formalised into freehold tenure. And 
this will make it possible for the government to identifY the divisive tribal sentiments and 
create progressive national sentiments among the citizens of Uganda. The land market, 
which is likely to evolve thereafter, will also help to break up the district (tribal) barriers 
and spread to the whole country and beyond. The national agricultural economy, which 
will be underpinned by freehold tenure, will most likely be able to adapt to industrialised 
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farming techniques, which will encourage viable and sustainable economic development 
in the whole country. 
Leasehold tenure, which was implemented immediately after independence, is created 
either by contract or by the operation of the law and whose duration is fixed, is by 
definition, complementary to freehold. As pointed out by the politicians and top land 
administrators, leasehold titles will be issued out of registered freehold land. Since 
leaseholds include long leases of up to 99 years, it may attract foreigners who may want 
to invest in the country. It is therefore logical that Uganda should adopt a tenure 
structure, composed of freehold and leasehold tenure systems. 
5.5.2: What methods can be used to harmonise the existing land tenure systems? 
This question raises the very fundamental issue that was highlighted in the introductory 
Section 1.0 of this study: the issue of harmonising customary, mailo and freehold into a 
formal tenure system. The top land administrators pointed out that the main debate 
concerning the integration of the existing land tenure systems into formal land tenure is 
between the proponents of mailo and freehold tenure systems. The mailo landowners 
appear to have two points of contention. Firstly, there are some mailo landowners who 
believe that mailo is entrenched in their tribal and monarchical identity (Nsibambi 
2004: 14, 19). They thus wrongly associate the safeguarding of monarchical institutions 
with according monarchical areas with federal status. Every effort should be made to help 
them learn to differentiate between mailo land tenure and the federal status; mailo and 
federalism are quite different, and they should be separated and treated differently. 
Secondly, some mailo owners do not agree that the government took the right decision 
when it adopted freehold as the integrated formal land tenure system for Uganda. They 
are not convinced by the argument that mailo is the same as freehold, and they therefore 
want to know why mailo cannot become the integrated formal tenure for Uganda. 
According to section 2 of the Possession of Land Law of 1908, mailo is defined as an 
interest in perpetuity over a parcel of land, which is already occupied by customary 
landowners. Freehold is defined under the Land Act (Cap. 227) as an interest held in 
perpetuity over a parcel of land free of customary occupiers and free from overriding 
interests. The point of contention therefore is to resolve the conflict between the tenants 
and the mailo owners amicably. The government's response to this problem is contained 
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in articles 24 and 26 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda. Article 24 provides for respect 
of human dignity and protection from inhuman treatment, while section 26 protects all 
Ugandans from deprivation of property. It would therefore appear that the government is 
interested in the unencumbered freehold system, because it wants to democratise private 
property ownership. This unencumbered freehold is what Nsibarnbi (1996: 13) was 
talking about when he said, "The Constituent Assembly believed that when the process of 
capital penetration supplemented by greater educational opportunities reaches different 
comers of Uganda, most areas of Uganda are likely to opt for a freehold system." 
The theory of social contract respects the right of first occupancy for a given piece of 
land because these are the rights that provide the reference point and which ought to 
guide the registration process under the formal tenure system (Rousseau 1994: 60-61). 
The theory underlines that the land must be uninhabited by other people; secondly, no 
more land must be occupied than is needed for subsistence; and thirdly, possession must 
be taken by work and cultivation, the only mark of ownership that ought, in default of 
juridical title, to be respected by others. It would therefore appear that the government's 
policy on the democratisation of private property satisfies the conditions of the theory of 
social contract. 
As the Prime Minister pointed out, the government intends to harmonise and establish 
<full blooded democratisation' over private land ownership before the federation of East 
African states takes effect. It also appears that the government is aware that the market 
forces have already helped a good number of customary occupiers to acquire mailo 
interest in many parts of Buganda. This might be one of the reasons, which motivated the 
government to vest the land in the citizens of Uganda. Doing so was a gesture of 
goodwill by the government, and its purpose was to democratise private land ownership 
for the benefit of all Ugandans. It is therefore imperative that all land tenure systems be 
integrated into freehold, which will minimize tribalism, encourage nationalism among 
Ugandans, and put the country on a better footing for sustainable economic development. 
Sections 24 and 26 of the Constitution were interpreted further in section 31 of the Land 
Act (Cap. 227), where it is clearly stated that a tenant who occupies registered land 
enjoys security of occupancy on the land. Since the market forces are already vibrant in 
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the Buganda region, it may not take long before the mailo landowners discover that they 
should allow the market forces to resolve the land question once and for all. However, the 
right approach, which the government should use to resolve the problem, is not to use the 
law to force anybody with dissenting views into submission; the right approach is to 
negotiate with them until a solution is reached that is agreeable to both parties. As Sir 
Andrew Cohen, former governor of Uganda (1952-1957) pointed out, "Plans and 
programmes cannot be forced on the people. If the plans and programs are to be effective, 
efforts must be made to persuade the people to accept them, and the process of persuasion 
may take weeks or even months" (Cohen, 1959: 72, quoted in Thompson, 2003: 324). 
Moreover, the proposed freehold tenure has not changed anything in the social contract 
that underpins mailo tenure. The government will still be unable to acquire land 
compulsorily for investment, which has always been the case under mailo tenure. The 
legal situation is exactly the same as it was in 1944, when the colonial administration 
wanted to acquire 200 acres of mailo land for the expansion of Makerere University 
(Thompson 2003: 233). At that time, the protectorate government could compulsorily 
acquiremailolandfordefenceandforcommunicationsandotherusefulpublicworks.In 
the case of Makerere University, the mailo landowners refused to sell to government, 
because the educational purpose for which land was being acquired did not fall in the 
category of compulsory acquisition. Since this same clause on compulsory acquisition 
was adopted wholesale into the Uganda Constitution of 1995, the mailo landowners do 
not have strong grounds on which to reject the proposed freehold. 
The customary landholders have persistently made one demand, viz. that the government 
must consult them before doing anything on their customary land. De Soto (2001: 181) 
seems to agree with them when he says, "the best way to create a social contract is to first 
consult the people in a participatory manner and make them form a consensus about the 
ownership of assets and the rules that govern their use and exchange." It therefore 
appears that the local population wants to form a social contract about how their property 
should be owned, and also to agree on the rules that should govern its use and exchange. 
The analysis of the baseline survey data has highlighted some of the people's views on 
this matter. For example, Table 5.54 shows that households under informal tenure want 
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the titles to be registered in the names of the household heads. Households under 
individualised customary tenure want the titles to be in the names of the household head 
and his or her spouse. And, lastly, households under communal (clan) customary tenure 
want the titles to be in the names of the household head, clan elders and children. 
Because the government is interested in establishing a market economy throughout the 
whole country, the national social contract must utilize all these local social contracts to 
design a national social contract that will be accepted by all the people. This means that 
the government must ensure that the people are informed and sensitised about the market 
economy and what it entails. It is therefore necessary for the government to negotiate 
with the people in a participatory manner until a consensus is reached. 
5.5.3: Are the existing informal and customary tenure systems ready to be 
formalised and integrated into the formal land tenure system? 
The feudal and non-feudal sedentary customary areas of Uganda were ready for the 
formal land tenure system before 1900, when Sir Harry Johnston, the Commissioner of 
the Queen in Uganda, discussed the land settlement question with the chiefs of the 
Buganda kingdom. The main difference between the Buganda kingdom, which utilised a 
feudal sedentary customary tenure, and other parts of Uganda, which utilised a family or 
clan sedentary customary tenure, is that the people of Buganda had strong tribal identity, 
whereas the people in the other parts of Uganda had a strong family or clan identity. 
When native freeholds were introduced in Toro and Ankole in 1900 and 1901 
respectively, where customary tenure had a strong family identity, most of the chiefs 
found it difficult to collect any ground rent and tribute from the local residents who 
occupied the native freehold. This was because there were no tribal arrangements already 
in place to enforce the collection of ground rent and tribute, as there were in the Buganda 
kingdom. The customary landholders stood their ground and the majority of the chiefs 
thus had to hold onto the paper titles, which they later bequeathed intact to their children. 
Since the land under feudal, family and clan sedentary customary tenure systems was 
already occupied by individuals by 1900, and the feudal customary tenure in the Buganda 
kingdom had been successfully formalised into mailo, it is most likely that the family and 
clan sedentary customary tenure systems would also have adapted to the formal system, if 
they had had the chance to discuss the land settlement question with the colonial 
administration. 
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The researcher, who is a resident of Nyakaina village in Rukarango parish, Ntungamo 
district, is aware of the so-called paper titles, whose owners failed to collect ground rent 
and tribute. He got this story by his late father who told him that his grandfather used to 
frustrate the emissaries sent by the Omugabe of Ankole, to collect ground rent and tribute 
from the customary occupiers, who were living on his native freehold. The parcel of land, 
which the researcher inherited from his late father, is located on the native freehold of 
Charles Rutahaba, who is one of the beneficiaries of the 1901 Ankole Agreement. 
Clearly, the parcels that were surveyed in Rukarango parish under the systematic 
demarcation pilot project in 2004 had existed for a long time. Table 5.58 gives the mean, 
minimum and maximum years, which the local residents in the three parishes have stayed 
on their parcels of land. Given the fact that the average life expectancy was found to be 
46 years in Rukarango and Aminit parishes, and 51 years in Kabigi parish (see Table 
5.26), and given that the current occupiers, who are the third or fourth generation, have 
stayed on their land for 30 years, one can work backwards and establish that 
individualised customary tenure existed before 1900. 
The results of the socio-economic profile (discussed in section 5.2.1 above) show that the 
informal tenure and all sedentary customary tenures, whether under family or clan 
control, recognise the individual's exclusive use rights over a specified piece ofland (see 
Table 5.23). The territorial customary land recognises exclusive use rights in areas nearer 
to urban centres where population density is higher than in rural areas. Although, by a 
stroke of the pen, all customary land in Uganda was declared crown land by the British 
Empire, the majority of the local people have lived on their individualised parcels of land 
uninterrupted for more than a century. It is, therefore, no surprise at all that the people of 
Rukarango parish welcomed the systematic adjudication and demarcation pilot project, 
when it was introduced in the parish in 2004. There are many other parishes, which 
would like to be given the same opportunity. 
It was later established that the incident that took place in Aminit parish, Soroti district in 
January 2005, where surveyors were seriously attacked and severely injured by a mob of 
about 200 people, was due to a number of factors: the inconclusive report of the 
consultant; the laxity of the members of the Systematic Demarcation Committee who did 
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not read the feelings of the public properly; and the area member of parliament who took 
advantage of the confusion and mobilised the people against the team of surveyors. This 
incident was, in fact, a repeat of what had happened in 1961, when the colonial 
administration attempted to introduce freehold in Teso, Lango and Bukedi districts 
without consulting the people (Thompson 2003: 31). Land being the main source of 
livelihood for the local people, they are not prepared to let anyone do anything to it 
without their consent. This is why the systematic adjudication and demarcation exercise 
needs to be preceded by an intensive sensitisation program, which should be followed by 
a baseline household survey to solicit and confirm the consent of the people. 
It would therefore appear that the ugly incident, which took place in Aminit parish in 
January 2005, could have been avoided if the Systematic Demarcation Committee had 
not based their decision on inconclusive consultancy findings, which underestimated the 
views of eighty households (58%) in Aminit parish (see Table 5.86) which deliberately 
refused to give their opinions about systematic demarcation. The statistic presented in 
Table 5.86 is also confirmed by the results presented in Table 5.96, which clearly show 
that the people of Aminit parish had stated that they were not adequately sensitised. And 
because they were not listened to, they had to react the way they did. When this kind of 
reaction is compared with what took place in 1961, it becomes very clear that the people 
will not yield to any form of pressure until the government agrees to hold serious 
discussions with them through well-conducted sensitisation programs. One can safely say 
that, with concerted sensitisation, all areas under sedentary customary tenure systems will 
be ready for freehold tenure. However, the government should not lose sight of the ethnic 
sentiments, which appear to have instigated the violent attack on the government officers, 
rather than taking them hostage or simply asking them to stop. As Karugire (1986) 
correctly observed, ethnic considerations are becoming increasingly salient in 
contemporary Africa, not because ethnicity is a concern but rather because violence 
appears more and more to be channelled along ethnic lines. 
Article 237(4)(b) of the 1995 Constitution and section 9 of the Land Act (Cap. 227) 
clarify that customary tenure does not change under certificate of ownership. Customary 
tenure only changes when registered under freehold. The top land administrators and 
parliamentarians have also pointed out, basing themselves on the costs incurred by the 
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government during systematic adjudication and demarcation, that it would not be 
advisable for the government to conclude the systematic adjudication and demarcation 
exercise without surveying the land and creating permanent records, which would be 
available to other users like researchers, physical planners, engineers and decision 
makers. The Prime Minister, who is also the leader of government business, has clearly 
stated that it is government policy to eliminate customary tenure in the long run and that 
the existing documentary private ownership will be democratized so as to enhance the 
market economy. It would therefore appear that the Constituent Assembly, which 
approved certificates of customary ownership, simply adopted the middle of the road 
position in order to accommodate divergent tribal and political sentiments. 
The top land administrators have further observed that so far no sub-county has instituted 
the certificate of customary ownership system, and that the system may in fact never be 
implemented. Because the whole matter concerning certificates of customary ownership 
was not on the agenda to be discussed by the Constituent Assembly; and because the act 
of maintaining customary tenure under the certificate of customary ownership contradicts 
the official position of government, the law that introduced the certificates of customary 
ownership will most likely remain a dead letter in the statute books. 
The case of informal tenants on mailo land does not appear to be bad at all. This is 
because the original allocatees were the only group of people interested in ground rent 
and collecting tributes from the tenants. With time this became a nightmare because the 
landlords did not have secure mechanisms of collecting ground rent and tribute. The 
second and third generations of the mailo landlords were interested in selling land to the 
sitting tenants (see Table 5.71). As a result, the land market on mailo land has turned out 
to be the most vibrant in Uganda, although mailo land in the rural areas is a big problem 
in that most of the land titles are still in the names of the original allocatees (see Tables 
5.51 and 5.52). This issue was articulated in section 5.2.4, and it needs to receive urgent 
attention from government. Once the succession law and procedures are sorted out and 
the office of Administrator-General is de-concentrated, it will become easy for the people 
to transfer titles into their names and the market forces will be able to take over. Because 
the relationship between the landlords and tenants is quite healthy (see Table 5.60), it is 
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most likely that many informal tenants will be able to access mailo land through the 
willing buyer/willing seller approach. 
There is a government land fund to rehabilitate the environment by resettling persons 
who have encroached on game reserves and forest areas; to purchase and redistribute land 
to the people of Kibaale district who were deprived of their land under the colonial 
regime; to facilitate land readjustment in freehold, leasehold and mailo areas in order to 
enhance productivity; and for any other sustainable approaches that may be identified 
(Uganda Government 2001: 33). But the fund is not enough for all these activities. The 
study proposes that the democratisation of mailo land should be left to the market forces. 
This is because the mailo landlords have enjoyed the proceeds of their land since 1900; 
while the native freehold registered owners have only had paper titles, although 
government guarantees these. The government should purchase the native freehold titles 
so that the customary occupiers can regain their land and register it in their names. 
According to Nsibambi (1996), all customary land in Uganda is held in perpetuity, 
pending formalisation into freehold. For the territorial customary tenure, which is only 
individualised in high population centres around urban centres, the concept of 
individualisation of land is likely to encourage mobile livestock keepers to become 
sedentary. This would make it worthwhile for the government to offer them efficient 
technologies to harness the natural resources such as 'water harvesting', and would allow 
farming/livestock practices to become intensified. Section 15 of the Land Act 1998 
(Cap. 227) provides that communal land associations may be formed by any group of 
persons for any purpose connected with communal ownership and management of land, 
whether under customary law or otherwise. So far, no research has been done to ascertain 
how the associations would work either under customary law or official law. More 
research is therefore needed in this area before any attempt is made to bring territorial 
customary tenure onto the register. 
5.5.4: Which approach should be used to introduce the formal land tenure system in 
the districts? 
The systematic adjudication and demarcation pilot project, which was carried out in 
Rukarango parish in 2004, established that systematic adjudication and demarcation is 
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better than the sporadic approach, which is currently in use. The top land administrators 
and politicians have observed that systematic adjudication and demarcation is much 
cheaper; moreover, it leaves everybody in the parish satisfied, and quality data can be 
acquired quickly and made available to other users, like researchers, physical planners, 
engineers and policy makers. The people's views about systematic adjudication and 
demarcation, which are presented in Table 5.87, are very encouraging. However, there 
are two fundamental reasons why formal land tenure should be implemented through 
systematic adjudication and demarcation. Firstly, formal land tenure is based on the 
curtain and insurance principles (see section 2.1.1) under which the registered owner 
enjoys an unchallenged title. The systematic adjudication and demarcation approach is 
the best method for identifying the customary occupiers of the land before land 
registration is carried out. Secondly, identifying and registering the customary 
landholders would establish a firm foundation for the land market in all the districts of 
Uganda. 
The customary landholders need to be told the benefits of the formal land tenure system. 
They also need to be educated about the advantages and mechanisms of the monetary 
economy. These should be the fundamental issues, which should be emphasised during 
the sensitisation programs. As a rule of the thumb, the people should be sensitised before 
systematic adjudication and demarcation begins, and the sensitisation should be 
immediately followed by a baseline household survey to gauge the people's 
understanding of the whole program and solicit their consent. The results of the baseline 
survey should be properly analysed and the results disseminated to the stakeholders in 
order to avoid any violent reactions from the local residents. This is because land is the 
main source of livelihood for most Ugandans, and it is important to obtain the consent of 
the people before systematic adjudication and demarcation takes place. 
The customary landholders may want to know that some changes have been made in the 
original formalisation process. In any case, it would be a grave oversight to implement 
systematic adjudication and demarcation without explaining to the people what their roles 
would be in the whole project. This is because the people have to be involved at every 
stage. It needs to be explained to them during sensitisation that the new approach will be 
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participatory at every stage and that nothing will be done to customary land without their 
consent. 
The members of the parish who would like to have their land formalised should make 
their intentions known to their sub-county land committee members. When the committee 
members are satisfied that the whole parish is ready for systematic adjudication and 
demarcation, they should write a report and submit it to the district land board. After 
receiving and considering the reports from all the parishes, which have declared their 
interest in systematic adjudication and demarcation, the land board should visit the 
parishes if need be, and work out the priority list to be adhered to by the district survey 
office, which is charged with the responsibility of implementing systematic adjudication 
and demarcation. The district survey office should carry out the actual land adjudication 
and demarcation. The private surveyors should carry out the field survey and the data 
collected by private surveyors should be processed into cadastral index maps by the land 
office. The draft cadastral index maps indicating numbers of markstones, plot numbers 
and names of owners should be taken back to the parish to be verified by the landowners 
themselves under the guidance of the private surveyor and mapping specialist from the 
district survey office. After verification and ensuring that the private surveyors correctly 
captured all plots, deed plans should be prepared and submitted to the Registrar of Titles. 
According to the findings of the study, presented in Table 5.96, the landowners have 
already made it clear that they are not ready to pay for the titles that will result from the 
systematic adjudication and demarcation exercise. This is an issue, which could be 
followed up and discussed to a logical conclusion. 
The institutional framework needed to implement formal land tenure is already 
decentralized to the district level. There are district land tribunals to deal with all types of 
land disputes. District land boards are already in place to deal with land administration 
matters, including the allocation of land to government institutions and private 
developers. The district land office is responsible for the planning, survey, valuation and 
registration of land. Cadastral survey services are privati sed to bring services nearer to 
the people. The sub-county land committees operate as an interface between the 
government and the local people. And the central government works hand in hand with 
the district local councils to ensure that a legitimate land delivery process is operational 
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5.6 Concluding remarks 
The tables presented in Section 5.2, summarise the views of the household heads that 
attended the one-week sensitisation workshops, which were conducted by the members of 
Systematic Demarcation Committee. The workshops were held concurrently at 
Rukarango parish in Ntungamo, Kabigi parish in Masaka and Aminit in Soroti districts. 
The sensitisation workshops preceded the baseline survey data collection by the research 
assistants of Makerere Institute of Social Research. These workshops were intended to 
appraise the households on good agricultural practices; environmental protection 
measures; and to educate them about systematic adjudication and demarcation approach. 
The workshops brought together the government officials and the rural people, in a 
participatory manner, to discuss, listen from each other and share views, before the single 
formal tenure system could be introduced in the districts. As De Soto (2001: 201) has 
correctly observed, "to make a property revolution, a leader has to do at least three 
specific things: to take the perspective of the poor, to co-opt the elite, and to deal with the 
legal and technical bureaucracies." 
The main purpose of the workshops was to sensitise the people about the new policy, 
introduced under the 1995 constitution, which vested the land in the citizens of Uganda in 
accordance with mailo, customary, freehold and leasehold tenure systems. This approach, 
which was a fundamental change from the colonial approach, where land policies used to 
be introduced in a top-down approach, was intended to create confidence in the people 
and to assure them that the government was interested in democratising and securing 
their land rights through a participatory approach. The overall aim was to ensure that the 
government's policy of democratising private land ownership is supported and 
implemented by all Ugandans who would then be in position to use Uganda's land 
resources productively and sustainably. 
The freehold tenure that the government wants to introduce throughout the country is not 
significantly different from mailo tenure, which was introduced following the 1900 
Uganda Agreement. The only slight difference is that mailo tenure is a quasi-freehold 
form of tenure, which permits the separation of ownership of land from the ownership of 
developments on land made by a lawful or bona fide occupant. Although the granting of 
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mailo titles in Buganda denied both the Central and Buganda governments that degree of 
control, which they would need to ensure that the land was developed to the best 
economic advantage, it did set a good example of land allocation to the local population 
(West 1964: 64). Therefore the democratisation of mailo will create freehold, which will 
be enjoyed by both the landlords and the former tenants. As a result, the freehold land 
tenure, being proposed by the government, will restore the dignity of all the customary 
occupiers, who have been the victims of informal tenure on mailo land. 
Freehold, as the single type of formal tenure, is further supported by the findings 
presented in Table 5.94, which confirmed that freehold, mailo, native freehold and 
adjudicated freehold tenures are significantly the same and hence belong to one category, 
with respect to surveying and registration processes. To understand the root causes of this 
common category, we need to look at the definitions of the three tenure systems. Mailo 
tenure, as defined in Section 2 of the Possession of Land Law, 1908, is in effect a 
freehold interest in a piece of land occupied by customary tenants. Similarly, native 
freehold is a freehold interest in a piece of land on which customary occupiers reside. 
Adjudicated freehold, too, is a form of freehold interest in a piece of land, although this 
land is free of customary occupiers. The democratically ideal situation for all the three 
tenures is the ownership of 'an interest in a piece of land free from customary occupiers.' 
These findings clearly provide empirical and technical evidence to support freehold 
which is free from customary occupiers as the single formal tenure for Uganda. 
However, the customary tenants who reside on mailo and native freehold need to regain 
their land using an approach of negotiation, persuasion and sensitisation. It should also be 
noted that the colonial administration's step of granting land, which was already occupied 
by indigenous people, to the chiefs was failure to diagnose correctly how land was 
customarily owned at the time. Therefore the government policy, whose aim was to 
democratise private land ownership, is an attempt to rectifY this anomaly, which had been 
created by the colonial administration. 
The analysis of the data acquired by means of the questionnaires has revealed that every 
household under informal, individualised (family) and communal (clan) customary tenure 
systems has access to land and housing. Therefore, with proper sensitisation of the local 
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population about systematic adjudication and demarcation, it is very likely that the 
implementation of formal land tenure will succeed in all feudal and non-feudal sedentary 
customary tenure areas. 
It was further established in section 5.2 that the individualisation of communal pastoral 
resources in territorial (nomadic) customary areas intensifies as population density 
increases, and that it is enhanced in areas nearer to urban centres where the population 
density is higher than in the rural areas. This suggests that most of the territorial 
customary land is not individualised. At the same time, this study has not adduced any 
evidence that confirms that the recommendation of communal associations, which are 
provided for in the Land Act 1998 (Cap. 227), was based on comprehensive research. 
There is thus a need for further research in order to understand how the communal 
associations would work and to establish whether the nomadic people would be interested 
in formal land titles. 
The analysis presented in section 5.2.1 has also shown that agriculture is the backbone of 
Uganda's economy and that land is the main source of livelihood for the citizens of the 
country. Therefore Uganda's small scale farming sector needs to be underpinned by a 
single formal tenure system, under which all local conventions on property will be 
codified, in a participatory manner, into a unified property system, operated by one 
official law. This formalisation process will also mean that the exposure and business 
transactions of the customary landholders will no longer be confined to the villages; the 
village residents will be able to operate in a wider Ugandan environment (De Soto 
2001: 184). They will also be in a better position to adapt to modem and improved 
farming techniques. This proposition supports the hypothesis that when land ownership is 
democratised and formalised, agricultural practices will improve and the national 
economy will grow. The local people will learn to transact business using small loans 
from micro-finance institutions until they graduate to taking big loans that require 
collateral in terms of land titles. After gaining experience and confidence, they will 
venture into the commercial banking institutions and compete with elites and foreigners 
alike. This will provide a permanent solution to and a better approach towards the 
eradication of poverty. 
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According to the Weekly Observer of 21 July 2005 (Anonymous 2005), an independent 
Ugandan newspaper, 
Microfinance institutions in Uganda are institutions that give poor people 
access to small loans. The difference is that micro finance institutions do 
what commercial banks don't do especially when it comes to the size of 
loans. In most cases these loans are unsecured, because the clients are 
people, mainly groups/associations of people, who have very small 
businesses, so that the capital required is very small. A client can borrow 
as little as Uganda shillings 50,000 (US$ 28) and a maximum of Uganda 
shillings 3 million. Normally, when a client graduates into an individual 
loan taker, the microfinance institution starts demanding collateral. 
Depending on assets one has, one can access a bigger loan of shillings 10 
million or 30 million. However, the micro finance institutions are 
interested in businesses that generate regular income and are able to pay 
on a regular basis. Therefore agricultural production businesses are not 
financed by microfinance institutions because these are long term 
investments. 
There are over 1,500 microfinance institutions in Uganda out of which 
only 104 are registered. And out of 104 only 4 are licensed by the Central 
Bank of Uganda, which gives them an opportunity to also take deposits 
from public institutions. All these are running micro finance business in the 
region of Uganda shillings 250 billion distributed among 900,000 to one 
million active clients. The registered micro finance institutions are 
regulated under a Micro-Deposit taking Institution (MDI) Act, and they 
have replaced microfinance institutions like Entandikwa, which were 
government sponsored. If more and more resources are available, more 
people will access loans and the poverty levels will most likely drop. In 
Uganda, the poverty level of people below the poverty line stands at 38%. 
The government needs to keep to its planned agricultural improvement approach, which 
is intended to improve the methods of crop and animal husbandry; moreover, this 
approach is designed to influence peasant farmers on both the psychological and the 
199 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
technical planes to induce an increase in their productivity, albeit without any abrupt or 
radical changes in traditional, social and legal systems. The emphasis should be on 
increased production on the small-scale peasant farms through extension work, 
introducing new farming techniques and education. 
The land delivery process, under systematic adjudication and demarcation, will be 
shortened; and this will make it feasible to bring all the customary land in the whole 
country onto the register within a much shorter time than was previously expected. 
However, the successful implementation of systematic adjudication and demarcation will 
depend on the following conditions. Firstly, the property laws will have to be revised and 
made appropriate to the Ugandan situation. Secondly, the sensitisation of the people will 
have to be handled very carefully. Thirdly, the bureaucracy within the institutional 
framework will also have to be reviewed to ensure that the whole process flows more 
smoothly. And lastly, the top political leadership will have to place the land tenure reform 
exercise high on the national agenda. 
The discussion presented in section 5.5 has affirmed that sensitisation and consultation of 
the people should be emphasised. It has also recommended a tenure structure composed 
of freehold and leasehold, and that this system should be implemented through systematic 
adjudication and demarcation approach. The next chapter will summarise the findings 
that resulted from the analysis of land records, questionnaires and the structured 
interview schedules. 
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CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
6.0 Introduction 
The summary of findings IS presented in SIX sections. Section 6.1 presents the 
formalisation process. Section 6.2 summarises the formal land transactions. Section 6.3 
outlines the humankind-land relationship within the rural areas. Section 6.4 gives the 
rationale underlying the adoption of the uniform land tenure structure in Uganda. Section 
6.S outlines the property laws and Section 6.6 gives the concluding remarks. 
6.1 The formalisation process 
It was established that the formalisation process was implemented by four government 
institutions, namely, Uganda Land Commission, Land Inspectorate Division, Surveys and 
Mapping Department, and Land Registration Department. It was also established that 
land record keeping in all these departments was poor. It was further established that the 
formalisation process combines three processes: land administration, cadastral survey, 
and land registration. Of all these three processes it is the land registration process which 
fixes the property concept and securely defines the rights in land so that land titles can 
safely be used in business transactions as collateral. 
The Uganda Land Commission as the controlling authority allocated the land to 
individuals and corporate applicants. The Land Inspectorate Division assisted the Uganda 
Land Commission in the administration of the land allocation process. The Surveys and 
Mapping Department carried out surveys of former crown lands while private surveyors 
carried out surveys of mailo land. It was established that the private surveyors were 
largely responsible for the vibrant land market on mailo land and that the government 
surveyors forced the landowners to pay twice for survey services, which slowed down the 
land delivery process of freehold and leasehold tenure systems. 
It was established that there are five formal tenure systems, namely, freehold, mailo, 
native freehold, adjudicated freehold, and leasehold. And that the initial allocation of 
mailo, native freehold and adjudicated freehold were implemented through systematic 
adjudication and demarcation while freehold and leasehold were introduced by sporadic 
adjudication and demarcation. It was established that systematic adjudication and 
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demarcation was people oriented while sporadic adjudication and demarcation was 
government oriented. Therefore, it would appear that the model of allocating land to the 
indigenous people through systematic adjudication and demarcation approach supported 
by private surveyors is likely to yield better results. 
It was established that apart from poor record keeping and delays in land delivery, the 
formalisation process was functioning properly. It only needs to be improved and focused 
on the local level, the technical procedures made simple, and used in collaboration with 
the local people. 
6.2 Formal land transactions 
For the purpose of this study, the formal land transactions were categorised in terms of 
transfers, mortgages, caveats and subdivisions. The general trend of each of these 
transactions was mapped in section 5.1.2. The overall business trend in terms of the 
number of titles that have had at least one transaction in each category is summarised 
below. The percentages shown against the respective numbers of titles are with respect to 
the total sample that was used for this study. 
Land Transaction 
Transfers 
Mortgages 
Caveats 
Subdivisions 
Number of titles 
118(24.5%) 
92(19%) 
65(13%) 
60(12%) 
6.1.1 The relationships between different land tenure systems and land transaction 
categories 
This section summarises the general findings of land transactions with respect to the five 
land tenure systems and the land policies, which implemented them. It also summarises 
the effect that these land tenure systems and policies had on the local population of 
Uganda. Table 6.1 analyses the relationship between land tenure and land transaction 
categories. 
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Table 6.1: Relationship between land tenure and land transaction categories 
Tenures Transfers Mortgages Caveats Subdivisions Total 
transactions 
Adj. Freehold 34 9 12 8 63 
Nat. Freehold 42 17 26 31 116 
Freehold 97 54 9 7 167 
Leasehold 17 11 7 0 35 
Mailo 102 33 51 33 219 
Total transactions 292 124 105 79 600 
From Table 6.1, it can be seen that the majority of land transactions occurred mainly in 
mailo tenure, followed by native freehold. These two are landlord/tenant systems. 
Leasehold tenure is at the other extreme end of the continuum, because the land titles 
were mainly acquired by customary landowners for security of tenure. It would appear 
that Ugandans are more comfortable with tenure systems, which are held in perpetuity. 
This is because the customary tenure is the main source of the people's livelihoods and it 
has always been held in perpetuity. Therefore, the democratisation of private ownership 
and the adoption of freehold tenure system is a step in the right direction and it is most 
likely that freehold will gain majority support of the local population. 
Mailo and freehold titles were issued under the colonial administration, whereas 
leasehold and adjudicated freehold titles were largely issued after independence. After 
independence the people developed a habit of acquiring land titles for security of tenure 
and not for investment. This attitude seems to reflect the i~ustice that the colonial 
administration land policies, which were adopted by the transition governments, inflicted 
on the Ugandan population. The land policies disregarded the occupancy rights of the 
first owner that underpin the consent principle, which is a cardinal principle in any land 
registration system. It would therefore appear that the motivation for acquiring leasehold 
titles was instigated by the fear that the government wanted to take away their customary 
land without their consent, thus turning them into squatters on their own land. The 
customary landholders had thought that customary land, in which they had a perpetual 
interest, would automatically revert to them at the dawn of independence. This view is 
strongly supported by the fact that there is a considerable land market with regard to 
mailo and freehold land, both of which are held in perpetuity, whereas leasehold titles are 
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simply kept merely as evidence of land ownership. This, points to the fact that the people 
did not understand why the government wanted to reduce the tenancy of customary 
tenure from perpetuity to a fixed leasehold period of 49 years. They also appear not to 
have understood why they were being asked to pay ground rent to the government, which 
had replaced the colonial administration. They seem to have been fully aware of the fact 
that they could even lose the customary land when they default. Therefore the whole 
process of formalizing customary land into leasehold was seen as a deliberate 
government scheme designed to devalue the perpetual interest in customary land in order 
to take it away. This is why the people became suspicious of government intentions and 
decided to acquire leasehold titles for security of tenure and not for investment. The 
government will have to sensitise the people out of this anti-developmental attitude. 
De Soto (2001: 61) observed that the formal tenure systems had been established to 
protect both security of ownership and security of transactions, although the Western 
systems emphasise the latter. He further observed that security is principally focused on 
producing trust in transactions so that people can more easily make their assets lead a 
parallel life as capital. It would appear that the success of the Western systems stems 
from the fact that the land ownership issues were solved long before capitalism was 
introduced. The only logical way forward seems to lie in resolving the land ownership 
problems before any meaningful success in land transactions can be achieved. 
6.1.2 The relationships between different land policies and land transaction 
categories 
This section summarises the general findings of land transactions with respect to the land 
policies, which implemented them. It also summarises the effect that these land policies 
had on the local population of Uganda. Table 6.2 analyses the relationship between land 
policies and land transaction categories. 
Table 6.2: Relationship between different land policies and land transactions 
Policies Transfers Mortgages Caveats Subdivisions Total 
1900 - 1962 38 24 16 29 107 
1963 - 1975 73 29 48 34 184 
1976 - 1995 130 61 28 13 232 
1996 - 2004 51 10 13 3 77 
Total 292 124 105 79 600 
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Table 6.2 shows that land transactions started off well under the colonial period and 
improved steadily up to independence. For example the land transfers were 0.6/annum 
under the colonial period, 5.6/annum under the transition period, 6.5/annum under the 
uniform tenure period and 5.7/annum under the liberalised period. The lack of steady 
progress after independence is mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, the colonial land 
policies, which were inherited after independence, were not well received by the local 
population. This was because the indigenous people thought that those policies were 
intended to take away their customary land. And secondly, the new policy, which was 
instituted in 1995, has not yet been implemented. The Prime Minister has pointed out that 
the timing for the full implementation of private ownership is still not right. He has also 
indicated that the government believes that the market forces will in the long run work in 
favour of freehold tenure system. However, it would also appear that the government 
might have to move swiftly and implement some of the findings that have already been 
submitted to government by the Land Sector Strategic Plan 2001-2011. This needs to be 
done without any delay because the apparent downward trend in the land transactions 
needs to be reversed quickly. For example, the government can commission systematic 
adjudication and demarcation in all areas under individualised customary tenure. 
6.3 The humankind-land relationships within the rural areas 
6.3.1 Socio-economic profile 
It was established in section 5.2.1 that every household has access to land and housing, 
except for the four households under informal tenure, which did not qualify for legal or 
bona fide occupancy. Secure access to land and housing is one of the central components 
of the existing poverty reduction strategies of the Uganda government. The communities 
are fairly stable and can support the formal tenure system. It was also found that the 
standard of living is slightly better under informal tenure than under customary tenure. 
This may be attributed to the fact that informal relationships exist on formal land, which 
is much more secure for investment than customary tenure. It was also established that 
the communities depend on agriculture, although the rate of consumption is much higher 
than the rate of production. This trend is a legacy of the colonial administration, which 
introduced the export of raw agricultural products and the import of consumable products 
to balance production capacity and to raise revenue through customs and excise. 
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6.3.2 Land transactions 
It was established in this study that an informal land market exists in Uganda, although at 
a very low level. The land market was more prevalent under individualised and informal 
tenures than under communal tenure. It is likely that greater sensitisation of the local 
people will lead to the development of a formal land market. The households surveyed do 
know about credit facilities, although these facilities are mainly used in extralegal 
transactions. Formal banks, micro finance institutions, and other government sponsored 
financial schemes, like Entandikwa, are rarely used. The local people have heard about 
the land laws, but they are very apprehensive about the issue. The households under 
individualised and communal tenures in particular gave a strong warning that the 
government must respect and seek their consent before doing anything on their customary 
land. 
6.3.3 Dispute resolution mechanisms 
It was established that the formal dispute resolution mechanisms were not functioning 
properly and that most of the cases were still pending. The need for dispute resolution 
mechanisms was more pronounced under informal tenure than under individualised and 
communal tenures. This shows that the wider scope of land transactions, which are 
usually associated with formal land tenure systems, will require active and capable 
dispute resolution mechanisms. 
6.3.4 Access to land and security of tenure 
It was established that the people are very clear about how they want to own their land. 
For example, the households under informal tenure want the title to be in the names of 
the household head; the households under individualised tenure want the title to be in the 
names of the household head and hislher spouse; and the households under communal 
tenure want the title to be in the names of the household head, children and clan elders. 
These views are consistent with the formal, family and clan systems of land ownership. 
However, the views of the informal and communal tenure systems do show that there is 
clear discrimination against women. 
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The mailo landowners who inherited land titles from their parents are simply holding 
onto these titles because they cannot transfer them into their names. This is because the 
succession law is archaic and needs to be overhauled. This problem is further aggravated 
by the fact that there is only one central office, which handles succession matters. The 
Administrator-General's office, which deals with succession matters, should at least be 
decentralised to the regional level. 
6.3.5 Informal tenure 
There are some tenants who would like to purchase the land they occupy from their 
landlords. Other tenants say that they do not have sufficient money to buy themselves 
out, whereas still others are satisfied with the system because they do not think that they 
can be evicted as long as they pay rent to their landlords. Some landlords are willing to 
sell to the sitting tenants, although others are not willing to sell, because they say that 
land is for their children or for other purposes like grazing. There are also tenants who 
bought themselves out and are now enjoying the mailo land as registered owners. Perhaps 
the government has taken the right decision to keep out of this otherwise seemingly 
healthy relationship between the tenants and the landlords. What is at stake here does not 
seem to be as serious as what was at stake in Kenya in the early 1960s, when the Kenya 
government had to negotiate with the British government, the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development, the Commonwealth Development Corporation, and the 
Federal Republic of Germany for funds to buyout the European settlers. Land market 
forces are thus likely to resolve the informal tenure relationships on mailo land. 
6.3.6 Common land resources and wetlands 
It was established that common resources and wetlands exist and that the people know 
about them. Under the individualised and communal tenures, the government through the 
Local Council II and the parish chiefs controls the common resources and wetlands. 
Under informal tenure, the common resources and wetlands are controlled by the 
landowners. 
6.3.7 Systematic adjudication and demarcation 
It was established that systematic adjudication and demarcation is welcome in the feudal 
and non-feudal sedentary customary tenure areas. However, all the households insisted 
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that sensitisation was essential for obtaining the consent of the people before systematic 
adjudication and demarcation started. The resistance to the systematic adjudication and 
demarcation pilot project, which was experienced in Soroti district in January, 200S was 
blamed on two aspects: the inaccurate reporting, which misled the systematic 
demarcation committee into taking a wrong decision, and the failure of the systematic 
demarcation team who, instead of carrying out a more comprehensive approach through 
local council meetings and house to house visits, sensitised the public of Aminit parish 
through the media. However, the district-tribal sentiments that are entrenched in 
communal tenure system and the violence associated with those sentiments were noted. 
6.4 The uniform land tenure structure for Uganda 
The analysis of data from land records supported the adoption of freehold and leasehold 
as the uniform tenure structure for Uganda. For example, the analysis presented in Table 
S.94 supported, at a 9S% confidence level, the conclusion that mailo, freehold, native 
freehold and adjudicated freehold belonged to the freehold category. The same analysis 
confirmed that leasehold was significantly the same as the freehold category only with 
respect to Cadastral survey but significantly different from the freehold category with 
respect to both land registration and land transfer processes. Therefore freehold is the 
major tenure system because it is held in perpetuity and leasehold is the minor tenure 
system because its duration is fixed and certain. 
The analysis of data from the households under informal, individualised and communal 
customary tenure revealed that freehold has a SO-SO chance of being accepted by the 
majority of Ugandans (Table S.9S). And the legislators, top land administrators and 
private land developers supported the adoption of freehold and leasehold as the uniform 
tenure structure for Uganda but warned that both the elite and the local people will have 
to be sensitised before the dual system is implemented throughout the country. 
6.S The property laws 
The Survey Act (Cap. 232), the Registration of Titles Act (Cap. 230) and the Succession 
Act (Cap. 162) were introduced by the colonial administration, and none of them have 
ever been revised to make them appropriate to the Ugandan conditions. For example, the 
Succession Act, which commenced on 1Sth February 1906, still does not embrace African 
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extended family relationships. Much as there are many commonalities in the cultures of 
the world, there is need to include more of the Uganda cultural practices in the 
Succession Act to make it more applicable and adaptable to the Ugandan situation. This, 
therefore, calls for surgical revision of all property laws to make them appropriate to the 
Ugandan situation. 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
The study of the land records data has established that the formalisation process, right 
from land allocation, through cadastral survey process up to the registration of land titles 
needs to be re-engineered to suit the recent land policy changes. The data from the 
questionnaires confirmed that the indigenous people living under communal, informal 
and individualised customary tenures hold the land they occupy and that this land is ready 
for formalisation. And the legislators, top land administrators and private land developers 
have pointed out that there is need for uniform tenure, although they also observed that 
this will require sensitisation of both the elite and the local population. The next chapter 
will justify the need for the formal tenure system and recommend what ought to be done 
with respect to legal, technical and political adjustments to ensure smooth 
implementation of the proposed land tenure structure. 
209 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.0 Introduction 
The conclusions are presented in section 7.1 while the recommendations are presented in 
section 7.2. The recommendations highlight issues that need to be addressed in order to 
ensure the smooth operation of the freehold and leasehold tenure systems. 
7.1 Conclusions 
The study has established that the relationship between human beings and land in the 
tribal communities of Uganda manifested itself in three distinct categories namely, 
feudalism; access to land through a network of social relations which recognized 
individual rights as well as community obligation by virtue of access to such rights, and it 
was prevalent in the non-feudal sedentary communities; and access based on territorial 
control in which access to land resources were governed by a complex network of 
reciprocal bonds within families, lineages and larger social units. The British colonial 
administration made no effort to administer the national land assets as a single unit, and 
this continued to be so throughout the entire period of its administration. Even after 
independence, several attempts to create uniform tenure system were not successful. 
In 1995, the government of Uganda adopted four tenure systems, namely, customary, 
freehold, mailo, and leasehold as the main tenure systems under which all land in Uganda 
should be held. This was however a temporary measure because the government accepted 
the four tenure systems after realising that, at the time, it was politically expedient not to 
antagonise the proponents of mailo and communal customary tenure systems who wanted 
to safeguard their existing systems. Nonetheless the government accepted in principal 
that freehold should become the uniform tenure for Uganda in the long term and this is 
why it proceeded to entrench freehold in the 1995 Constitution. Therefore, the study on 
harmonising the land tenure systems of Uganda is, to a large extent, intended to make a 
contribution towards the resolution of the stalemate between the government on the one 
hand, and the registered mailo owners and communal customary landowners on the other, 
over the selection of freehold as the uniform tenure for Uganda. 
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The study has also established that there are three possible formalisation options: The 
replacement of customary tenure option; the legal recognition of customary group land 
rights option; and the flexible tenure option. The study has further established that out of 
the existing five formal tenure systems, freehold is the most appropriate tenure system for 
Uganda at a statistically significant level of 95%. It was also established that freehold 
stands a 50-50 chance of being accepted by most districts of Uganda. This result was 
established after analysing the questionnaires, which were executed by Makerere Institute 
of Social Research on behalf of the Systematic Demarcation Committee. 
The study has further established that customary tenure is a virtual freehold since it is 
held in perpetuity. In fact, the concept of replacing customary tenure by freehold is not 
only well understood by the majority but it is also acceptable to Ugandans. Although the 
legal recognition of customary group land rights option would also entitle Ugandans to 
perpetual land ownership, the fact that it would encourage tribal sentiments based on 
feudal, family, communal and territorial customary tenure systems tends to negate the 
spirit of nationalism. At the same time, the Ugandan population is relatively 
homogeneous such that there is no distinct divide between the wealthy and the poor. This 
means that the flexible tenure option which was recommended for Namibia would not 
work in Uganda. Therefore, out of the three options, the customary tenure replacement 
option, represented by the tenure structure made up of freehold and leasehold tenures 
seems to be the best option for Uganda. 
Powelson (1988 as quoted by World Bank 2003:23) summed up the advantages of a good 
tenure system in the following words, "The benefits of a well-defined and secure property 
rights and the advantages of public provision of such rights have, over history, led 
virtually all economically and politically advanced societies to establish State managed 
systems for regulating land ownership and land transfers." Because the European settlers 
were fully aware of the benefits of secure property rights, they were quick to tum all the 
estates which they expropriated from the Native Americans into freehold. Even the white 
settlers in Namibia have opted for freehold. It would therefore appear that Uganda's 
choice of a tenure structure made up of freehold and leasehold is a better option since it 
would give the highest tenure security to the people. As the World Bank (2003:xix) has 
rightly observed, 
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For most of the poor in developing countries, land is the primary means of 
generating a livelihood and a main vehicle for investing, accumulating 
wealth and transferring it to generations. Land is also a key element of 
household wealth. For example in Uganda land constitutes 50 to 60 
percent of the asset endowment of the poorest households. Because land 
comprises a large share of the asset portfolio of the poor in developing 
countries, giving secure property rights to land they already possess can 
greatly increase the net wealth of poor people. 
Since 1894, when Uganda became a British protectorate, the economy of Uganda has 
always been contributed to by both the indigenous people and foreigners. The indigenous 
people have always occupied and earned a living out of the land while the foreigners 
dominated trade and agro-processing (Thompson, 2003 :52). Apart from a few large sugar 
estates and a handful of tea, coffee and tobacco plantations, productive activity in Uganda 
has remained indigenous, individual and small-scale. Therefore the design of a 
meaningful land tenure structure for Uganda must consider the coexistence of both the 
indigenous people and the foreigners. 
The first attempt to harmonise the coexistence of Ugandans and foreigners was made in 
1900 in the Buganda kingdom when customary land in Buganda was divided into two 
halves (West 1964:9-10). One half covering 9,000 square miles became mailo land, 
which was then allocated to the King, his royal family, chiefs and notables, while the 
other half covering 8,000 square miles was vested in the British Crown and was to be 
allocated in freehold and leasehold titles to foreigners. The Crown was however generally 
upset by the results of the harmonisation exercise because it thought that the colonial 
administration did not handle the exercise properly. The British Crown believed that the 
allocation of customary land to Buganda kingdom and to the Crown was leniently 
handled by Sir Harry Johnston, the special commissioner of the Queen in Buganda (West 
1971: 18). Thereafter the British Crown abandoned the participatory approach and used 
the force of law to tum customary land into Crown land in other parts of Uganda. 
As the land settlement issues continued to unfold, it became clear that the land settlement 
plan of Sir Harry Johnston, who was immediately recalled by the British Crown, could 
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probably have created the most harmonious coexistence in Uganda. A number of factors 
support this argument. Firstly, the plan to transform Uganda into a world-class economy 
through industrialised farming was only known and understood by the colonial 
administration. Secondly, the Baganda chiefs who negotiated with Sir Harry Johnston 
knew very well that customary land belonged to the 52 clans of Buganda kingdom. 
Although the Buganda kingdom needed the British protection, the Kabaka did not own 
the customary land and therefore he had to convince the clan leaders before he could give 
any land to the British Crown. This appears to be the main reason why the Baganda 
chiefs could not allocate the most valuable and productive land to the British Crown. And 
thirdly, the stiff resistance from the local population in other parts outside Buganda 
kingdom, which the colonial administration had to contend with thereafter, demonstrates 
that the British Crown acted before it thoroughly grasped both the magnitude and gravity 
of the land settlement question in Uganda. 
Nevertheless, Ugandans and foreigners have coexisted since 1900. And in the meantime 
other benefits of coexistence such as joint investment ventures and the development of a 
competitive world-class economy have come to be appreciated by the post-colonial 
regimes. This study therefore, intends to rekindle the harmonious coexistence, albeit in a 
slightly modified approach, by proposing a tenure structure composed of freehold and 
leasehold: freehold for Ugandans and leaseholds of up to a maximum of 99-years for both 
citizens and foreigners as stipulated in article 237(2)(c) of the Constitution and section 40 
of Land Act, 1998 (Cap 227)). 
The study proposes that freehold should be implemented through systematic adjudication 
and demarcation approach throughout the country. This approach is preferred because it 
provides comprehensive information on the spatial location of every plot, which is a pre-
requisite for land information systems (Dale and McLaughlin 1988: 8-9). For example 
the World Bank Report (2003:xxix) observed that in developing countries where formal 
and individual ownership title is the option of choice, 
If no previous records exist, or where these are seriously out of date, a 
strong case for systematic, first time registration can be made on grounds 
that a systematic approach, combined with wide publicity and legal 
assistance to ensure that everybody is informed, provides the best way to 
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ensure social control, and prevents land grabbing by powerful individuals, 
which would be not only inequitable, but also inefficient. 
According to Simpson (1976: 174), registration of title makes the creation and transfer of 
interest in land so simple, quick, cheap, and certain. The Uganda Investment Authority 
should then be in position to link up the landowners with investors who would like to 
invest in joint investment ventures with some capable citizens or projects of public 
interest. It is also possible for the Uganda Investment Authority to acquire leases of more 
than 99 years, which they can sub-lease to foreign investors. The government is also in a 
position to impose land related taxes, which can improve its national revenue tax base. 
However, in the event that land tax is recommended, it should be collected by district 
councils, which should account to the central government. When this is done, market 
forces will take over and help to determine the direction of the national economIC 
development. This will not only set Uganda on a firm foundation for economIC 
development, but, more importantly, it will restore dignity among the citizens of Uganda 
and also help to eradicate the vicious circle of poverty within the households. 
7.2 Recommendations 
7.2.1 The formal land tenure structure 
Although the government has taken bold steps to address the land policy issues through 
the 1995 Constituent Assembly and other forums, Uganda has not yet created a fully-
fledged deliberate land policy (Nsibambi 1989: 226-228). The study proposes that such a 
land policy can only be achieved by harmonising all the existing land tenure systems into 
a tenure structure composed of freehold and leasehold, as shown below in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: The proposed land tenure structure for Uganda 
PERIOD HARMONISATION OF TENURE SYSTEMS 
Existing tenure systems Tenure systems in need Proposed tenure 
of further research structure 
2003 - Future - Communal (clan) - Territorial - Freehold 
- Territorial (nomadic) - Leaseholds (ofless than 49 
- Individualised (family) years, 49-years and 99-ycars). 
- Informal relationships 
-Mailo 
- Freehold 
- Leasehold 
- Native freehold 
- Adjudicated freehold 
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Freehold should be reserved for the citizens of Uganda, whereas leasehold should be 
limited to land developers and especially foreign investors. The harmonisation process 
would involve the following changes in the existing land tenure structure: 
• The private land ownership under the mailo, native freehold and leasehold tenure 
systems needs to be democratised in order to resolve the long outstanding issue of de 
Jacto and de jure land rights. The democratisation should be implemented by means 
of sensitising and educating the public community and the elite groups. 
• Mailo, leasehold, native freehold, and adjudicated freehold should be progressively 
converted to freehold tenure. Section 28 of the Land Act 1998 (Cap. 227) needs to be 
revised to include the conversion of mailo, native freehold and adjudicated freehold 
into freehold. 
• Customary tenure should continue to be recognised under the Land Act 1998 
(Cap.227) as substantive tenure, pending formalisation, and the certificates of 
customary ownership should be prepared on demand from customary landholders. 
This is because certificates of customary tenure do not change the status of customary 
tenure; the status of customary tenure only changes when it is formalised into 
freehold. 
• The market forces should be allowed to resolve the informal relationships on mailo 
land. This is because the majority of the former tenants now own land. 
• The informal relationships on native freehold, leasehold, freehold and disadvantaged 
areas like Kibaale district (see section 5.5.3) should be treated differently by the 
government. The government should buyout all the registered leasehold and freehold 
owners as well as the mailo owners in Kibaale district to enable the customary 
occupiers to own the land they occupy. This is because the registered owners have 
been holding onto paper titles, which are guaranteed by government. This 
recommendation is in line with the principle of prescription under which long 
possession of land is recognised as proof of ownership (Simpson 1976: 155). 
Although this legal principle was abrogated in respect of registered title, it needs to be 
restored. 
• The government should continue recogmsmg territorial customary tenure as 
substantive tenure, which will be formalised at an appropriate time. Since territorial 
customary tenure is only individualised in high population centres around urban 
centres, the concept of individualisation of land is likely to encourage mobile 
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livestock keepers to become more sedentary. This will make it worthwhile for the 
government to offer them efficient technologies to harness the natural resources such 
as 'water harvesting' and would encourage the intensification of farming/livestock 
practices. 
• The government should set the date from which all new land titles should be issued in 
freehold and leases of 49 or 99 years according to procedures already set out in the 
Land Act 1998 (Cap. 227). This should preferably be done before the implementation 
of the Federation of East African States in the near future. 
7.2.2 Implementation of systematic demarcation and adjudication 
According to Dowson and Sheppard (1968, quoted by Simpson 1976: 189), the 
systematic adjudication, demarcation and compilation of land rights determines the 
rights, the interested parties and their registration. Moreover, it does so in a methodical 
manner and in orderly sequence, district by district, village by village, block by block, 
and parcel by parcel, throughout the territory concerned. Systematic adjudication and 
demarcation minimizes indemnity claims because it removes ambiguity in the ownership 
and description of parcels at first registration (Simpson 1976: 186). The study 
recommends that the government should introduce freehold in the districts through 
systematic adjudication and demarcation, starting with the individualised customary 
areas. It is most likely that this approach will spark off a multiplier effect, which will 
extend freehold to all districts of Uganda in the long term. 
Under the current democratisation, decentralisation and privatisation policies of the 
government, a systematic adjudication and demarcation approach will perform better than 
sporadic adjudication and demarcation. The systematic approach, area by area, will 
moreover have a positive impact on the poor and on women. It is necessary, though, to 
have strong land management institutions involved in adjudication and dispute resolution, 
and in adjudication regulations and training (Fourie 2000(b): 3). Systematic adjudication 
and demarcation is intended to be fully subsidised because it is a public good, although 
some nominal fee intended to offset part of the processing charges could be determined 
by government and paid by the landowners on receipt of duplicate certificates of title. 
Land registers of all systematically demarcated land parcels should be prepared and kept 
by government. 
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Systematic adjudication and demarcation addresses the wider land tenure issues than 
sporadic adjudication and demarcation in that it creates information products for planning 
and service delivery, enables revenue generation, assists with the settlement of land 
disputes, increases equitable tenure security, encourages the integration and coordinated 
supply of decentralized services at large scale on a routine basis, builds capacity to 
undertake land administration and environmental management at the local level, and 
builds sustainability, all of which contribute to agricultural development and poverty 
eradication (Fourie 2000(b): 4). 
The sub-county land committee, the district land board, the district survey office, the 
district land tribunal and the private surveyors will implement systematic adjudication 
and demarcation in a selected parish. The district land office and the sub-county land 
committee will be in charge of land adjudication and demarcation. Therefore, the district 
land office needs to be facilitated with logistical support, which will enable it to supervise 
the systematic adjudication and demarcation process in the parish from its inception to its 
completion. The private surveyors will survey the demarcated land parcels and pass on 
the data to the district survey office for checking and processing of deed plans. Any land 
disputes that are not resolved at the site, will be referred to the district land tribunal. The 
district land board will approve the declaration of ownership forms and pass them on to 
the district land office, which processes the land titles. The systematic adjudication 
information, which includes applications for systematic adjudication, records of the 
adjudication process, appeals against the adjudication process and the declaration of 
ownership by the district land board, should be recorded on standard forms. 
The decentralized institutional framework at the district level should be properly 
equipped with personnel, stationary, office equipment and some field survey equipment 
to check the work of private surveyors. The district land office should be made up of 
staffs that, at a minimum, consist of district surveyor, data processing specialist, land 
officer, registrar, physical planner and some supporting staff including secretaries and 
records clerks. And the district surveyor should be the head of department because the 
integrity of the land tenure structure rests on the quality of the data bank that will be 
created at the district. The land officer should deputise the district surveyor and also work 
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as the field coordinator. The districts should ensure that records clerks are regularly 
trained and upgraded in records handling techniques. The records and document handling 
courses are already being offered at certificate, diploma and degree levels at Makerere 
University and Uganda Management Institute, Nakawa. Similarly, the strong rooms, 
which are currently in disarray, need to be revamped. Although the government is eager 
to computerise the land records in order to create coherent and integrated land 
information systems, the hard copy records should not be destroyed but should be kept as 
a backup. 
The implementation of systematic adjudication and demarcation should be guided by 
rules and regulations to ensure that law and order is maintained and that the required 
standards are achieved. Sensitisation of the public and the household baseline survey to 
solicit the people's consent should be compulsory and should precede the systematic 
adjudication and demarcation process. 
Since the survey process is to be carried out by professional survey companies made up 
of registered land surveyors, no private survey firm should be permitted to practice as a 
land surveyor in the selected parish without providing surety to the value of 20 currency 
points as per the survey regulations (see Appendix B). This provision is designed to 
ensure that that surveyor at his own cost would rectify any errors discovered in the 
surveyor's work. The private surveyors' work needs to be closely regulated by the 
national survey and mapping department, so that the private surveyors become a corps of 
public servants working on commission. A currency point is the highest denominational 
value of Uganda currency, and it is currently equivalent to Uganda shillings 50,000/=. 
The Differential GPS equipment and the Total Station equipment used by the private 
surveyors needs to be recommended by the Commissioner for Surveys and Mapping and 
approved by the Surveyors Registration Board (see Appendix B). Where necessary, the 
government should enter into a contract with each selected private survey firm, which 
would ensure that the survey equipment can be made available on loan. This presupposes, 
though, that the government would purchase the equipment and pass it on to the selected 
private survey firm. Since the proceeds from the survey of the whole parish are much 
higher than the cost of the survey equipment, the government could enter into a contract 
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with the private survey firm, such that the cost of the equipment is deducted from the 
survey fees. This would ensure that good quality data, which is a pre-requisite for land 
information systems, is collected. 
The survey data collected by individual private surveyors should be checked by the 
respective survey firms before it is submitted to the district land office for further 
checking to ensure that it is consistent with any other previous survey work, which may 
have been done in the area or in neighbouring areas. The district surveyor should be in 
charge of the datasets kept at the district offices, and a backup dataset should be kept with 
the Commissioner of Surveys and Mapping at the national survey and mapping 
headquarters. The datasets kept at the national survey and mapping headquarters should 
be accessible to researchers, national land use planning, national census and statistics, 
and for establishing national priority program areas. The dataset at the district offices 
should be used for local land administration, such as management of public land, 
protection of wetlands, assistance in dispute resolution and the planning of small-scale 
infrastructural development. The individual landowners could check their rights and 
those of their neighbours, thereby improving governance. 
7.2.3 Revision of statutory tenure laws 
As pointed out in section 2.1.1, issues about land ownership and control are as much 
about the structure of social and cultural relations, as they are about access to material 
livelihoods. Njonjo (2003: 19) observed that land tenure in Africa always tends to revolve 
around the structure and dynamics of lineages and cultural communities rather than being 
based on strict juridical principles and precepts. This observation suggests that any 
meaningful land tenure structure has to capture two different relations. The cultural 
relations are captured under the law of succession, whereas the social and economic 
relations are captured under the strict juridical principles and precepts, which are based 
on social contract. Under the social contract theory as defined in the capitalist system, 
land is either vested in the state or the head of state (Department for International 
Development 2002). Every land tenure system must define the ultimate location of land, 
because it is the location of the ultimate title that gives meaning and credence to the 
doctrine of eminent domain. The following sections recommend some changes with 
regard to the location of ultimate title, the doctrine of eminent domain, the law of 
219 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
Ca
pe
 To
wn
succeSSIOn and survey regulations. Although all the laws for land registration and 
cadastre are due for revision, the four cases that are highlighted below illustrate only the 
worst-case scenarios. 
1) The location of the ultimate title 
The spirit of the 1995 Constitution is to transit from the autocracy and anarchy that have 
been the hallmark of the state-led democracy to the society-led democracy (Nsibambi 
1996). Simpson (1976: 8) observed that the state must assert special authority over land 
because this is its basic asset. The vesting of the land in the citizens of Uganda in 
accordance with the land tenure systems, as provided for under article 237 of the 1995 
Constitution, only refers to the ownership of rights or interests in land and not the land 
itself. After all, the purpose of article 237 was to resolve a long outstanding issue of de 
Jacto and de jure tenure rights, which had been inherited from the colonial administration 
(Marquardt 1996). 
While article 237 states that land belongs to the citizens of Uganda in accordance with 
the land tenure systems recognised in the Constitution, article 189 states that the 
government is responsible for the functions and services of land (see sixth schedule of the 
1995 Constitution). It would appear that the people are not comfortable with the location 
of the ultimate title in the head of state. 
According to Simpson (1976: 123-124), the land records can be maintained either by the 
state or the private enterprise. The land records that are maintained by the state can either 
benefit the state or the landholder. The colonial administration introduced the land record 
holding system that benefited the state in 1900 and vested the land in the head of state, a 
status quo that persisted up to-date. In 1975, the Uganda government, while maintaining 
the ultimate title vested in the head of state, nationalised the land under the Land Reform 
Decree of 1975. Mailo and freehold tenures were abolished and converted to leaseholds 
of 99 years for individuals and 199 years for corporate bodies; customary land was 
declared public land, and leasehold was adopted as the uniform tenure for Uganda. Mailo 
and freehold continued to operate underground until 1995, when they were reinstated. In 
1995, the government initiated the fundamental land reforms but no attempt was made to 
relocate the ultimate title. Whereas the restoration of mailo, freehold and customary 
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tenure systems was a step in the right direction, the government should have relocated the 
ultimate title as well. 
According to Njonjo (2002: 39), "The importance of the issue as to where ultimate or 
radical title should be located, is that this is what determines the derivation, security and 
the integrity of land rights. This is the reason why colonial expropriation of land started 
with the resolution of this issue." In other words by failing to relocate the ultimate title, 
the Uganda government 'missed the big picture,' if I may borrow the words of De Soto 
(2001: 216). 
Although the power of the people is entrenched in article 1 of the 1995 Uganda 
Constitution, which states, "All power belongs to the people who shall exercise their 
sovereignty in accordance with the Constitution," the ultimate title nonetheless should 
vest in the state and the land administration carried out by state machinery on behalf of 
the people. It is likely that this oversight or maybe it was deliberate, created much 
suspicion among the Constituent Assembly members, because they could not be sure that 
the head of state would not at one time misuse his powers to destabilise the land tenure 
structure. This study recommends that the government should adopt and unambiguously 
declare a people-led relationship under which the land should vest in the citizens and be 
operated by the state on behalf of the people. This will not only resolve the issue of the 
location of the ultimate title, but it will also harmonise articles 189 and 237 of the 
Constitution. 
2) The doctrine of eminent domain 
The doctrine of eminent domain subsumes vertical tenure relations between the people 
and the state. It is only applicable in those cases where private property is wanted for 
public use. The state is regarded not only as having powers of disposition of land in the 
whole national territory, but also as the representative owner of both the national territory 
and all other private property found within its limits. The compulsory acquisition of 
property is therefore founded on the superior claims of the whole community over an 
individual citizen (Rousseau 1994: 60). When the government takes property for public 
use, it must pay compensation to the owner of the land, which is the subject of 
acquisition. The right of eminent domain does not imply a right in the sovereign power to 
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take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even for full compensation, 
where public interest will in no way be promoted by such transfer (Bhalla 1993: 13). The 
doctrine of eminent domain, as encapsulated under article 26 of the 1995 Constitution 
reads as follows: 
1) Every person has a right to own property, either individually or in association 
with others. 
2) No person shall be compulsorily deprived of property or any interest in or right 
over property of any description, except where the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
a) the taking of possession or acquisition is necessary for public use or in the 
interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public 
health; and 
b) the compulsory taking of possession or acquisition of property is made 
under a law which makes provision for: 
1. prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation, prior to the taking 
of possession or acquisition of the property; and 
ii. a right of access to a court of law by any person who has interest or 
right over the property. 
According to article 237(1) of the 1995 Constitution, the government is restricted to 
acquiring land only for the public purposes stipulated under article 26(2)(a). This means 
that the government will find it difficult to acquire land compulsorily for investment, 
education or any other public purposes outside those listed in the Constitution. As was 
pointed out in section 5.5.2 above, article 26(2)(a) captured the same restricted doctrine 
of eminent domain that was provided for under the 1900 Uganda Agreement, which had 
resulted in the creation of the mailo tenure system. 
By way of comparison, the corresponding part of article 13 of the 1967 Constitution 
reads as follows: 
1) No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and 
no interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily 
acquired, except where the following conditions are satisfied, that is to say, 
a) The taking of possession or acquisition is necessary in the interest of 
defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town 
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and country planning or the development or utilization of any property in 
such manner as to promote the public benefit. 
Most of the Uganda elites have been heard to say publicly that article 237(1) of the 1995 
Constitution vested the ultimate title in the citizens of Uganda. According to the DFID 
(2002), however, the ultimate title can only vest in the state or in the head of state. This 
shows that there is some misconception, which together with the autocracy and anarchy 
that characterized the previous government regimes appear to be the main reasons why 
the Constituent Assembly delegates insisted on restricting the doctrine of eminent domain 
in article 26(2)(a) of the 1995 Constitution. 
The government of Uganda needs to demystify this misconception by explaining to the 
elites and the general public that land can only vest in the state or in the head of state. 
The government would not like the general public to believe that the basic principles, 
which underpinned the land tenure structure in the 1995 Constitution, were not based on 
careful analysis of issues. The entrenched fear embedded in the autocracy and anarchy 
exercised by the previous governments does not constitute sound reason on which to base 
any meaningful land tenure structure. This is because, when autocracy and anarchy are 
replaced by better methods of governance, the fear will disappear, but leave behind a 
poorly structured land tenure system. The punitive attitude of the members of the 
Constituent Assembly will only hurt developmental efforts rather than inducing good 
governance. At the same time, the government must take cognisance of the fact that there 
might be some members of Parliament who are still behaving like district-tribal 
ambassadors (Burke 1964: 229), instead of focussing on national issues. Because the 
main mission of government is to sensitise the elites in the districts in order to make them 
focus on national goals, it must strive to remove the anti-developmental restrictions, 
which are embedded in the current doctrine of eminent domain. This study recommends 
that article 26(2)(a) of the 1995 Constitution should be replaced by article 13(1 )(a) of the 
1967 Constitution. 
3) The Succession Act (Cap. 162) 
A law of succession is fundamental in the life of any society, and its formulation and 
efficient functioning is the concern of many aspects of life including marriage, 
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legitimacy, guardianship, and the proper administration of land. We shall restrict 
ourselves to those aspects of inheritance, which affect ownership of land and the 
registration of such rights. 
As already pointed out in Chapter Three, it was only in the Buganda kingdom where the 
normal procedure for the formalisation of customary land was followed; in the other 
kingdoms and districts, customary land was forcefully converted into crown land. This 
gave the Buganda kingdom a chance to retain its native law relating to succession of land 
in Buganda. At the time, the law of succession in Buganda was that the clan subject to 
confirmation by His Highness the Kabaka as Ssabataka, should choose the successor. 
The basic Uganda law on inheritance is contained in the Succession Ordinance of 1906 
(now the Succession Act (Cap. 162)), which is modelled on the English law, both as 
regards the making of wills and the rules for the division of property upon intestacy 
(West 1964: 79). But power was granted to the Governor under this Ordinance to exempt 
any race, sect, or tribe in Uganda from its operation, and thus, by an Order dated 22nd 
January 1906, the estates of all natives of the Uganda Protectorate were exempted. The 
Buganda kingdom took advantage of this exemption, and thus its native law of succession 
was enacted in the Buganda Land Succession Law of 1912. Section 3 of this Succession 
Law states: 
Certificates of succession can be given to the man who has had the land 
left to him by will, or, if there is no will, they shall be given according to 
the customs of succession in Buganda, or they shall be given to the 
guardian, or another person on behalf of the person who is entitled 
according to law to have possession of the land. 
It is evident that, at least in the case of intestacy, succession in the Buganda kingdom is 
handled according to the customary law of the Baganda. Because this succession law was 
already in use before mailo land came into existence in 1900, it falls short of the social 
and economic requirements of a formal property tenure system and therefore is due for 
revision. Williams, the Conveyancer and Registrar of Titles in the Uganda Protectorate, 
pointed out in a Memorandum on the Law and Practice of Succession to land in Buganda 
that the system was a complete failure (West 1971: 77). The full memorandum, which he 
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published in 1941, is attached in Appendix A. All the other districts outside Buganda 
have no choice but to use the Succession Act of 1906 (Cap. 162), which commenced on 
15th February 1906. Given the above facts, this study recommends that the succession law 
should be overhauled in order to take into account the situation of the Uganda society. 
4) The Survey Regulations, 1966 
The conference proceedings commonly referred to as 'The Survey Regulations of 1966', 
which were bound into a booklet of more than 100 pages, are a product of the 
Commonwealth Senior Surveyors' Conference. They contain a collection of illustrations 
and procedures for survey measurements; pictures of theodolites for different classes of 
survey accuracies; examples of calculations for reducing bearings of traverse 
observations; traverse calculations and distribution of misclosures using the Bowditch 
method; different methods of computing areas of different shapes; diagrams of different 
beacons and how they should be emplaced in the ground; diagrams showing how the 
trigonometric stations for different orders of triangulation should be constructed; and 
many other survey methods. These regulations are in fact good lecture notes for an 
undergraduate land survey course taught at a university or polytechnic. 
Although the content is good, these so-called 'survey regulations' are nonetheless too 
detailed, and they are being implemented illegally. They are not structured because they 
have never gone through the scrutinizing eye of a legal draughtsman and therefore have 
not had authority of Parliament since 1966. With the help of a legal draughtsman, these 
so-called survey regulations could be synthesized into a few pages and presented to 
Parliament for consideration and enactment into proper survey regulations. This study 
consequently recommends that the existing survey regulations should be condensed into a 
bill of regulations and forwarded to Parliament for enactment into law. Lessons can be 
learnt from the South African experience where similar survey regulations were enacted 
by Parliament under the Land Survey Act 8 of 1997 (see Appendix B). 
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APPENDIX A 
MEMORANDUM ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF SUCCESSION 
TO LAND IN BUGANDA, 1941 
1) Of all questions relating to land administration in Buganda, the most unsatisfactory is 
that of succession on death; indeed it would hardly be an exaggeration to speak of the 
present system as a complete failure. Many instances could be cited of estates 
remaining unadministered, or only partly administered, twenty years or more after 
death. Successors frequently agree to sell part or all of the land to which they believe 
themselves entitled before their right to do so has been established. And as succession 
depends ultimately on choice and not on right, litigation follows in many cases. 
2) The trouble is largely due to the retention of a primitive system which was adequate 
in the days when there was no formal individual ownership of land and personal 
possessions were completely limited, but which is quite unsuitable to a landowning 
community. 
3) The only existing law is contained in the Land law, 1908 (section 2(e) and (f) and 
section 4), The Land Succession Law of 1912 and The Wills Law of 1916. 
4) It would appear that by the joint effect of these, a mailo owner can dispose of his land 
by will, complying with requirements roughly similar to those prescribed by English 
law. But in practice it would appear that those laws, as such, are ignored and the 
former customs still prevail; that although a man may express wishes regarding the 
devolution of his property, his power over it ceases with his death, and the clan, if it 
thinks fit, may overrule those wishes. 
5) In case of intestacy, local custom prevails, and this, similarly, means that succession 
rests on choice. 
6) The procedure falls into three stages: first, the Clan chooses the successors. Secondly, 
that choice is approved or varied, normally by the Kabaka but in practice by the 
Lukiiko under the general control of the Katikiro. Finally there is the act of loyalty to 
the Kabaka. 
7) The essential flaw in the administrative practice is that at present administration of an 
estate or partial administration, is a privilege that may be exercised by a beneficiary, 
not a duty that may be performed. As the estate is not administered as a whole, and as 
succession depends on choice and not on law, nothing is final until the process is 
complete, a process which may be infinitely protracted. Furthermore, where there is 
any question of an estate proving insolvent or of a successor's creditors to attach his 
interest, inaction becomes the policy and not inertia. 
8) It is extremely desirable that both the law and the practice be most drastically 
reformed. 
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9) When a man makes a will, provided that it accords with the law, it should be enforced 
at law, although provision could be made giving the Court discretion, limited to a 
proportion of the estate, to relieve hardship of the wives or children of the deceased. 
10) It is also suggested that excessive fragmentation might be avoided by providing that, 
except within a certain radius of the more important towns, no holding of - say - ten 
acres or less may be divided and in the case of larger holdings, no subdivision may be 
smaller than ten acres. The views of the Agricultural Department might be taken on 
the area to be chosen as the minimum. If a man with a holding too small to be broken 
up wishes to divide his property, either one successor may take the land and 
compensate the others or it would have to be sold and the proceeds divided. 
11) Finally, with regard to practical details, the appointment of an administrator should be 
made compulsory within a period of - say - three months from the date of death. This 
appointment can, if it is desired to use the present framework of the Clan, be made by 
the Clan, and if no person is willing or able to act, a Clan official should be 
appointed. 
12) The administrator would be responsible for furnishing to the Lukiiko, similarly within 
a definite period, possibly twelve months: 
(i) a complete list of assets of the deceased, so far as he has been able to discover 
them; 
(ii) a similar list of dates owing and contracts unfulfilled by the deceased; and 
(iii)a statement showing the persons entitled, with the original will, if any. 
13) The Lukiiko would then apply to the Registrar of Titles for particulars of all relevant 
entries in the Register book. 
14) From the particulars so obtained, the Lukiiko would prepare a draft order of 
administration. This would be sent to the administrator and copies posted at all Sazas 
and Gombololas within which the deceased owned any land. If no person appealed to 
the Court within - say - sixty days, the order would be made absolute and the 
administrator would distribute the assets. 
15) When the deceased owned any land, a signed copy of the Order would be lodged with 
the Registrar of Titles for registration. The administrator would be responsible for the 
fees payable in this connection, which would be raised out of the estate. 
D.L.G. Williams 
Conveyancer and Registrar of Titles 
Date: 1941 
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APPENDIXB 
SURVEY REGULATION GUIDELINES 
The following regulations were extracted from the South African Land Survey 
Act 8 of 1997 to demonstrate that the Uganda Parliament could enact similar 
survey regulations regarding: 
1. a) the manner in which surveys shall be performed, and the manner and form in 
which the records of those surveys shall be prepared and lodged with the 
Commissioner; 
b) the degree of accuracy to be obtained and the limit of error to be allowed in 
surveys and resurveys of land and for surveys of reference and other permanent 
marks; 
c) the deed plans required in connection with the registration of any land in a land 
title registry, the manner of preparing those deed plans, the information to be 
recorded thereon, and the number of the deed plans to be supplied; 
d) the form and dimensions of beacons and reference marks, the manner of marking 
them for identification, and the manner of their construction, erection, protection, 
maintenance and repair; 
e) the procedure to be followed in obtaining agreement regarding beacons and 
boundaries and in arbitration proceedings under the Survey Act and the powers 
and duties of arbitrators appointed under the Survey Act; 
f) the manner and circumstances in which cadastral surveys of land shall be based 
upon or connected to trigonometric stations and reference marks; 
g) the manner of resurveying any block of land for the purpose of readjusting the 
boundaries and establishing the beacons thereof, and the manner of recovering the 
costs of those resurveys; 
h) the steps to be taken by a district surveyor to test the accuracy or correctness of 
surveys of which the results are recorded on deed plans which have been, or are 
intended to be, registered in a land title registry, and in the event of those surveys 
being inaccurate or incorrect, to cause correct deed plans to be framed and the 
relevant land titles to be amended; 
i) the steps to be taken by a private surveyor, a district surveyor and a registrar in 
order to rectify an incorrect deed plan; 
j) the testing of measuring instruments to be used in the survey of land; 
k) the unit of measure to be used in surveys or on cadastral plans; 
1) the conditions on which copies of plans and other documents may be issued by 
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the district surveyor for judicial, informational or other purposes; 
m) the manner in which any notice contemplated in these survey regulations shall be 
served or published; 
n) no private survey firm shall practice as a land surveyor in a systematically 
demarcated parish without providing surety to the value of 20 currency points; 
and 
0) any other matter relating to the surveying and mapping of land and the rendering 
of land information services, and for achieving the objects of these survey 
regulations. 
2) The Board may by regulation prescribe the circumstances in which the Commissioner 
or a District Surveyor may authorize a departure from a regulation made in terms of 
subsection (1) (a), (b), (c), (f) and (h) when compliance with any such regulation is 
found to be impossible or impracticable. 
3) The Board may amend or rescind any survey regulation made by it. 
4) If the need occurs to make, amend or rescind a regulation and it is not expedient to 
call a meeting of the Board, the Commissioner may: 
a) with the concurrence of not less than 80% of the members of the Board, 
make, amend or rescind the regulation. 
b) cause the regulation contemplated in paragraph (a): 
(i) to be submitted to the Surveyors' Registration Board at its next meeting for 
ratification, and if ratified shall be deemed to be a regulation of the Board; 
and 
(ii) the regulation ceases to exist if not so ratified, but everything purported to have 
been done in terms of that regulation shall be deemed to have been done as if 
the regulation had been ratified. 
5) No regulation or any amendment or rescission thereof shall come into operation until 
one month after it has been published in the Gazette. 
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APPENDIXC 
DATA EXTRACTION FORM SERIAL NOo _____ _ 
Land title particulars 
Register Volume: Folio: Block: _______ Plot __ _ 
Current title Owners: ______________________ _ 
Physical Address: _______________________ _ 
Size of plot: _______ _ 
Date of issue: 
---------
Category of land title (use codes below): _____ __ 
[1] Leasehold [] [2] Freehold [] [3] Mailo [ ] 
Land registration particulars 
Plot size of the initial title to land: 
-------
Number of subdivisions: 
-------
Number of transfers: 
-------
Number of mortgages: ______ _ 
Number of caveats: 
-------
Previous Landowners (use codes below) 
From To Date of registration 
[1] Man only [] [2] Woman only [] [3] Corporate body [ ] 
[4] Administrator [] [5] Common ownership [] [6] Joint ownership [ ] 
[7] Joint (conjugal) [ ] [8] Joint (man/man) [ ] [9] Joint (woman/woman) [ ] 
Duration of registration process 
Date of lodgment of the initial Deed Plans: 
--------
Date of issue of the first Land Title: 
-----------
Duration of survey process (Leasehold only) 
Land file number: 
-------
Term of Lease: 
-------
Date of initial application for the land: _______ _ 
Date of Lease Offer to applicant: ______ _ 
Date of request for survey: 
-------
Date of completion of Survey: ______ _ 
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APPENDIXD 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR TOP GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATORS AND 
POLICY MAKERS 
As a top government Administrator or Policy maker concerned with the day to day 
management or policy formulation, I request you to respond to the following issues that 
are pertinent to the current debate on whether Uganda needs uniform land tenure. 
Uniform Land Tenure 
1) The 1995 Constitution of Uganda recognizes Mailo, Freehold, Leasehold and 
Customary tenure systems. In your view, do you think the Uganda government has 
enough resources to sustain all the four land tenure systems running? 
2) Do you think a uniform land tenure system would be better for Uganda? 
3) The four different land tenure systems in Uganda are a legacy of the colonial indirect 
rule policy; they do not favour the creation of a national state. Why in your opinion, 
has Uganda taken so long to come up with a viable uniform tenure system? 
4) In your view, why did the Constituent Assembly (CA) hesitate to recommend 
freehold as the uniform land tenure for Uganda? 
Land registration process 
5) Mailo, native freehold and adjudicated freehold are registered under the block and 
plot system while freehold and leasehold are registered under volume and folio 
system. Do you think there is need for one registration system throughout the 
country? 
6) The certificates of customary ownership are issued at the sub-county by a recorder 
while mailo, leasehold and freehold titles are issued by the registrar of titles at the 
district, why is customary tenure treated so differently? 
7) Customary tenure can either be issued in form of certificates of customary ownership 
or it can be issued in form of freehold land titles. In your view, do you think the 
creation of a new register for registration of certificates of customary ownership at the 
sub-county is sustainable? 
8) Do you think the different land tenure systems are so entrenched that it would be a 
useless venture for government to introduce uniform land tenure? 
Land Survey process 
9) In your view, has the privatization of cadastral services improved the land delivery 
process? 
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10) Are the privatized cadastral services likely to be of any help under the systematic 
adjudication and demarcation approach? 
11) Are there any steps being taken to make the survey costs more affordable by the 
customary landholders? 
12) How would uniform land tenure improve the land survey methods? 
Thank you very much for responding 
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Government of Uganda 
241 
Date of interview 
____ ----'1 __ -'1 
Timing: Start !Finish 
--_____ --'1 __ --
APPENDIXF: 
Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment 
Systematic Demarcation Baseline Study 
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
Name of Enumerator 
Name of supervisor 
Comments: 
Strictly Confidential 
(For either the head of HH or the Spouse only) 
Introduction: 
We are a team from the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment. We are carrying out a study on 
various land issues that you experience in your home and the community at large to understand the land 
situation in this parish. 
SECTION 1: LOCATIONAL DATA 
DISTRICT 
COUNTY /MUNICIPALITY 
SUBCOUNTY III TOWN COUNCILIII DIVISION 
PARISH/II WARD 
VILLAGEIIIZONEIIICELL 
Location of Household 1. Urban Municipality I J 
2. Town Council I J 
3. Trading Centre I J 
4. Rural I J 
CO-ORDINATE UTM NOTHING EASTING 
Names ascribed or used to refer to the household 
SECTION 2: HOUSEHOLD OBSERVATION 
1) Nature of housing in the household 
(Multiple responses allowed, Tick applicable 
observation) 
1. Mud and wattle I ] 
2. Un plastered un-burnt bricks with mud I J 
3. Un plastered burnt bricks with cement I J 
4. Plastered walls I J 
5. Cemented floor I J 
6. Thatch I J 
7. Corrugated roof I J 
8. Tiles I J 
2) Other location household characteristics 
I. Located in Homestead 
2. Situated in Rural wetland 
3. Situated in Urban wetland 
4. Situated in Gazetted area 
[ J 
[ J 
I I 
I I 
1. Parish Settlement pattern Closely spaced (dense) 
2. Parish Settlement pattern Sparsely spaced (apart) 
3. Parish Settlement pattern Sparse but clustered 
I J 
[ J 
I I 
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SECTION 3: HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE 
How many people do you consider to be permanent members of this household? ________ Please tell me all the information of the people who are currently staying in 
this household We will start with your full names 
3) Names of Household 4) Sex 5) Age 6) Relation to HH Head 7) Marital status 8) Education level 9) What is your/her/his main 8. What is your /Her/ His other 
Members activity Gob)? key source of income? 
1. Female 1. Husband 1. Married Mono o None 1. Pension 1. Pension 
2. Male 2. Wife 2. Married Poly 1. Lower Primary (1-4) 2. Rearing birds/animals 2. Rearing birds/animals 
3. Daughter 3. Single 2. Upper Primary (5-7) 3. Crop production 3. Crop production 
4. Son 4. Separated 3. Lower Secondary (1-3) 4. Shop operation 4. Shop operation 
5. Cousin 5. Widowed 5. Upper secondary (4-6) 5. Produce Dealer 5. Produce Dealer 
6. Grand child 6. Cohabiting 6. Tertiary-Certificate 6. Market stall 6. Market stall 
7. Daughter in law 7. Tertiary-Diploma 7. Carpentry/Mason 7. Carpentry/Mason 
8. Niece/ Nephew 8. University 8. Salary- public service 8. Salary- public service 
9. Uncle/ Auntie 9. Other (specify)------------- 9. Salary- private EntlCo. 9. Salary- private EntlCo. 
10. Grandparent 10. Casual wage laborer 10. Casual wage laborer 
11. Other specify 11. Going to school/Student 11. Going to school/Student 
11. Other -specify 12. Other -specify 
1. Respondent 
2. Spouse: 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Developed and Desi!«r! by Makerere Institute of Social Research for Land Reform and Implementation Unit-MWLE- May 2003. 
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DYNAMICS 
243 
10) How many pieces of land do you own within the parish? I I Family Piece Piece 2 Piece 3 
II) Where is this piece located? 
1. Municipality I J 2. Town Council I J 
3. Trading Centre I J 4. Rural I J 
12) How big is this piece ofland? [Record as statedJ 
13) How did you acquire this piece ofland? 
I.Purchased 2. Inherited 3.Given as gift 4. Just settled 
5. Other 
14) From who did you buy/acquire this piece ofland? 
1. Parents 2. Other relatives 3. Registered owner 4. Another Tenant 
5. Other specify 
15) Do you have a document to show ownership of the land? 
I. Yes 2. No (go to Qn18) 
16) What type of document do you have? 
I.Land Title 2. Purchase agreement 3. Other specify 
17) In whose names is the document (go to lOY? 
I. Self 4. Spouse 7. Parents 
2. Self and Spouse 5. Self and Children 8. Relatives 
3. Self, Spouse, and Children 6. Spouse &Children 9. Registered owner 
10. Other specify 
18) Ifno document, would you like to get a document to show ownership of your 
land parcel? 1. Yes 2. No 
19) If you were to get documentary evidence, in whose name should it be? 
1. Self 4. Spouse 7. Parents 
2. Self and Spouse 5. Self and Children 8. Relatives 
3. Self, Spouse, and Children 6. Spouse &Children 9. Other specify __ 
20) What is the tenure status of this piece ofland? 
1. Kibanja on Mailo 4. Leasehold title 7. Customary land 
2. Kibanja on Leasehold 5. Mailo title 8. Don't Know 
3. Kibanja on Freehold title 6. Freehold 
21) Who makes the major decisions about what to grow on this piece? 
1. Self 4. Spouse 7. Parents 
2. Self and Spouse 5. Self and Children 8. Relatives 
3. Self, Spouse, and Children 6. Spouse &Children 9. Other specify __ 
22) Who would make the final decision if the piece ofland is to be sold? 
I. Self 4. Spouse 7. Parents 
2. Self and Spouse 5. Self and Children 8. Relatives 
3. Self, Spouse, and Children 6. Spouse &Children 9. Other specify __ 
23) How long has this household lived in this parish? ______ _ 
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SECTION 5: HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPUTION LEVELS 
This part is about the crops you grow on the land in this parish. We want to know if the program will help the 
household to grow more after perhaps settling the land situation. So I have a number of questions related to the 
agricultural activities in your household. 
Family Piece Piece 2 Piece 3 
24) Please give 5 main crops household grows on this land. 
25) How much/many sacks did HIH harvest last season (main crop only)? 
26) How much of this did H/H seIl off (main crop only)? 
27) How much was given away (main crop only)? 
28) How much of this is stored until next harvest (main crop only)? 
CONSUMPTION LEVELS 
29) Does HIH sometimes buy food? 30) What three major types offood 31) About how much have you spent 
1. Yes do you normally buy? on this type of food the last 3 months? 
2. No ~go to 28 {Get the cost for each/ 
Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 
32. Why does HIH buy food? _________________________ _ 
SECTION 6: OCCUPANCY ON REGISTERED LAND [FOR TENANTS ON TITLED LAND ONLY] 
Family Piece Piece 2 Piece 3 
33) Do you know the owner of this land? l. Yes 2. No. 
34) Have you ever had any misunderstanding with the Registered owner? 
l. Yes 2.No. 
35) What was the misunderstanding about? 
I. None payment of ground rent 2 Fraudulent sale 
3. Boundary 4. Other specify 
36) Have you ever had any misunderstanding with your neighbors on this piece of 
land? l. Yes 2. No. 
37) What was the misunderstanding with your neighbor about? 
I. Boundary 2. Trespass 3. Other specifY. 
38) Do you pay any ground rent (Busuulu) to the Registered owner? l. Yes 
1. Yes 2. No. go to Qn40 
39) How much do you pay? 
40) (fno in Qn38, why not? 
41) Would you be willing to buy yourself (okwegula) and get your own title? 
1. Yes 2. No go to Qn46 
42) How much are you willing to pay for the piece you hold? 
43) Have you discussed this option with the Registered owner? 
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1. Yes 2. No go to Qn45 
Family Piece Piece 2 Piece 3 
44) What was the response from the Registered owner? 
45) Ifno in Qn43, Why not? 
46) Ifno in Qn41, Why not? 
SECTION 7: FOR REGISTERED OWNERS ONLY 
47) Do you have tenants on this piece of land? 
1. Yes 2. No 
48) How many tenants do you have on this plot? 
49) How many of these tenants do you recognize or have agreements with? 
50) How many tenants pay ground rent to you? 
51 ) How much does each tenant pay? 
52) Are you willing to sell the land to them if they proposed to buy it from you? 
1. Yes 2. No 
53) IAsk for Reasons either answer in Qn52) 
54) I-lave you discussed with any of the tenants about the possibility of them 
buying their interest in the land? 1. Yes 2. No (go to Qn56) 
55) What was the response? 
56) Ifnot in Qn45, why not? 
SECTION 8: LAND DISPUTES 
57) Have you had any land dispute on this piece of land in the last year [2002]? 
1. Yes 2. No 
58) If Yes, in Qn57, How many times have you experienced land conflicts on this 
~iece of land since January of 2002? 
59) What were these conflicts about? (Multiple responses allowed) 
1. Inheritance 6. Trespass 10. Evictions 
2. Exceeding boundaries 7. Encroachment I\. Resettlement 
3. Compensation 8. User rights 12 Other (specify) 
4. Land sales 9. IlIe&al Ssettlement 
60) With whom was the conflict? (Multiple responses are allowed) 
1. Family member 4 Other Relatives 7. Government officials 
2. Neighbours 5. Land lord 8. Other (specify) 
3. Squatters/ Migrants 6. Tenant 
61) Where did you first go for settlement of the disputes? 
I. Clan! Elders 2. Neighbours 3. LC 
4. Magistrates Court 5. Police 6. Other specify 
62) Why did you choose this level/office? (Probe/or the most important reason) 
I. More responsive 3. Easily accessible 5. Was referred/advised 
2. More knowledgeable 4. Protocol dictates 6. Other specify 
63) Who finally resolved the disputes? 
I. Clan! Elders 2. Neighbours 3. LC 4. Magistrates Court 
5. Police 6. Still pending 7. Other specify 
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SECTION 9: VIEWS ON SYSTEMATIC DEMARCATION 
64) Have you heard of the systematic demarcation program? 1. Yes I ] 2. No I ] go to 43 
65) From who? 
1. Village meeting I 2. Radio I J 3. Local Official I J 
4. Church/School I 5. Specify any other source ________ _ 
66) Have you ever attended any meetings about the Program? 1. Yes I I 2. No I ]got032 
67) Where was the meeting? 1. Village gathering 
3. Trading CTR 
I I 
I J 
2. Mosque/Church I ] 
4. School 
5. Any other __________ _ 
68) What do you understand is to be done in Systematic Demarcation? 
69) What is your opinion about Systematic Demarcation? 
70) Do you think, you as person, will gain out of it? 1. Yes I] 2. No I I go to 36 
71) Why do you think like that? (Probe for 2 most important reasons for either response above) 
72) What do you think other people in household will gain out of it? (Probe for 2 most important gains) 
73) What will the community gain out of it? (Probe for at least 2 gains) 
74) What will be your responsibility as an individual in the program? 
75) Is there any other member of this household who will have any responsibility in the program? 
1. Yes ( ] 2. No ( J 
76) What will they do? 
77.a) Do you think there are likely to be obstacles out ofthe Program? 1. Yes I I 2. No I] 
78.b) {Solicit reasons for either response] 
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SECTION 10: LAND MARKETS 
80) In the last 6 months, did you hear of anyone buying land in this area? 1. Yes I I 2. No. I I go to Qn82 
81) How many people did you hear of? 
82) How many people do you know have come in to settlellive in the village in the last 6 months? 
SECTION 11: LAND FOR COMMON USE 
83) Is there land for common use by all in the village? 1. Yes 2. No--- go to Qn87 
84) What is it used for? 
85) Who controls the use of this common land? 
86) Are there any conditions for using this common land? 
SECTON 12: WETLANDS 
87) What do you use wetlands for in this parish 
88) Who controls the use of wetlands in this parish? 
89) Are there any problems in the use of these wetlands? 1. Yes [ ] 2. No. [ ] go to 54 
90) What problems are these? 
SECTION 13: ACCESS TO CREDIT 
91) Have you ever tried to borrow money? I. yes 2.N~oto 
92) From where/Whom? 1. Friend/relative I I 
2. Entandikwa I I 
3. MFI Village bank I I 
4. Any other 
93) Were you required giving any security before you get the money? 1. Yes I I 2. No I J go to 
94) What kind of security was required? 1. Land 
2. Other household property 
3. Other specify 
95) Were you successful? 1. Yes I I 2. No I J 
96) Ifno, why weren't you successful? 1. Did not have a title/ document to prove ownership 
2. Other specify 
SECTION 14: FOR MARRIED FEMALE SPOUSES ONLY 
97) Do you have land you call your own and can individually make decisions on?1. Yes I ) 2. No [ ] go to 
98) If yes, where is this land located? 1. Within the parish I J 
2. Outside the parish with the sub county I J 
3. Outside the parish within the district I I 
4. Outside the district I I 
99) How did you acquire this land? 
I. Bought it I J 2. Inherited it I J 
3. Given as gift I J 4. Other specify 
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100) If you were to get documentary evidence for the ownership of that personal land, in whose names would it be? 
I. Mine alone I I Mine and my husband I J 
2. My children I J 4. Other specify ______________ _ 
SECTION 15: KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE LAND ACT 1998 
10 I ) Have you heard of the 1998 Land Law? I. Yes J J 2. No I J go to QnlO4 
102) From where or through whom? 
I. Village I J 2. Radio I J 3. Local officials I J 
4. Newspapers I J 5. Other specify 
103) Please tell me three (3) things you know about this law. 
I. 
2. 
3. 
SECTION 16: HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
104) About how much money did you earn from your main economic activity last one month? 
105) About how much money did you earn from your second main economic activity last one month? 
106) About how much total income do you earn per month? 
107) Does your spouse earn any money from his/her activities? I. Yes I J 2. No II 3. Don't Know I J if2 or 3 go to Qnl09 
108 About how much does shelhe earn per week? 
109 What are the 3 most valuable assets 1. 2. 3. 
for you in this household? 
J J 0) What new household items did you I. 2. 3. 
buy last month (limit to 3) 
Ill) How would YOU rank your household in terms of economic status? I. Very Poor I J 
[You can engage in a short dialogue for the respondents to be able to 2. Poor I I 
classifY themselves} 
3. Average I J 
4. Rich I J 
5. Very Rich I J 
SECTION 17: AWARENESS OF COMMUNITY EVENTS 
112) Please tell me 3 major events that have happened to you-in your life in the last 6 months .... ? 
113) What one major event has happened in your household in the same period? 
114) What one major thing that has happened in your village in the last 3 months? 
115) Do you have any questions you would like to ask me? 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH! 
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